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Rural labor markets in India are characterized by high inequality in landownership,
concentration of political power and caste fragmentation. Consequently, small and
marginal farmers are vulnerable to land grabs by local landlords and large urban in-
dustrial corporations. Further, agricultural workers lack bargaining power in wage ne-
gotiations with monopsonistic employers. This dissertation analyzes the role of these
power asymmetries in landownership, wage determination and the implementation of
government programs aimed at poverty alleviation and structural transformation. My
research suggests that development policy must focus on addressing the bottlenecks
to structural transformation as a means to improving the standard of living for over
140 million small farmers and landless workers in the Indian countryside.
vii
The first chapter “Land Acquisition and Rural Labor Markets: Evidence
from Special Economic Zones in India” examines whether Special Economic
Zones (SEZs) effectively induce structural changes in India’s rural economy by shift-
ing workers from agricultural to non-agricultural employment? This chapter analyzes
the labor market impacts of land acquisition for SEZs in a difference-in-differences
and event time framework. We find that land acquisition leads to a significant reduc-
tion in time spent in self-farming. Paradoxically, this leads to a significant increase in
workers’ reliance on the traditional agricultural sector for subsistence as time spent in
non-agricultural employment does not increase significantly. These effects are present
both, in the short and medium-run. The main mechanism explaining the results is
increased uncertainty about landownership after land acquisition leading to a reduc-
tion in area under cultivation. This reduces labor demand in agriculture, suppress-
ing agricultural wages and worsening income inequality. Our analysis suggests that
there are important distributional effects of the SEZ policy. While land acquisition
for SEZs converts small and marginal farmers into landless agricultural workers, it
provides large farmers with an opportunity to diversify towards higher productivity
non-agricultural production.
The second chapter of this dissertation “Does Historical Land Inequality At-
tenuate the Positive Impact of India’s Employment Guarantee Program?”
analyzes the labor market impact of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
(NREGA). By providing 100 days of guaranteed employment to every rural household,
NREGA can challenge the hegemony of landed elites as major employers in the Indian
countryside. Using the colonial classification of landlord and non-landlord based land-
revenue institutions in India, this chapter provides a political economy explanation
for regional variation in the labor market impact of NREGA. The extractive landlord-
based system led to high inequality in landownership and political domination by a
large landlord class. Comparing the labor market impacts of NREGA between the
viii
landlord and non-landlord districts in a difference-in-differences and triple-difference
framework, we find that the provision of public employment under NREGA and corre-
spondingly, its impact on rural wages is muted in landlord districts. In these districts,
public employment under NREGA substitutes for self-farming but has no impact on
private wage employment. However, the program is highly successful in raising wages
by generating more public employment in non-landlord districts. In these districts,
the provision of public employment under NREGA crowds-out labor primarily from
unpaid domestic work, reflecting an increase in women’s participation in the program.
These findings suggest that NREGA has not become a credible alternative to private
employment in regions historically characterized by exclusionary economic and polit-
ical institutions since large land-owning elites in these regions have managed to keep
wages depressed by virtue of their position as major employers in the countryside.
The third chapter “No Employment without Participation: An Evaluation
of India’s Employment Program in Eastern Uttar Pradesh” documents the
bottlenecks in the functioning of NREGA in one of the poorest districts in India. Ex-
isting research shows that at the national level, NREGA has been highly successful
in providing an income safety-net to small peasants and landless workers. However,
in the poorer states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Jharkhand the provision of public
employment under NREGA has been inadequate. Using evidence from field research
in the Mirzapur district of Uttar Pradesh, this chapter aims to study how awareness
among program beneficiaries about their legal entitlements and at various levels of
government determines the provision of NREGA employment in one of the poorest
regions of the country. Further, we discuss the impact of NREGA on agricultural
productivity and wage bargaining by landless workers who are the intended bene-
ficiaries of NREGA. Our findings suggest that patron-client exchanges between the
local elite and NREGA beneficiaries determines the provision of public employment
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CHAPTER 1
LAND ACQUISITION AND RURAL LABOR MARKETS:
EVIDENCE FROM SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN
INDIA
1.1 Introduction
Economic development has traditionally focused on tackling two related manifes-
tations of underdevelopment - ‘rural underemployment’ and ‘late industrialization’
(Hirschman, 1981).1 In order to tackle these challenges, policy recommendations
have stressed on the need to divert labor away from agriculture and have advocated
for the role of the state in directing industrial policy (Sen (1983); Agarwala and Singh
(1958)).2 Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in developing countries like China, India,
Malaysia and Vietnam are examples of policies designed to tackle these structural
challenges to economic development. SEZs are created to increase exports, gener-
ate gainful employment and contribute to economic growth (Aggarwal, 2007). These
SEZs are an example of ‘induced industrialization’, which can increase complemen-
tarities of investment by creating backward linkages with the rural economy thereby
lead to greater productivity and employment creation in the non-agricultural sector
1Rural underemployment or disguised unemployment refers to the concentration of surplus population in the
agricultural sector of developing countries (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1956). Lewis (1954) argued that the ‘traditional’
agricultural sector in developing countries like India is characterized by ‘unlimited supplies of labor’ which implies
that the population share engaged in agriculture is very large relative to capital and natural resources. Consequently,
the marginal product of labor is negligible or zero. Similar to underemployment, late industrialization is also a major
challenge to economic development. The problem of late industrialization refers to the lack of well functioning financial
markets, adequate entrepreneurship and other challenges to industrialization in developing countries (Hirschman
(1981); Gerschenkron (1962)).
2For instance, McMillan and Rodrik (2011) discuss how labor flows from low productivity traditional agricultural
sectors to high productivity manufacturing sectors have contributed to rising incomes and higher economic develop-
ment in Asia. The relative inability of countries in Latin America and Africa to achieve this structural transformation
has contributed to the reduction in income growth rates since the 1990s.
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(Hirschman, 1981). However, if the rate of absorption of labor in the non-agricultural
sector is low, they will perpetuate dependence of landless workers on agriculture
and other forms of informal employment (Todaro (1969); Anant et al. (2006)). This
would exacerbate inequality between the landowning elite and landless workers. In
this context, this chapter examines whether SEZs in India were successful in address-
ing the problem of rural underemployment or does the diversion of agricultural land
for setting up of SEZs increase rural distress by converting farmers into landless wage
workers relying on low productivity agriculture for subsistence.
Policies like SEZs which transfer ownership of the means of production from some
social groups to others have been common throughout history.3 For instance, the
eighteenth century Enclosure Movement in England led to the forceful eviction of
small farmers while the twentieth century land reforms in East Asia led to a transfer
of land away from large farmers. In both cases, changing ownership of agricultural
land induced structural changes in the economy which impacted agricultural pro-
ductivity and capital accumulation.4 In the Indian experience, the process of land
acquisition for setting up SEZs was often involuntary and farmers losing their land
were not offered adequate or fair compensation for their land (Jenkins, Kennedy, and
Mukhopadhyay, 2014).
3The process of capitalist economic development is historically characterized by the forcible separation of labor
from the means of production, a process described by Marx (1867) as the primary (or original) accumulation of capital.
This process involves involuntary land acquisition using extra-economic methods, ranging from coercion by powerful
groups to the use of legislation enacted by the state to transfer ownership of productive resources like agricultural
land from the peasants to large corporations.
4The evidence on the impact of enclosures on agricultural productivity is mixed. Turner (1986) finds considerable
improvements in agricultural productivity on enclosed lands while Allen (1999) argues that the enclosures did not
cause significant productivity gains in English agriculture which was already witnessing productivity improvements
since the seventeenth century. Correspondingly, Thompson (2016) conceptualizes enclosures as forceful eviction of
peasants to create a class of rural and urban labor force. On the other hand, evidence on the impact of land reforms on
agricultural productivity, wherein ownership was transferred from large landlords to small farmers, is unambiguously
positive. Putzel (2000) shows that land reforms in South Korea contributed to rapid economic growth in the post-
World War II period. Land reform in East Asia accelerated economic growth while its absence retarded productivity
gains in Latin America (Kay, 2002).
2
India has a long history of pursuing policies and programs that acquire private land
for public purposes like dams and infrastructure projects. However, Levien (2015a)
argues that contrary to land acquisition for public projects, SEZs involve transfer-
ring land from farmers to large capital for the development of private industry. This
represents an important departure from previous forms of land acquisition which
corresponds to changes in the nature of the state and polity since the economic lib-
eralization of the 1990s. Bardhan (1984) identifies capitalists, rich farmers and the
bureaucracy as dominant classes in the pre-liberalization power structure of India.
These classes competed and aligned with each other for political space and rent ap-
propriation. This characterization situated the interests of farmers at the forefront
of political discourse in the country. Correspondingly, Bardhan (2015) shows that
during the period 1967 - 2004, 85 percent of the decline in average landholding size
in the state of West Bengal is explained by demographic factors and attempts by
the state to acquire agricultural land have been few.5 This coalition between the
dominant classes weakened after economic liberalization leading to the emergence of
a larger and much more powerful capitalist class enjoying greater political power in
comparison to the landed elite (Chatterjee, 2011). Not only does this class benefit
immensely from proximity to the political elite but they also enjoy considerable ide-
ological support from the urban middle-classes.6 Since farmers are no longer part of
the ruling coalition in the neoliberal regime, policies that are inimical to their inter-
ests (like land acquisition for SEZs) can now be pursued vigorously by the various
state governments in India (Basu, 2007).
5Adivasis or tribal population living in forest regions of central and eastern India have been predominant victims
of land acquisition attempts by the state. However, farmers in other parts of the country were relatively insulated
before the 1990s (Bardhan, 2015).
6The emergence of the influential capitalist class changed policy making in India as the political elite facilitated
capital accumulation at the expense of farmers. In order to assuage political tensions owing to policies favoring the
capitalist class, governments enact income transfers and welfare schemes like rural employment guarantee programs
(Sanyal, 2014).
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In this context, the SEZ Act, passed in 2005 envisioned the establishment of com-
prehensive industrial townships with social facilities like housing blocks, schools and
hospitals (Hyun, Ravi, et al., 2018). The SEZ policy had five stated objectives includ-
ing: (a) generation of additional economic activity, (b) promotion of exports of goods
and services, (c) promotion of investment from domestic and foreign sources, (d) cre-
ation of employment opportunities, and (e) development of infrastructure facilities
(Sharma, 2009). To pursue these objectives, the SEZ Act allowed large corporations
and state governments to acquire agricultural land for setting up SEZs. It was argued
that if SEZs raise rural wages by creating non-agricultural employment, they would
create positive spillovers for the local economy which would compensate farmers for
the loss of their land. Further, non-agricultural employment created by SEZs could
cause a reduction in labor engaged in agriculture, which would improve the living
conditions and incomes of workers in this sector.7 Therefore, by increasing the de-
mand for non-agricultural labor, SEZs would bring structural transformation in the
Indian economy which would increase the standard of living for workers in both agri-
cultural and non-agricultural sectors ((Nurkse, 1953); (Datta, 1960)). For instance,
Alvarez-Cuadrado and Poschke (2011) show that improvements in industrial technol-
ogy attracted labor to non-agricultural employment in the US since 1800, which had
a positive impact on real wages in the economy.8
In light of these potential benefits, it seemed paradoxical that farmers posed stiff
resistance against land acquisition attempts by the state for setting up SEZs. For
instance, farmer agitations against land acquisition in West Bengal contributed to
ending over three decades of left-front rule in the state (Chatterjee, 2009). This led
7According to the National Sample Survey Office (2013), around 64 percent of rural labor force was employed
in the traditional agricultural sector in 2011 - 2012. The proportion of male labor force working in agriculture was
59 percent while 75 percent of the female labor force was working in the agricultural sector. However, agriculture’s
contribution to India’s GDP was only 25 percent (Arjun, 2013).
8Syrquin (1988) describes structural change as a movement of labor from the traditional agricultural sector to the
modern manufacturing sector.
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to the cancellation of land acquisition attempts by successive governments in the state
and elsewhere.9 Movements opposing land acquisition in India have been ubiquitous
and, on several incidents, successful in stymieing the progress of SEZs across India
(Jones, 2009). One possible explanation for farmer agitations against SEZs could
be that farmers did not expect to benefit from the creation of SEZs but anticipated
that they would be dispossessed of their agricultural land and be converted into wage
workers in agriculture which would depress their incomes. Existing research shows
that land acquisition adversely affected small and marginal farmers who were often
undercompensated for their land which resulted in substantial economic hardship for
large sections of the rural population (Ghatak, Mitra, et al., 2013).
Policies like SEZs derive political and economic legitimacy by conceptualizing the
involuntary acquisition of agricultural land as productivity enhancing redistribution
of the means of production to the most efficient economic agents in order to facilitate
economic growth in developing countries. However, the expectation that land acqui-
sition for private accumulation will result in a structural transformation is predicated
on the assumptions of well functioning labor markets and flexible wages. Further, such
an analysis does not account for asymmetries of power (Basu, 1986), imperfect factor
markets (Bardhan, 1980) and imperfect labor substitution between the traditional
agricultural sector and the modern SEZ (industrial) sector (Weisskopf, 1972). These
political economy factors play a significant role in determining the distributional im-
pact of SEZs. Baran (1958) argued that the appropriation of economic rents created
by land acquisition is determined by the distribution of political power between large
capital, the rural elite and the state. Political institutions often determine choice of
9Given the political sensitivity of these issues, there has been significant political reluctance to amend the 1894
Land Acquisition Act to provide farmers with adequate and fair compensation for their land. For instance, two
attempts by the government to change land acquisition rules failed between 2009 and 2011 (Das, 2011). In the third
attempt in 2012, the government proposed to provide farmers with four times the value of their land as compensation
for acquisition. See Sathe (2011) for an overview of policies related to land acquisition in India.
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economic policies and the distribution of economic ‘rents’ ensuing from them (Ace-
moglu and Robinson (2006); Acemoglu and Robinson (2008)). SEZs may increase
capitalist accumulation and generate rents for rural landowners while suppressing
labor demand and wages in the agricultural sector. This may result in uneven eco-
nomic development which exacerbate social and economic inequalities. For instance,
Weisskopf (1972) argues that foreign investment in developing countries often relies
on capital-intensive technologies which create problems of underemployment for the
unskilled rural labor force. This benefits the skilled or educated labor at the expense
of farmers and agricultural workers who would be dispossessed.
In this context, using nationally representative sample survey data on employment
and a new data set on land acquisition, this chapter provides the first empirical esti-
mates of the impact of land acquisition for SEZs on rural labor markets. Specifically,
using archival research we determine the date of land acquisition for SEZs using three
sources of data. First, we use records maintained by the minutes of SEZ Board of
Approvals (BoA) to infer the timing of land acquisition. Second, we use answers to
parliamentary questions on land acquisition and SEZ development raised in the Rajya
Sabha (Upper House) of the Indian Parliament.10 Finally, we triangulate data on the
date of land acquisition using archival research of newspaper articles which reported
extensively on farmer agitations across the country. These three sources of data allow
us to determine the timing of land acquisition for each SEZ used in the study.11
To measure the causal impact of land acquisition on rural labor markets we exploit
the temporal and geographic variation in the timing of land acquisition for each SEZ.
10Owing to large scale farmer unrest and agitations created by SEZs, opposition leaders asked the government to
provide details of land acquisition status of various SEZs and compensation paid to farmers. We use the detailed
replies given by the government to verify the dates of land acquisition for several SEZs.
11Since our data allows us to trace the status of an SEZ project since its inception, we are able to identify projects
where land was acquired for SEZs but was subsequently returned to farmers owing to judicial intervention or farmer
agitations. We remove these SEZs from our study.
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Geographic variation arises because SEZs were notified in only certain districts and
temporal variation stems from the phased rollout of the SEZ policy: each SEZ in a
district was notified in a different month and year. We use these sources of variation
in a difference-in-differences framework. A district is considered as ‘treated’ from the
year it receives the first notified SEZ. Additional SEZs in the same districts do not add
treatment districts to our study. To ensure that the timing of SEZs is not correlated
with pre-existing characteristics in the local labor market, we confine our sample to
SEZs in the western and southern states of Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh
(including present day Telangana), Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu. These states
account for over 72 percent of all notified SEZs in the country. We find no evidence
of a pre-existing trend in any of our estimates. We supplement the difference-in-
differences design with an event time framework, which allows us to disaggregate
short and medium-run impacts of land acquisition for SEZs. Importantly, the event
time framework also acts as a robustness check to our results because it makes fewer
assumptions than a traditional difference-in-differences design.
This chapter finds that land acquisition for SEZs has strong direct and indirect effects
on rural labor markets. Specifically, there are two main direct effects. First, as
agricultural land is diverted for setting up SEZs, the proportion of labor time in casual
non-agricultural employment increases by 0.5 percentage points. This translates to
around two work days in a year. This result shows that propensity of SEZs to create
non-agricultural employment is marginal. Second, we find that proportion of labor
time spent in self-farming witnesses a sharp decline of 3 percentage points which
translates to around 11 days per year. This decline in self-farming is caused by
a significant increase in the proportion of small and marginal farmers after land
acquisition as shown in Figure 1.4.
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Further, by dispossessing farmers of their agricultural land, SEZs indirectly impact
agricultural labor supply and income in two ways. First, contrary to expectations of
a structural transformation, the proportion of labor time spent in casual agricultural
labor increases by 2 percentage points which translates to an increase of 7 days per
year. Therefore, we find that dispossession of agricultural land for setting up SEZs
increases the proportion of small and marginal farmers who depend on agricultural
employment for subsistence. This implies that employment generated by the SEZ
sector is not robust to absorb labor supply in non-agricultural employment. This
sluggish pace of employment generation by the SEZ sector is similar to the formal
manufacturing sector in India. For instance, Sanyal (2014) discusses the low rate of
absorption by the capitalist sector.12
Second, we find that real incomes in the agricultural sector remain unchanged. The
increase in labor supply in the traditional agricultural sector has adverse consequences
on earnings which are determined by the average product of labor (Lewis, 1954).
Further, land acquisition also reduces the proportion of land held by large and medium
farmers who are net employers of agricultural labor as shown in Figure 1.4. These
factors exert a downward pressure on the earnings of workers in the agricultural
sector. Consequently, we see that even when district level real agricultural wage rates
are rising over time (Figure 1.5), the daily earnings of agricultural workers remain
constant in SEZ districts. Therefore, we find that SEZs have both direct and indirect
effects on rural labor markets which contribute to lowering of earnings for agricultural
labor.13
12See Chaurey (2015) and Besley and Burgess (2004) for factors impacting labor demand in India’s manufacturing
sector.
13This chapter also examines changes in agricultural productivity and land use to determine that the increase in
labor time allocated to agricultural labor is not in response to an increase in agricultural productivity which would
increase labor demand. As agricultural productivity remains unaffected, we conclude that the increase in labor time
spent in the agricultural sector is caused by an increase in labor supply reliant on agriculture for subsistence.
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This chapter contributes to the following strands of literature. First, by discussing
the labor market impact of land acquisition for SEZs in India, this research adds to
the literature on the developmental impacts of place based policies like SEZs, road
construction and other regional development programs which aim at improving la-
bor productivity in a region. For instance, Wang (2013) finds that SEZs in China
create agglomeration economies which generate wage increases for workers and Alder
et al. (2016) shows that SEZ states witnessed higher rates of economic growth in
China. Similarly, Greenstone et al. (2010) find that US counties successful in cre-
ating large manufacturing agglomerations increased total factor productivity which
created positive spillover benefits for workers including higher wages. In contrast, by
disaggregating our results into short-term and medium-run effects of land acquisition
on rural labor markets we show that the rate of employment generation in the SEZ
sector continues to remain sluggish even after two years of land acquisition. This ex-
perience of India’s SEZs is in contrast with other place based development strategies
like the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in the United States which created long-
term benefits for workers in the non-agricultural sector (Kline and Moretti, 2013).
Even within India, public infrastructure development programs like building rural
roads have resulted in a sustained reduction in workers reliance on agriculture for
subsistence (Asher and Novosad, 2016). Further, Chaurey (2017) finds that location
based tax exemptions in India also contributed to increases in employment generated
by firms.
Second, this chapter contributes to the relatively thin literature estimating the impact
of SEZs on developmental outcomes in India. Hyun, Ravi, et al. (2018) measure
the impact of ‘functioning’ SEZs on labor productivity and find evidence of spillover
benefits in the form of greater formalization of the informal manufacturing sector. On
the other hand, Alkon (2018) finds no evidence of socio-economic spillover benefits of
SEZs in the form of increased provision of schools, roads and other public services.
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However, this chapter differs from these studies in several ways. First, we estimate
changes in rural labor markets following the acquisition of agricultural land for SEZs.
Second, we study changes in agricultural land use pattern to discuss the distributional
impact of long-term changes in the agrarian economy caused by SEZs. Finally, since
farmers lose their land for SEZs, we study the impact of SEZs on rural incomes and
its potential to bring about structural transformation in rural labor markets.
Finally, this chapter engages with the political economy literature which analyzes
forceful alienation of farmers from agricultural land to capitalist accumulation in de-
veloping countries around the world.14 Involuntary acquisition of agricultural land
for setting up SEZs can be characterized as instances of ‘accumulation by dispos-
session’ (Levien, 2015a).15 This chapter contributes to this literature by discussing
the impact of SEZs on landownership patterns, distribution of incomes and vulner-
ability of small and marginal farmers (Levien (2012); Chakravorty (2013); Krieger
and Leroch (2016)). Using a new data created through archival research on land
acquisition for SEZs in India and data from the nationally representative National
Sample Survey (NSS), we provide casual estimates of the adverse impact of SEZs on
the rural economy. Our findings are consistent with field studies suggesting that not
only are SEZs unable to absorb dispossessed farmers, they also generate a peculiar
agrarian transformation through land speculation which drastically amplifies existing
class and caste inequalities in India (Levien, 2011).16
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides an overview of
the Indian SEZ experience. Section 1.3 presents a theoretical model that outlines the
14See Edelman et al. (2013) and Oya (2013)) for a discussion on farmer dispossession in Africa. Borras Jr et al.
(2012) and Borras Jr et al. (2012) for ‘land grabs’ in Latin America.
15Accumulation by dispossession (ABD) refers to the dispossession of agricultural workers, forest dwellers and
marginalized groups in order to make land and labor available for capital to acquire at extremely low costs (Harvey,
2007).
16See Misra (2019a) for a review of political economy factors impacting land acquisition for SEZs in India.
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impact of land acquisitions for SEZs on rural labor markets. Section 1.4 presents the
data and section 1.5 discusses the empirical strategy used in this study. Section 1.6
presents the results, while Section 1.7 discusses the mechanisms driving changes in
rural labor markets. Finally, section 1.8 concludes with policy recommendations.
1.2 Context
After economic liberalization in 1991, the share of manufactured exports in India’s
GDP increased significantly from 75 percent in 1989 to 81 percent in 1999 (Aggarwal,
2002). Between 2000 - 2005, India’s exports more than doubled, from USD 42 billion
in 2000 to USD 100 billion in 2005 (Nayyar, 2010). While several studies suggest
that rising per-capita incomes contributed to rising exports (Chandra (2003); Dhawan
and Biswal (1999)), Indian policy makers prioritized increasing exports as a means
to achieving higher economic growth. In this backdrop, the Special Economic Zones
(SEZ) Act of 2005 was passed by the Parliament of India. SEZs were envisioned as
comprehensive industrial townships with social facilities like housing blocks, schools
and hospitals (Hyun, Ravi, et al., 2018).17 To pursue these objectives, the SEZ Act
allowed large corporations and state governments to acquire agricultural land for
setting up SEZs.18
SEZs were expected to bring large flows of foreign direct investment and spur domes-
tic investment, which would boost economic growth at the national level. In addition,
they were expected to benefit the local economy by boosting infrastructure and gen-
erating employment, and stemming rural to urban migration (Aggarwal, 2007). This
was expected to allow rural workers to diversify their incomes by reducing their re-
17The minimum size requirements for Indian SEZs were much lower than SEZs set up in China. Information
Technology (IT) SEZs were allowed to be as small as 0.1 square kilometers, while multi-product SEZs needed to be
at least 10 square kilometers of area.
18The policy for land acquisition for SEZs was based on the Land Acquisition Act of 1894. Under this law the state
could allow for transfer of ownership of any privately owned land if considered necessary for ‘public purposes’. This
provision is also known as the ‘eminent domain’ clause of the SEZ Act of 2005.
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liance on the agricultural sector (Aggarwal, 2012). In light of these expected gains,
the state provided several fiscal benefits like exemption from import and customs
duty in procurement of input goods, full tax-exemption for the first five years, and a
50 percent exemption in the next five years.19 In addition, SEZs were exempted from
paying the Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT), which is currently set at 18.5% of book
profits in India.20 Further, SEZs benefited from preferential processing of applications
requesting permissions to expand or diversify production, “single window clearances”
and exemption from various credit constraints like restrictions on foreign borrowing
faced by other firms (Shah et al., 2009).21
1.2.1 Procedure for Setting up SEZs
In order to examine the causal effects of land acquisition for SEZs on rural labor
markets, it is important to discuss the process of setting up an SEZ. Setting up an
SEZ involved three steps: (1) approval, (2) notification, and (3) operationalization.
Our empirical analysis hinges on the penultimate stage of setting up an SEZ i.e.
notification. Since SEZ developers are required to provide evidence of land acquisition
for a formal approval by the Board of Approvals (BoA), we can ascertain the status of
land acquisition by tracing the process of SEZ approval and subsequent notification.
We describe below the process of SEZ approval and notification.
In the first stage of setting up an SEZ i.e. approval, using evidence provided in the lit-
erature (Aggarwal (2007); Alkon (2018); Hyun, Ravi, et al. (2018)) and by examining
various official notifications and orders of the government, we identify the three main
steps in obtaining an approval. First, the applicant must make a formal application
19The corporate tax rate in India is 35 percent (Aggarwal, 2007).
20The MAT is a compulsory tax levied on companies that make substantial profits but have low, or even zero, tax
liability due to the host of deductions and exemptions available under the income tax law.
21Single window clearances implied that applications were reviewed jointly by both the Central and State govern-
ments through a single regulatory body, the Board of Approval (BoA), which was set up to facilitate a faster pace of
clearances and resolution of bureaucratic red-tape (Hyun, Ravi, et al., 2018).
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to the BoA under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Second, after reviewing
applications, the state government submits a report recommending or raising objec-
tions to the proposal of setting up of each SEZ. Third, if the state government gives a
favorable recommendation and the project fulfills the area requirements laid down in
the SEZ Act (2005), the BoA makes its first decision. This decision could be one of
the following: (a) formal approval, (b) in-principle approval, (c) deferring the decision
to a later date, or (d) rejecting the proposal.
While the exact criteria for each decision is not available, a review of BoA meeting
minutes reveals that the BoA grants formal approval on three conditions. First,
the applicant must be in possession of the land. Second, the state government must
recommend the SEZ and finally, land proposed for the establishment of the SEZ must
be above the minimum threshold required by the SEZ Act.22 If the SEZ developer
is not in possession of the land then the BoA would grant an ‘in-principle’ approval.
In the second meeting of the Board, held in June 2006, it was decided that in such
cases, the developer has to approach the Board for a ‘formal approval’ after acquiring
the proposed land. Finally, apart from evidence of being in possession of the land, if
other technical requirements (like environmental clearances or legal disputes pending
on the firm) were not met, the Board decided to defer the decision on the proposal
and if state governments object, the proposal is rejected.
In the next stage of setting up an SEZ i.e. notification, proposals that received
formal approvals were invited to provide more details about land ownership, lease
agreement and clearances from other government agencies within 30 days of the date
22The minimum area requirement for SEZs was originally 100 hectares, but this kept changing and over time smaller
sized SEZs were also approved (Hyun, Ravi, et al., 2018). Particularly in the handicrafts sector, SEZs of 10 hectares
were also approved.
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of approval.23,24 If the BoA is satisfied by the documents provided by the developers,
then the SEZ would be notified. Once notification is announced, the SEZ can become
functional. The Board emphasizes that developers should begin operations as soon as
possible after the formal notification of the SEZ. It is important to note that according
to the rules enacted by the BoA, SEZ developers must submit official documents like
land registration, rental or buying agreements to prove that they are in possession of
the land, within 30 days of getting a formal notification.25 The detailed procedure
for approval and subsequent notification of an SEZ is summarized in Figure 1.1.
Based on the above framework of setting up of SEZs, land acquisition should have
occurred before the BoA awards the formal approval to the proposal. Based on
newspaper reports and answers to questions in the Parliament, we can conclude that
the primary cause for not granting approval is disputes related to land acquisitions.
If land acquisition efforts by the developers do not succeed then the Board does
not change the in-principle approval of the SEZ. According to our archival research
(described in detail in Section 1.4), during the period between 2006 - 2012, 221 SEZ
projects in 88 districts were not awarded formal approval. In some cases approvals
were denied due to legal reasons and stay orders passed by the courts. However, in
most cases, projects which received in-principle approval but failed to convert these to
formal approval can be linked to farmer agitations. As shown by Jenkins, Kennedy,
Mukhopadhyay, and Pradhan (2015), several SEZ projects fail to get notified or
become operational even after acquiring land from farmers at rates lower than the
market value of the land. In these cases, land is often returned to farmers. For
instance, in Maharashtra, over 24,000 acres of land was returned to farmers after
23These include the Ministry of Environment and in some cases the Ministry of Defense and External Affairs. In
additional cases, the Board also requests statement of finances for green shoot developers (i.e. new firms).
24In practice, the time between formal approval and notification in many cases lasted more than 30 days and could
be up to one year.
25In some exceptional cases, the BoA allowed for more than 30 days for SEZ developers to provide information.
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SEZs proposals were canceled due to farmer protests (PTI, 2015). In some cases,
land is not returned even when projects were canceled and farmers had to approach
the Supreme Court for their land (Rajagopalan, 2017).
Our main empirical analysis includes SEZs that pass the penultimate stage i.e. no-
tification. Figure 1.2 shows the district where SEZs were notified till 2012. Further,
Table 1.1 shows the break-up of notified SEZs in each state in each year between
2006 - 2012.26 As can be seen, more than 72 percent all notified SEZs are located in
the western and southern states of Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh (including
present day Telengana), Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Kerala.
1.2.2 Performance of SEZs
According to the SEZ web-portal of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in India,
by 2019, more that 400 SEZ projects were approved by the government. Of these,
232 became operational and started exports by 2019. The SEZs relate to information
technology (IT) and electronic hardwares, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology. More
than 50,000 hectares of land has been acquired for setting up of these SEZs which
have created around 2 million jobs in the period between 2005 - 2017.27
The BoA has claimed that SEZs have increased India’s exports by around 10 percent
annually between 2007 - 2018. The growth of SEZ exports remained unaffected by the
economic crisis of 2008 (New Delhi, 2009). However, newspaper reports suggest that
SEZ developers have earned huge profits by evading government taxes by taking ad-
vantage of SEZ rules (Sarkar and Damor, 2013). Aggarwal (2009) reports that India’s
chief auditor found that SEZ developers evaded INR 20 billion (USD 300 million) in
26We exclude union territories like Chandigarh and Pondicherry and small states like Goa and Nagaland from this
analysis as information about farmer movements is scarce for these regions.
27The statistics on the performance of SEZs have been taken from the SEZ portal which can be accessed at
http://sezindia.nic.in/upload/5cdd38b952661FACT%20SHEET%20ON%20SEZs%20as%20on%2015.5.2019.pdf.
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taxes by classifying domestic sales as foreign exports.28 Existing evidence suggests
that SEZs have contributed to increased economic activity in the neighborhood where
they are created and have contributed to increasing formalization of the local labor
force (Hyun, Ravi, et al., 2018). However, SEZs have not had a significant spillover
effect on the socio-economic development indicators like physical infrastructure in-
cluding schools, tapped water supply and the provision of electricity (Alkon, 2018).
Aggarwal (2012) argues that SEZs can promote new knowledge intensive industries to
diversify production but evidence on this is scarce. Banerjee-Guha (2008) argues that
over 62 percent SEZs produce IT-enabled services and only five percent SEZ produce
manufactured outputs. Therefore, the ability of SEZs to generate low-skill employ-
ment opportunities at a large scale is limited and SEZs simply reorganize the space
relations in capitalist production by creating ‘enclaves’ for capitalist accumulation.
The expectation that policy initiatives like SEZs would benefit the rural economy
does not appreciate the role of agrarian institutions and asymmetries of economic
and political power between large landlords and landless workers (Bardhan, 1989b).29
Therefore, surplus appropriation is not determined solely by the dictates of efficiency
(Rao, 1994). The role of dominant classes in controlling institutions would determine
the benefits of SEZs. Rao (1986) argues that wealth distribution and social relations of
production determine the rate of accumulation and technological change in the rural
economy. Factors like market imperfections, wage-setting power of employers and
limited mobility of factors across sectors constrain the impact of efficiency enhancing
technical changes in the agrarian sector (Rao, 1989).
28Using the 2009 exchange rate of 1USD = 67 INR.
29These asymmetries manifest in differential access to factors of production like capital and credit for different
agrarian classes (Bardhan, 1989a). The rural economy is often characterized by imperfect and interlinked factor
markets for credit and capital (Bardhan, 1980). Correspondingly, agricultural workers depend on large landlords for
subsistence. Land acquisition for SEZs increases the reliance of small farmers on large landowners by dispossessing
them of their land. Further, SEZs may allow large landowners to transition from agricultural to non-agricultural land
use which would increase the rents associated with landownership. In the process, labor demand in agriculture would
decline which would adversely impact agricultural workers.
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SEZs pose serious concerns for the well-being of workers in the agricultural sector.
While SEZ rules require that non-agricultural or infertile land should be used for
SEZ development, Balagopal (2007) shows that several SEZs were approved by state
governments even when they were proposed on fertile agricultural land. This may
have serious implications for food security (Aggarwal, 2006). While evidence on the
impact of SEZs on manufacturing output, economic growth and exports is limited,
even fewer studies discuss changes in social relations of production at the local level.
Levien (2011) argues that SEZs do not absorb the labor dispossessed by land acqui-
sition, but result in the creation of a rentier class of rural elite which engage in land
speculation with adverse impacts on agricultural production and food security of the
region.30 This rentier class, comprising of the local elite become the major beneficia-
ries of SEZs which weakens the traditional norms around land sales in the countryside
(Levien, 2015b).31 In addition, these changes reduce women’s independent rights to
agricultural land and increase their burden of household reproductive work (Levien,
2017). Unsurprisingly, land acquisition attempts for setting up of SEZs have met with
stiff resistance from farmers in most parts of the country. Appendix A.1 provides an
overview of farmer resistances compiled used archival newspaper research.
1.3 Model
This section presents a simple model to explain how acquisition of agricultural land
under the SEZ policy will impact rural labor markets in India. Diverting agricultural
land for SEZs generates rents for the rural elite. Using a framework of rents appro-
30Levien (2011) shows how local elite including political leaders and large farmers buy land belonging to small
farmers in the expectation that they will benefit from developing the land or selling it when prices appreciate after
SEZs become functional.
31Agricultural land is related to farmers prestige and land markets in rural India are thin. Farmers sell land to pay
off debts or arrange finances for weddings and bereavements (Levien, 2011). Since land acquisition for SEZs increases
the demand for non-agricultural land use, Ghatak and Ghosh (2011) advocate for auctions of land around SEZs to
ensure that the interests of farmers are safeguarded against forceful land grabs.
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priation similar to (Khan and Jomo, 2000) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), we
first discuss how labor supply decisions depend on the original endowment of agri-
cultural land with small and large farmers. Next, we analyze the potential of land
acquisition to create land rents for the rural elite by transferring ownership of land
from agricultural to non-agricultural use. These rents create a divergence between
the class-interests of the predominant agrarian classes - large landowning elite and
small farmers (and landless workers). Finally, we discuss the optimization problem
faced by the elite and derive factor prices that would prevail after land acquisition
for SEZs.
1.3.1 The Basic Setup: Rural Class Structure
Suppose there are p small farmers each owning a small plot of land, lp. Further,
there are e large farmers or elites owning, le units of land.32,33 By definition, the
size of land owned by large farmers is larger than that owned by small farmers,
le > lp. Assuming that the total population of the village is normalized to unity, a
fraction, γ of the population comprises of large farmers. Correspondingly, 1−γ is the
proportion of small farmers and we assume that small farmers outnumber the large
farmers, 1− γ > 1/2.
Before land acquisition for setting up SEZs, agriculture is the primary occupation of
the rural economy.34 If θ is the proportion of rural land belonging to large farmers,
32Family members of small farmers work on their own farms and they do not hire any labor (Sen, 1962). In addition,
at least one member of the household works as a wage worker employed by large farmers. Therefore, small farmer
households are net sellers of labor in the economy.
33Large farmers can either cultivate their land themselves or rent it out to tenant farmers. Their role as owners of
land is important in protecting their class interests as net buyers of labor power and engaging in production. The
elite seek to increase the rents accruing to them as land prices increase after land acquisition for SEZs.
34Small farmers work on their own land and as wage workers on the lands of the elite. Therefore, the labor
supply for agricultural production comprises of the entire working population of the economy. This labor abundant
feature is referred to as ‘unlimited supplies of labor’ in the traditional agricultural sector by Lewis (1954) and Ranis
and Fei (1981) among others. Further, the elite also engage in agricultural production using labor and their initial
endowment of land. We argue that after land acquisition, large farmers (elite) can transition away from agriculture
to non-agricultural production.
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average land size for small farmers and large farmers is given by the following.
lp =
(1− θ)l¯











li where n = p+ e
Every individual i belongs to one of the two mutually exclusive sets, large farmers
or elites, r or small farmers, s. Using their initial endowments of land, both elites
and small-farmers (∀i ∈ (r, s)) engage in agricultural production. Additionally, small
farmers also work as wage labor to supplement their farming incomes.35 Any changes
in landownership of both groups changes their production or labor supply choices as
discussed below.
1.3.1.1 Elites
In practice, land acquisition under SEZs would lead to a transfer of agricultural land
from farmers to non-farmers (industrial capital). However, post-land acquisition,
large farmers or the elite themselves diversify from agricultural production to real
estate development and other non-agricultural activities Levien (2011).36 This change
in land use by large farmers creates non-agricultural employment in the economy.
Since we are primarily concerned with changes in the agricultural economy, we focus
on changes in landownership within the different agrarian classes. We assume that
35Sen (1975) demonstrated that small farms are more productive than large farms in India, particularly at low levels
of agricultural technology (Deolalikar, 1981). Correspondingly, several studies have discussed the role of small farms
in helping smooth consumption (Barrett, 1996) and providing an income-safety net to small farmers (De Janvry and
Sadoulet, 2011). However, Rudra and Sen (1980) clarify that the inverse-size relationship may be a consequence of
greater labor input provided by family members on subsistence farms. Therefore, small peasants in India are in a
“precarious position” since they lack non-labor inputs for agricultural production. Therefore, the output produced
by small farms is not sufficient to sustain their families. In fact the size of small farms can be less than 1 hectare
(Figure 1.4) which makes small farmers ‘effectively landless’ (Basole and Basu, 2011). Small farmers need to augment
their incomes from self-cultivation or rely on alternative sources of income like public and private wage employment.
36Throughout this chapter, we use ‘large farmers’ and ‘elite’ interchangeably.
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the non-agricultural employment created by the SEZ sector is a consequence of the
rural elite diverting a part of their land towards non-agricultural production in the
SEZ sector.
Before land acquisition, each member of the class of large farmers, i ∈ r engages in
agricultural production using their original endowment of land, le and labor as inputs
with total-factor productivity, ψ. After land is acquired for SEZs, large farmers
may divert a part of their land away from agriculture to non-agricultural production.
As SEZs get established, the demand for non-agricultural land use in real estate,
housing complexes and other infrastructure projects increase (Levien (2012); Reddy
and Reddy (2007); Baka (2013)). However, land acquisition reduces the size of large
farmer’s landholding, so the land available for non-agricultural production is less than
their original endowment of land, i.e. l < le. Further, non-agricultural production is
associated with higher total factor productivity, φ which would increase their returns
on the land, i.e. φ > ψ.
We assume that introduction of industrial activity through land acquisition for SEZs
is the only prerequisite for large farmers to change their land use from agricultural
to non-agricultural use without any costs.37 Therefore, the production function for
large farmers, i ∈ r is given by the following.
Y r =

ψF (li∈r, nia), if li∈r = l
e
ψF ((1− κ)li∈r, npia) + φF (κli∈r, nina), if li∈r = (1− q)le
(1.2)
where, l is the land owned and na is the labor employed by each large farmer before
land acquisition. We assume that the elite lose a fraction q of their land and they
use a fraction κ of their remaining land to engage in non-agricultural production. nna
37This assumption implies that physical infrastructure like link roads etc. exist and the elite have the technical
expertise to transition from agriculture to non-agricultural production. However, the stock of physical infrastructure
may vary between regions which may determine the labor market impacts of SEZs in a given region.
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is the labor employed by the elite in non-agricultural production. Finally, the elite
continue to engage in agricultural production using the remaining land (1 − κ) and
demand npa labor. Since large landlords are diverting a part of their land away from
agricultural production, we can see that labor demand in agriculture will reduce after
land acquisition na > npa. We assume that both agricultural and non-agricultural
production is characterized by constant returns to scale. From the production func-
tions, we can see that labor productivity in both scenarios, depends solely on the total
factor productivity in each case. Therefore, in principle, non-agricultural production
should hire more workers than agricultural production (nna > na) since (φ > ψ). This
condition would hold even when the actual land available to large farmers has declined
due to land acquisition, since after land acquisition larger farmers will diversify to
non-agricultural production. Therefore, the total demand for non-agricultural labor
should exceed the labor demand generated by the traditional agricultural economy.38
1.3.1.2 Small Farmers
Small farmers own lp units of land and one unit of labor. They work on their own
farms and as wage workers for large farmers. Their labor supply decisions depend
on the productivity of their land and their ability to retain their initial endowment
of lp units of land after land acquisition attempts.39 More formally, the production
function of small farmers is given by the following.
38This increase in labor demand in the SEZ sector should result in moving ‘underemployed’ labor out of agriculture.
However, we discuss in Proposition 3 that agricultural workers being displaced by land acquisition are not absorbed
by the non-agricultural SEZ sector.
39Land acquisition may not affect all small farmers in the village. However, once customary rules of land ownership
are changed through land acquisition, there is greater uncertainty associated with agricultural production which
adversely affects small farmers Levien (2012). Therefore, we assume that SEZ creation will eventually dispossess
all small farmers and lead to the creation of landless workers who work as wage workers in the agricultural or non-




τnc, if li∈s = lp
0, if li∈s = 0
(1.3)
where τ is the average and marginal productivity of labor on family farms and nc
is the number of hours spent by workers cultivating their family farms. We assume
that the small farmers lose all of their land in land acquisition for SEZs. Given the
production functions of large farmers and small farmers from Equations 1.2 and 1.3
respectively, the market clearing condition defined by the labor supply curve in each




na +Nc, where Nc =
∑
nc, if li∈r = le∑
nna +
∑
npa, if li∈r ≤ le
(1.4)
where Equation 1.4 assumes that after land acquisition has taken place and SEZs are
constructed, the elite will transition partially from agricultural to non-agricultural
production and correspondingly labor demand in agriculture will decline from na to
npa. We now turn to calculating the rents before and after land acquisition that
the elite will appropriate. However, we first impose the following restrictions on the
parameters in the model.
Assumption 1: The productivity of labor on self-cultivated small farms (τ) is less
than the productivity of labor in all other forms of employment. This is because the
small size of land owned by small farmers may not allow them to use advanced tech-
nology or greater mechanization that large farmers can employ.40 This assumption
also allows us to create a fall back position or wage floor for workers.
Assumption 2: wcpre > w
g+τ . For labor markets to clear, we assume that the sum of
legal minimum wages (wg) and average productivity of small farms (τ) is lower than
40Since the traditional agricultural sector is characterized by excess labor, crowding out labor from this sector would
not reduce the productivity of self-farming (Lewis (1954); Sen (1962)).
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the wages in private agricultural employment in competitive labor markets before
land acquisition takes place wcpre. If wages paid by employers are lower than workers
earnings received by self-farming and public employment guarantee, workers would
choose to not work in private labor markets.
1.3.2 Rents
Rural labor markets in India are highly monopsonistic i.e. they are characterized by
high land inequality and surplus labor. For instance, Rawal (2008) shows that the
Gini coefficient of land ownership in India was around 0.76 in 2003. States like Andhra
Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra and Karnataka have the highest incidence of land-
lessness in India (Rawal, 2008). Large farmers enjoy considerable political domination
in these regions and in the absence of any major land redistribution after indepen-
dence, this class has managed to retain their wage setting power. Consequently, the
model described above defines a monopsonistic labor market characterized by few
employers and many employees, (1 − γ) > 1/2. In monopsonistic labor markets,
many small farmers rely on a few large farmers who have short-side power in the
labor market. Bowles (2009) argues that short-side power is vested in the economic
agent who is on the short-side of a non-clearing market. In this case, since p is large
and lp is very small, workers would depend heavily on wage employment from a few
large employers.
Before land acquisition takes place, the elite engage in agricultural production and
after land acquisition for SEZs, they divert their land towards non-agricultural use
in order to benefit from the increased land rents generated by the SEZs. Given the
market clearing condition from Equation 1.4, we derive the factor prices for land and
labor before and after land acquisition below.
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1.3.2.1 Rents from Landownership
In order to determine the rents generated by the elite before and after land acquisi-
tion we compare factor prices that prevail in this imperfect labor market where few
employers control labor demand to corresponding factor prices in a perfectly com-
petitive economy. Rents are defined as excess earnings over the amount necessary to
keep the factor in its present occupation (Pareto, 1964).41
In competitive labor markets, the factor prices for each factor (land and labor) are
determined by the value of their marginal products. Therefore, the returns to wages
equals the marginal product of labor. However, in imperfect labor markets employers
can use their market power to depress wages below its marginal product and returns to
ownership of the means of production (land) is the difference between the total output
and the total wage bill (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). Therefore, the returns to
land are higher in imperfect markets in comparison to perfectly competitive markets.
This difference in the returns to land generates rents for large farmers.
The magnitude of this rent is determined by the ability of large farmers to depress
wages. There are two reasons why rents accruing to large farmers would increase
after land acquisition. First, the presence of subsistence farming creates a wage floor
for the elite. If they reduce wages below the marginal product of self-farming τ , the
labor supply would fall to zero. This is because small farmers would not be willing
to work for wages lower than what they earn through self-farming. However, after
small farmers are dispossessed, the elite can lower wages further as workers no longer
have land to undertake self-farming. Second, SEZs allow the elite to diversify their
land use from agricultural to include non-agricultural production which is associated
with higher factor productivity and consequently, higher profits.
41The rents defined above are Paretian rents which constitute returns to factors in excess of their marginal pro-
ductivity or opportunity cost. Alternatively, in the classical tradition, rents are defined as the proportion of national
income accruing to owners of non-reproducible resources (Basu, 2018). See Banaji (1990) for a discussion on rents
accruing to landowners in the agrarian sector.
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More formally, rents accruing to large farmers, ∆Rpre, before land acquisition takes
place can be defined as follows.
∆Rpre ≡ Rmpre −Rcpre (1.5)
where Rmpre is the returns to agricultural land in monopsonistic labor markets and R
c
pre
refers to the marginal product of land. The superscript m refers to monopsonistic
labor markets and c refers to competitive labor markets. Likewise, the rents generated
for large farmers after land acquisition ∆Rpost are defined as follows.
∆Rpost ≡ Rmpost −Rcpost (1.6)
where Rmpost refers to the rents appropriated by large farmers due to their market
power after land acquisition and Rcpost is the marginal product of land after land
acquisition.
1.3.2.2 Differential Rents
Using the rents described above, we can calculate the differential rents that land
acquisition would create for the elite. We know that wages in competitive markets
are higher than those in repressive labor markets, wcpre > w
m
pre. Correspondingly,
land rents in monopsonistic (repressive) labor markets are higher than competitive
markets, Rmpre > R
c
pre.
42 Using the rents before and after land acquisition, we now
define differential rents, R¯ gained by the elite if they succeed in acquiring the land
owned by small farmers as follows.
R¯ ≡ ∆Rpost −∆Rpre (1.7)










Since φ > ψ and using Assumptions 1 and 2, we can see that ∆Rpost > ∆Rpre.
Equation 1.7 presents the gains accruing to the local elite after land has been acquired
for SEZs and they have transitioned away from agricultural production. Both, changes
in the composition of the rural labor force and higher productivity associated with
non-agricultural production contribute to the rents appropriated by the elite through
land acquisition.
1.3.3 Employment and Wages after Land Acquisition
We now evaluate the level of non-agricultural employment and wages that would
prevail after land acquisition. We start by first examining the non-agricultural and
agricultural labor demand decisions of the elite after land acquisition.
If labor markets have to clear, we can see that (wg) is the wage rate that would
prevail after land acquisition and from Assumption 1 that (wg) is the lowest wage
that employers would pay if small farmers have no alternative to self-farming on their
farms. Therefore, the wage rate in the non-agricultural and agricultural labor markets
would be equal to the wage floor set by the state. wnpa = wna = wg. However, we
assume that the elite have to spend a proportion of their differential rents in order
to convert their agricultural land for non-agricultural use. This could imply political
lobbying for changing the designation of land use or other investments in land to
make it suitable for real estate or construction, among other uses. Specifically, the
elite spend a fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of their differential rents in land improvements and
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political lobbying. The elite determine their non-agricultural labor demand, nina after
land acquisition using the following optimization problem.
pi(nna, npa) = max
nna,npa
{
npaψf((1− L)/npa) + nnaφf(L/nna)− αR¯− wg(nna + npa)
}
subject to (1− α)R¯ ≥ ∆Rpre
(1.8)
where L = κqle is the proportion of land that the elite divert to non-agricultural
production following land acquisition and (1−L) is the proportion of land remaining
under cultivation. nna is the labor demand in the non-agricultural sector and npa
is the new labor demand in the agricultural sector. Therefore, after the elite have
succeeded in dispossessing farmers of their land, their labor demand function n∗na is
the total non-agricultural employment generated by the elite.43 This completes the
formalization of the model. We now discuss the following comparative statics.44
Proposition 1: Non-agricultural labor demand after land acquisition increases when
total factor productivity associated with SEZ production increases.




> 0. An increase in the productivity associated
with non-agricultural production would allow the elite to hire more workers and con-
sequently increase their profits. Since the elite can keep wages depressed wna ≈ wg,
they would hire more workers in response to an increase in productivity associated
with non-agricultural production to increase their profits. Therefore, land acquisition
could lead to greater employment creation if the factors affecting the productivity of
production like roads, ports and electricity, among others, improve. Consequently,
SEZs may have greater employment opportunities and greater political acceptability
in regions characterized by better provision of physical infrastructure. This suggests
43Appendix A.2.3 provides the first order conditions and shows the derivation for equilibrium values for n∗na.
44We present the formal proof of the propositions in Appendix A.2.4.
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that regions with higher levels of existing industrialization and infrastructure facilities
may be better suited for structural transformation by SEZs.45
Proposition 2: Agricultural labor demand and agricultural wages will decline as the
elite transition from agricultural to non-agricultural land use.
This proposition implies that, (∂na
∂le
> 0) and (∂wa
∂le
> 0). The intuition is as follows:
Large farmers are primary employers of agricultural labor and land acquisition for the
creation of SEZs increases the opportunity cost of using land for agriculture. Conse-
quently, large farmers transition into real estate development and divert land away
from agriculture. Correspondingly, labor demand in agriculture declines (∂na
∂le
> 0).
This reduction in labor demand exerts a downward pressure on agricultural wages
(∂wa
∂na
> 0). Wage floors created by public employment guarantee provide the lower
bound for agricultural wages.46 However, imperfect implementation of public employ-
ment programs may allow monopsonistic employers to reduce wages below the legal
minimum and wages would fall even when minimum wages are rising.
Proposition 3: Labor demand in the SEZ (non-agricultural) sector falls short of
labor supply which creates involuntary unemployment for dispossessed workers who
are forced to work in the agricultural sector.
According to Equation 1.4, after land acquisition, small farmers would rely solely on
employment in the private sector for their subsistence as they would be dispossessed of
their land. Therefore, each worker would like to work solely in private employment.
However, the SEZ sector would not be able to absorb the labor force dispossessed
by land acquisition: therefore, n∗na < 1. This means that, while labor demand in
45Correspondingly, we use SEZs in the more developed southern and western states of India for empirically esti-
mating the labor market impacts of land acquisition for SEZs. In Section 1.4 we discuss the criteria for inclusion of
states in this study.
46Several studies estimating the labor market impact of public employment show that rural wages rise due to
employment programs like the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) of India (Imbert and Papp
(2015); Misra (2019b).)
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the non-agricultural sector increases (from Proposition 1 ), there will still be under-
provision of private employment after land acquisition relative to labor supply. There
are several reasons for the slow rate of labor absorption by the SEZ sector. First, labor
demand by the elite would decrease as the proportion of rents necessary for setting
up SEZs α increases. Therefore, if the rural elite have to invest a large proportion of
their differential rents on non-productive lobbying, the labor demand generated by
the SEZ sector would decline. Second, labor demand generated by the SEZ sector
depends on the degree of labor market imperfection in the rural economy prior to
land acquisition (∆Rpre). If land rents accruing to the agricultural elite are large,
they may not fully transition into non-agricultural production which would further
depress labor demand, n∗na. This mechanism explains why productivity enhancing
technical improvements in agriculture are retarded when large landlords can keep
wages in agriculture depressed (Lewis, 1954).
Therefore, land acquisition would not only restrict the ability of workers to augment
their earnings with self-farming, but will also lead to under-provision of private em-
ployment. This would create involuntary unemployment in the rural economy. Since
non-agricultural employment is determined by the marginal product of labor, the
excess labor supply will be absorbed by the non-capitalist agricultural sector in the
economy. Correspondingly, labor supply in the agricultural economy would increase
causing a downward pressure on rural wages.
Proposition 3 has two important distributional consequences for the local economy.
First, small and marginal farmers are adversely affected by involuntary land transfer
on two counts (a) direct effect of land dispossession, and (b) the decline in their fall-
back position in the labor market which reduces workers’ ability to bargain for higher
wages. Second, land acquisition converts small farmers into landless workers which
increases labor supply in the rural economy. However, labor demand in agriculture
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declines due to the reduction in agricultural land in the economy. These changes in
the rural labor markets exert a downward pressure on, both rural wages and con-
sequently the incomes of small farmers and landless workers. In contrast, the large
landowning elite benefit from the creation of SEZs even when they lose a part of their
agricultural landholding. This is because, even when a part of landholding is acquired
for SEZs, their expected profits would increase as SEZs would increase the market
value of the remaining land. Consequently, the elite can then profitably transition to
higher productivity non-agricultural land use.
With the theoretical framework above in mind, we next describe how we estimate
the causal impact of land acquisition for SEZs on rural labor markets and discuss the
possible threats to our identification strategy. We start by first describing the data
used for the empirical analysis in the next section.
1.4 Data
1.4.1 Data on SEZs
To determine the impact of SEZs on the agrarian economy, data on timing of land
acquisition across different districts across the country is essential. Since this infor-
mation is not available in the publicly available documents on the SEZ web-portal, we
determine the timing of land acquisition, using the procedure of establishing an SEZ,
outlined in Section 1.2. As detailed in Section 1.2, setting up an SEZ involved three
steps: (1) approval; (2) notification; and (3) operationalization. In the first stage
of SEZ approval, SEZs were approved once the SEZ developer was in possession of
agricultural land and the project was recommended by the state government. In the
second stage of SEZ notification, SEZs were officially notified when they produced
evidence of being in possession of land such as land lease documents. Specifically,
SEZ developers were required to submit evidence of land acquisition like land lease
to get their project officially notified.
30
Since this chapter investigates the impact of agricultural land being diverted for
non-agricultural use, our empirical strategy includes SEZs that pass the penultimate
stage in the process of setting up i.e notification. Therefore, our identification relies
on correctly assigning the date of land acquisition. In over 90 percent of cases, the
difference between the date of approval and notification is only a few months as
the SEZ BoA met to evaluate these proposals and track their progress every month
between 2006 - 2015. Therefore, we can infer that land is acquired by all notified
SEZs in the year preceding the year of notification of the SEZ.
The official SEZ website is the primary source of information on SEZs on the list of
notified SEZs. However, these lists do not contain the exact year of notification of each
SEZ. To obtain the actual year of notification of each SEZ we rely on three different
data sources. First, we follow Hyun, Ravi, et al. (2018) and Alkon (2018) and rely on
the minutes of the SEZ BoA meetings which discuss each SEZ proposal and determine
whether the developer is in possession of the land required for their projects. Using
these minutes, we can determine the month and year of SEZ notification. However,
the notification status of SEZs kept changing in response to farmer agitations, legal
disputes and other irregularities found in the project. Therefore, relying simply on
the date of notification from the SEZ BoA meeting minutes may not be adequate.
In order to overcome this limitation, we use a second important data source - archival
research. Specifically, we use newspaper reports on farmer agitations, and other
SEZ related disputes to confirm that notified SEZs continue to be in possession of
agricultural land and are not de-notified over time. In addition to the more infamous
examples of canceled SEZ projects in Nandigram and Singur, Shailesh (2015) shows
how farmer protests in Uttar Pradesh have led to the cancellation or stalling of SEZ
projects in Uttar Pradesh. The BoA also de-notified various projects between 2007
- 2012. Since the inception of SEZs in 2006, the national and regional media has
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reported extensively on disputes related to land acquisition and legal battles fought
for SEZ land and compensation paid to displaced farmers. Since land acquisition
attempts by the state often resorted to violent and illegal methods, even international
organizations like the United Nations Human Rights Watch released press statements
on land acquisition drives in India. These documents allow us to confirm that over
100 SEZ projects were de-notified during the period of 2006 - 2012.
Finally, we triangulate the information obtained from the minutes of SEZ BoA meet-
ings and archival newspaper evidence with a third crucial data source - answers to
parliamentary questions tabled by members of parliament.47 Since SEZs were a highly
contentious issue and land acquisition attempts by various states involved violent
displacement of farmers, several discussions on the subject occurred in the Indian
parliament. This was true particularly in the Rajya Sabha (Upper House) of the
parliament where opposition members frequently asked questions on land acquisi-
tion, compensation paid to farmers and government policy on rehabilitation. Some of
these questions dealt with the status of SEZ notification and operations. This chap-
ter uses the official government replies to these questions to confirm the notification
status of SEZs over the period between 2006 – 2012. We collect information from
over 30 detailed questions related to farmer agitations, compensation paid to farmers
and detailed lists of notified SEZs.
The analysis in this chapter is confined to 2006 - 2012. There are two reasons why
we confine our analysis to this period. First, data on rural labor markets used in this
analysis is taken from the Employment and Unemployment Rounds of the National
Sample Survey Data of India (described below). The government has not released this
data after the 68th Round which corresponds to the period 2011 - 2012. Therefore,
we cannot observe changes in labor markets after this period. Second, all SEZs that
47https://rajyasabha.nic.in/rsnew/Questions/DateSearch.aspx
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were approved after 2010 were situated in the districts that already had at least one
functioning SEZ. Since our data on rural labor markets, agricultural productivity,
land ownership and land use is disaggregated at the district level, additional SEZs in
the same districts do not add treatment districts to our study.
Using the data collection method described above, Table 1.1 shows that 286 SEZs
were notified in 87 districts in 16 states and 3 Union territories of India from 2006
- 2012. In the same period 355 SEZs were approved but 69 of these approved SEZs
could not provide documented evidence of land acquisition and were not notified.
From Table 1.1, we see that 72 percent of all notified SEZs were concentrated in the
southern and western states of united Andhra Pradesh (present day Andhra Pradesh
and Telengana), Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala and Gujarat. United
Andhra Pradesh alone accounts for 62 (20 percent) of all notified SEZs. Among the
other states, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh have the greatest number of notified SEZs
(19 and 17, respectively).
This analysis is confined to the states of Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Kar-
nataka, Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Telangana. Figure 1.3 presents the distribution of
SEZs in the states used in the study. These main southern and western states account
for over 72 percent of all notified SEZs.48 There are several reasons for excluding the
northern states from this chapter. First, most SEZs in north India were notified
in the predominantly urban districts of Gautam Buddh Nagar (Noida and Greater
Noida) and Gurgaon in Uttar Pradesh and Haryana, respectively which border the
National Capital Region of Delhi. Since this chapter discusses the impact of SEZs
on the rural economy, these districts may not contribute significantly to our analysis.
Second, information on SEZs in smaller states and Union territories including Goa,
48Hyun, Ravi, et al. (2018) also use similar states in their analysis of spillovers of SEZs in India. Specifically, they
include Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Uttar Pradesh.
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Nagaland, Pondicherry and Manipur is relatively scarce in the national newspapers
and therefore, the status of land acquisition in some of these cases is ambiguous. Fi-
nally, states like West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Odisha and Rajasthan have witnessed
the most successful farmer agitations on land acquisition and in several cases, SEZ
developers have had to return some parts of the land acquired for SEZs to the farmers.
The exact amount of land returned cannot be ascertained in most cases. Therefore,
we exclude these states from our analysis.
1.4.2 National Sample Survey Data
Data on individual measures of employment and wages for rural and agricultural
markets is taken from the nationally representative Employment and Unemployment
Rounds of the National Sample Survey (NSS) of India. The NSS is conducted peri-
odically, sometimes with a large sample and sometimes with a smaller sample. To en-
hance precision, we use only the rounds with larger samples (called ‘thick’ rounds).49
Each ‘thick’ round of data has a sample size of about 120,000 households spread
between urban and rural areas. In each round, the NSS includes data over four sub-
rounds in a year from July to June. The first two sub-rounds covering the period
from July to December correspond to the peak (rainy) season of agriculture and the
last two sub-rounds between January to June correspond to the lean (dry) season
of agriculture. The main specification of this chapter uses four ‘thick’ rounds corre-
sponding to the period from 2004 - 05 to 2011 - 12. Data from the 61st Round from
July 2004 to June 2005 corresponds to the period before the SEZ Act was passed in
2005 and forms the pre-program period. The first meeting of the SEZ BoA to grant
approvals to projects under the SEZ Act was held in 2006. Therefore, data from the
49Thick rounds are quinquennial rounds of NSS surveys with a sample size of round 120,000 households. Thin
rounds conducted in the intervening period have a sample size of around 40 percent of the thick round.
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64th Round (July 2007 to June 2008), 66th Round (July 2009 to June 2010) and the
68th Round (July 2011 to June 2012) form the post-program period.
The Employment and Unemployment Rounds of the NSS provide information on
weekly time-use and earnings for each member of the household. This allows us to
calculate the daily percentage of time spent in public and private employment in the
rural sector and calculate daily earnings of workers in each category. Table 1.5 shows
the baseline mean values of our main labor market outcomes for all districts in our
sample. In districts where SEZs were notified, around 19 percent of labor time is
spent in non-agricultural employment while agricultural employment, at 41 percent;
is the predominant occupation. In non-SEZ districts from the seven southern and
western states percentage of labor time spent in non-agricultural and agricultural
employment are 14 percent and 54 percent respectively. Further, individuals spend
more than 22 percent of their labor time in household activities. Real agricultural
wages in 2004 were around 4 rupess in both SEZ and non-SEZ districts which was
significantly higher than non-agricultural wages (1.64 rupees and 1.1 rupees in SEZ
and non-SEZ districts respectively). Appendix A.4 provides an overview of other
sources of data used in this chapter and the procedure used to create variables used
in the empirical estimations.
1.5 Empirical Strategy
Existing literature on the impact of India’s SEZ policy is mostly anecdotal and focuses
largely on exports or non-agricultural employment in the geographical neighborhood
of SEZs. There are two studies which empirically estimate causal impacts of SEZs
in India using different estimation techniques. Leveraging the temporal differences
in the notification of SEZs, Hyun, Ravi, et al. (2018) examine the effect of SEZs on
economic activity in the immediate vicinity of an SEZ using both, an event study
framework and a spatial difference-in-differences approach. Similarly, Alkon (2018)
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estimates spillover effects of SEZs on infrastructure creation at the village-level (such
as roads, schools and hospitals) using a control group of villages matched on observ-
able characteristics.
There are several causal empirical studies that estimate the impact of infrastructure
development and industrial zones on local economic indicators in India and China.
For instance, Shenoy (2018) studies the impact of a regional growth augmenting
program in the state of Uttarakhand in India using a spatial discontinuity design.
Similarly, Chaurey (2017) studies a location-based tax incentive scheme in India on
employment, output and capital, using a difference-in-differences design. DE´Murger
et al. (2002) analyzes the impact of Chinese SEZs on provincial convergence in growth
rates using location dummies. Similarly, in a study examining the economic growth
effects of SEZs in China, Alder et al. (2016) employ a difference-in-differences frame-
work. Finally, Wang (2013) examines the impact of the Chinese SEZ policy on foreign
direct investments using panel data regressions and matching.
Additionally, there is also a growing literature examining place-based development
policies in other domains including in the infrastructure and education sectors in
India using different estimation techniques. For instance, Jagnani and Khanna (2018)
examine the introduction of elite public colleges in India on local markets for primary
and secondary education using an event time framework as their main identification
strategy. Aggarwal (2018) and Adukia et al. (2017) examine impacts of India’s rural
road construction program using a difference-in-differences and instrumental variables
strategy, respectively. Finally, Ghani et al. (2014) use a non-parametric approach to
estimate impacts of India’s golden quadrilateral highway construction program.
These studies suggest that the impact of industrial development projects like SEZs
can be estimated by comparing outcomes in treatment districts to comparable control
districts in a difference-in-differences framework. Alternatively, we can employ the
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event time framework which generalizes the difference-in-differences framework by
accounting for the effects of time-varying variables and by allowing the effects of of
the program to vary over each time period following the event (Jacobson et al., 1993).
We employ both these methods to estimate the impact of land acquisition on rural
labor markets.
1.5.1 Difference-in-Differences Framework
In this section, to examine the impacts of land acquisition for SEZs on rural labor
markets, we use a difference-in-differences estimator exploiting temporal and geo-
graphical variation in land acquisition across districts and years for the notification
of SEZs. Our identification strategy depends on assigning the timing of land acqui-
sition for the first SEZ in a district. Archival research discussed in Section 1.2 shows
that the notification of SEZs is contingent on land acquisition. Correspondingly, we
can infer that land acquisition occurs in the year preceding notification.
The conventional difference-in-differences estimator requires that the treatment be
assigned randomly across the population (Heckman et al., 1997). This random as-
signment ensures that any unobservable characteristics that may affect outcomes are
controlled for as these may be present in both groups. However, the location of SEZs
may be correlated with state and district level characteristics such as growth rates,
levels of urbanization and level of infrastructure development. For instance, over 72
percent of all SEZs in India are located in the more developed western and southern
states. This implies, notification of SEZs was not exogenous. Districts where at least
one SEZ was notified (treatment districts) may be systematically different from other
districts (control districts).
We follow the approach in Alder et al. (2016) and mitigate this potential endogeneity
concern in two ways. First, we confine the analysis to districts in the seven states
where the majority of SEZs are concentrated. Specifically, we only include the states
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of Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, and
Telangana in the analysis. Second, our estimation controls for time-invariant district
level factors like poverty, proportion of marginalized communities (Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes), agricultural wage, labor market participation and literacy
rates at the district level. All district level controls are mentioned in Table 1.2.
The sample for the difference-in-differences specification includes all districts in the
seven states in our sample. The identifying assumption in the difference-in-differences
framework is that in the absence of treatment (land acquisition for SEZs), treatment
and control districts would follow a similar trend in the post-program period. We
estimate the following model:
Yidt = βTdt + λ1Zd × 1{t>2006} + σHi + pit + µd + idt (1.9)
where Yidt is the outcome of interest (e.g. time spent in non-agricultural employment)
for individual i in district d during year t.50 Tdt takes the value 1 after the first SEZ is
notified in district d and 0 otherwise.51 Zd contains pre-program measures of fraction
scheduled caste (SC), fraction scheduled tribe (ST), fraction of literate males, fraction
of literate females, male labor force participation rate, female labor force participation
rate, fraction of agricultural labor, fraction of cultivators, fraction of irrigated land,
population density, and population below poverty line. These time invariant district
controls are interacted with a post-treatment dummy to capture trends correlated
with the controls. Table 1.2 provides the mean values of all district-level controls
used in this chapter. Hi are individual controls for age, years of education, indicator
for female, indicator for being married, indicator for belonging to SC, ST, and other
50Since the NSS data is not annual, for outcomes examined with the NSS data, t = 2004, 2008, 2010, 2012. For
outcomes examined with annual ICRISAT data, t = 2000− 2012.
51Since the timing of notification of the first SEZ differs across districts, for each district post will take the value 1
in different years
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backward caste (OBC) categories, indicator being a muslim, and household size.
Table 1.3 provides mean values for individual level controls used in this chapter. pit
capture survey year fixed effects and µd are district fixed effects. District fixed effects
absorb district specific time-invariant heterogeneity. All estimates are adjusted for
correlation over time within districts by clustering at the district level.
1.5.2 Event Time Framework
The difference-in-differences framework described above compares districts where
SEZs were notified to districts where SEZs were never notified. However, districts
where SEZs were notified may vary significantly from other districts on several factors
including the level of urbanization, poverty rates and agricultural labor force partic-
ipation. Therefore, we use an additional estimation strategy - event time framework
similar to Jacobson et al. (1993) and Bailey and Goodman-Bacon (2015), which re-
quires fewer assumptions than a traditional difference-in-differences design. Further,
the event time framework allows us to estimate the short-term and medium-run im-
pacts of land acquisition separately, which are useful in analyzing the systemic changes
in agricultural land and labor markets which land acquisition for SEZs may trigger.
We exploit the staggered notification of SEZs from 2006 - 2012 in an event time
framework by using within district changes in local labor markets that correspond
to the year of land acquisition in each district. The identifying assumption of the
event time framework is that the timing of land acquisition is uncorrelated with
other determinants of changes in rural labor markets. The sample for the event
time framework includes only notified districts in the seven states in our sample.




βτ1(t− T ∗d = τ) +
m∑
τ=0
βτ1(t− T ∗d = τ) + µd + pit + idt (1.10)
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where Yidt is the outcome variable (e.g. time spent in non-agricultural employment)
for individual i in district d in time t. Estimates for the effect of land acquisition on the
agrarian economy are captured by the coefficients on the time dummies 1(t−T ∗d = τ),
which are equal to 1 when the observation is τ periods away from T ∗d , the year when
the first SEZ was notified in district d and (τ = −1) is omitted.52
The first set of coefficients with τ < 0 capture the pre-treatment period and the
second set of coefficients, with τ ≥ 0 capture the post-treatment period. These
estimates are intent-to-treat effects of land acquisition relative to the time period
before land acquisition took place in these districts. For instance, if a district d got
its first SEZ notified in 2009, then it must have completed land acquisition in 2008.
Correspondingly, the period between 2006 - 2007 capture the pre-treatment period,
τ < 0 and 2009 - 2012 capture the post-treatment period, τ ≥ 0. µd indicate district-
level fixed effects and pit capture survey year fixed effects. Finally, estimates are
adjusted for correlation over time within districts by clustering at the district level,
idt.
We restrict our sample to districts where atleast one SEZ was notified in the seven
states in our analysis in order to compare changes in agrarian labor markets in similar
districts. Using district fixed effects, we control for time-invariant unobserved charac-
teristics that affect local labor markets and may also be correlated with the presence
of an SEZ. Year fixed effects control for year specific unobservable factors common
across all districts. This allows us to identify the impact of land acquisition for SEZs
on the agrarian economy by estimating within-district changes in labor market and
agricultural productivity for each time period after land acquisition occurred for the
first SEZ in that district. This event time framework relies on fewer assumptions than
52Since land acquisition must be completed before SEZs are notified, we expect to observe effects of land acquisition
on rural labor markets immediately after notification of the SEZ. This implies that the causal impact of land acquisition
is identified by changes in rural labor market outcomes in the first observable round of data after notification (τ = 0).
Therefore, (τ = −1) is the natural baseline to capture these effects.
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a traditional difference-in-differences design and has two distinct advantages. First,
we do not compare districts where SEZs were never notified to districts where SEZs
were notified since these are likely to be very different from each other. Instead, the
sample is restricted to only those districts where SEZs were notified. Second, unlike
in traditional difference-in-differences models where treatment happens in a specific
year, in this study, we exploit the staggered rollout of SEZs in different years. This
allows us to study the impact of SEZs without conflating impacts with changes in
any one particular treatment year. Thus, there is no longer just one particular year
that impacts all treatment districts which may be correlated with other year-specific
shocks.53
With the inclusion of district and year specific fixed effects in the event time frame-
work, there are two challenges that remain. The first concern to the identification
strategy is that the location and timing of land acquisition for SEZs may be cor-
related with unobservable and observable characteristics of the district like higher
growth rate, greater employment opportunities or better road connectivity, among
other factors. That is, timing of SEZs could be correlated with pre-existing trends
in the local labor market. For instance, it is possible that rapid industrialization is
driving both, the location of SEZs and changes in agricultural markets. Alternatively,
it is also possible that SEZs are introduced in areas where a larger fraction of the
labor force is employed in non-agricultural work. To address this concern, we con-
fine our sample to the major southern and western states of the country which are
comparable in economic characteristics like GDP growth, population growth and the
degree of industrialization. Further, we exclude major cities like Mumbai, Chennai
and Bangalore from our analysis as these cities are predominantly urban and may
not be comparable to other districts in the sample. Finally, if the location and timing
53Year specific shocks like droughts may impact agricultural labor markets in a region during a given year.
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of SEZs was correlated with district specific factors which were also driving changes
in labor markets, we would expect these trends to appear in the form of pre-existing
trends. For each outcome in our analysis in Section 1.6 below, we examine pre-existing
trends.
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Pre-Period Trends in Rural Labor Market Outcomes
A concern with the difference-in-differences estimation strategies described in Sec-
tion 1.5 is that SEZ districts may have been witnessing labor market changes in the
rural economy even before land acquisition for SEZs took place. Further, SEZs may
have developed in these districts precisely because these districts witnessed a decline
in self-farming, which created a work force available for non-agricultural work. In
order to address this concern, we investigate whether the trend in the main outcome
variables in treated districts was different from control districts in the years shortly
pre-dating the reform. Using two thick rounds, the 55th Round of the NSS corre-
sponding to 1999 - 2000 and the 61st Round corresponding to 2004 - 2005, we check
for pre-program trends in labor market outcomes in SEZ districts, before the pro-
gram was implemented. Since SEZs were notified after 2006, this data reports labor
market dynamics prior to treatment. We assign a program dummy which takes the
value 1 for treatment districts and use data from 2004 - 2005 as the ‘post’ period for
this placebo test. In these estimations all district and individual level controls are
included along-with district and year fixed effects.
Table 1.6 shows the results of the difference-in-differences specification described in
Equation 1.9 using data from the 55th and 61st Rounds of NSS data from the period
before the SEZ policy was implemented. This placebo treatment tests for any pre-
existing trends in the treatment districts. Column (1) presents the results for non
agricultural casual work. Column (2) reports the coefficient for non-agricultural earn-
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ings and column (3) shows changes in self-farming. Column (4) corresponds to casual
agricultural work and column (5) corresponds to agricultural daily casual wages. As
expected, there is no effect of the placebo treatment for any of the outcome vari-
ables. These results show that even though district-level factors like the proportion
of labor force engaged in agriculture or the percentage agricultural land irrigated
may affect the location of an SEZ, we can control for these factors using district-level
time-invariant controls interacted with the ‘post’ dummy.
1.6.2 Effect of Land Acquisition on Rural Labor Market Outcomes
In this section, we present our main findings on the causal impact of land acquisition
for SEZs on rural labor market outcomes. We present impacts on: (1) non-agricultural
casual labor; (2) real non-agricultural casual wages; (3) self-farming; (4) agricultural
casual labor; and (5) agricultural earnings and wage rates.
1.6.2.1 Changes in Non-Agricultural Casual Labor
we turn to the difference-in-differences estimation for changes in time spent in non-
agricultural employment using Equation 1.9 which are reported in Table 1.7. We
report the results for three specifications in columns (1) - (3). All estimates in-
clude survey year and district fixed effects. In addition to survey year and district
fixed effects, results in column (2) control for individual characteristics mentioned in
Table 1.3 and results in column (3) include individual controls and district level char-
acteristics interacted with a dummy for the post period. Column (3) is our preferred
specification. From Table 1.7, we find that relative to control districts from the seven
states of western and southern India, the time spent in non-agricultural employment
in treatment districts increases by 0.5 percentage points. From Table 1.5, we see that
at baseline, workers in SEZ districts spent around 4 percent of their labor time in
non-agricultural employment which translates to 0.28 workdays per week (15 days
in a year). An increase of 0.5 percentage points corresponds to an increase of 1.8
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work days in a year. This suggests negligible employment opportunities are created
for workers in the non-agricultural sector immediately following land acquisition as
construction on SEZs begin. This result is robust to all specifications presented in
Table 1.7.
Next, using Equation 1.10 we estimate the impact of land acquisition for SEZs on
non-agricultural casual labor in the event time framework. Land acquisition for SEZs
would generate greater construction activity which should provide greater employ-
ment opportunities for rural workers. As the construction of SEZs begin, the demand
for casual labor required for the construction of large industrial complexes increases
in the rural economy. Figure 1.6 presents the estimates for changes in the time spent
in non-agricultural casual labor using the event time framework. We find that the
coefficients for post-program rounds are positive and statistically significant. Land
acquisition for setting up SEZs increased time spent in non-agricultural casual labor
by around 0.13 percentage points in the short run (τ = 0). In the medium-run, the
time spent in non-agricultural casual employment rises to 0.3 percentage points (τ =
2).54 These changes are significant at the 95 percent confidence interval.
The impact of land acquisition for setting up of SEZs is positive on creating non-
agricultural employment at the intensive margin as shown by Proposition 1 of our
theoretical framework presented in Section 1.3. This result is consistent with national
level analysis of rural labor markets in India. For instance Mehrotra et al. (2014)
find that an increase in non-farm employment in the construction sector more than
doubled between 2004 and 2010. However, as suggested by Proposition 3, the increase
in non-agricultural employment falls short of the labor supply dispossessed by land
acquisition. The marginal impact of land acquisition on non-agricultural employment
54The short run refers to a period of one year from the date of SEZ approval and the medium-run refers to the
period of up to two years from the date of SEZ approval.
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is consistent with the evidence from other infrastructure programs in rural India. For
instance, Asher and Novosad (2016) finds that rural road building programs fail to
create substantial non-farm employment growth at the village-level. Therefore, the
marginal impact of land acquisition on non-farm employment in rural labor markets
do not represent structural transformation in the Indian economy. In fact, Jatav
and Sen (2013) show that education, gender and age remain barriers to workers’
participation in non-agricultural employment.
1.6.2.2 Non-Agricultural Earnings
We next turn to impacts of land acquisition on real non-agricultural casual wages. Ta-
ble 1.8 reports the difference-in-differences estimates for real non-agricultural wages.
We find that real non-agricultural wages increase by 0.41 rupees per day from the
baseline value of 5.3 rupees per day. These results are significant at the 95 per-
cent confidence level. Correspondingly, Figure 1.7 shows the results using the event
time framework. We see that real non-agricultural wages increase by 1.4 rupees per
day in the short-run and 1.5 rupees per day in the medium-run, respectively. The
short-term and medium-run impact of land acquisition on non-agricultural wages are
similar in magnitude which implies that SEZs do not create spillover demand for
non-agricultural labor in the economy.
Changes in real non-agricultural casual wages reflect increased demand for non-
agricultural employment created by SEZs. As agricultural land is diverted towards
creating manufacturing and residential units, jobs are created primarily in the con-
struction sector which increases time spent in non-agricultural labor and wages. How-
ever, these changes are primarily witnessed in the demand for casual labor and not
permanent wage employment in the non-agricultural sector.55 Several studies have
55Hyun, Ravi, et al. (2018) show that wage employment in the formal sector also increases after SEZs become
operational.
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discussed the trend towards increasing ‘informalization’ of non-farm employment in
India. For instance, Sundaram (2008) finds that between 14 and 27 million workers
in the non-farm sector lack social security, retirement benefits and job security.
Similarly, SEZs do not create long-term and high-paying employment opportunities
for the local economy. Our findings are consistent with evidence on non-farm em-
ployment and wages in rural India. Lanjouw and Murgai (2009) show that non-
agricultural employment in rural India predominantly consists of low-paying casual
labor jobs which do not increase consumption levels of workers and have no impact
rural poverty. The impact of SEZs on non-agricultural earnings also suggest that
wages in the sector do not increase the standard of living for workers in the rural
economy.
Hyun, Ravi, et al. (2018) find that after SEZs get operational they create formal sector
employment. However, in our study focusing on casual labor markets, we find that the
employment generation potential of SEZs for unskilled workers is limited. This is not
surprising as Banerjee-Guha (2008) argues that over 62 percent of SEZs produce IT-
enabled services and only five percent of SEZs produce manufactured outputs. This
implies that the ability of SEZs to generate low-skill employment opportunities at a
large scale, is limited. Therefore, SEZs would simply reorganize the space-relations
in capitalist production by creating ‘enclaves’ for capitalist accumulation. Several
studies suggest that the unskilled poor labor force relies on short-term rural to urban
migration (Coffey et al., 2011), low paying agricultural employment (Lanjouw and
Murgai, 2009) or other coping mechanisms in response to the prevailing agrarian
distress in India.
Correspondingly, the employment growth in the non-farm sector can be explained in
terms of a ‘push’ out from agriculture, rather than the ‘pull’ of the SEZ sector. This is
contrary to claims made by SEZ developers and the state governments. For instance,
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in several cases, the state government acquired land from farmers on the condition
that SEZs would create permanent employment opportunities for dispossessed families
((Kumar, 2006); (Jadhav, 2018)).
1.6.2.3 Self-Farming
We next turn to examining impacts on self-farming. The estimates for time-spent in
self-farming using the difference-in-differences estimation are presented in Table 1.9.
Using the preferred specification which controls for individual and district-level char-
acteristics, column (3) shows that self-farming declines by 3 percentage points from
the baseline mean of 23 percent after land acquisition for setting up of SEZs. This
translates into a decline of around 11 days in a year.
Similar to the difference-in-differences specification, Figure 1.8 presents the estimates
for proportion of labor time spent in self-farming after land acquisition for SEZs.
Using the event time framework, we find that in the short-run, time spent in self-
farming falls by 2 percentage points. This corresponds to the direct effect of land
acquisition as farmers get dispossessed due to land acquisition for SEZs. Since SEZs
require the transfer of agricultural land from farmers, the proportion of land holders
in the rural economy would decline and consequently, there would be a decrease in
labor time allocated to self-employment in agriculture. The impact of land acquisition
for SEZs is not confined to the short run as we find that labor time allocated to self-
farming continues to decline by 5 percentage points in the medium-run. This medium-
run decline in time spent in self-farming suggests that the process of dispossession of
farmers continues even after SEZs are created.
The legal framework created to support land acquisition changes the traditional rules
governing the sale of agricultural land. While land acquisition for SEZs entail a one-
time transfer of land from agricultural to non-agricultural use, it weakens customary
practices and institutions around land markets in the Indian countryside. Once force-
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ful acquisition of agricultural land is legitimized by state policy, small and marginal
farmers become vulnerable to land grabs by large farmers, local politicians or other
powerful social groups. This alters their perceptions about the security of their land
and investments for two reasons.
First, by dispossessing small farmers, land acquisition increases the proportion of
marginal and small farmers in the economy who do not own enough land to under-
take subsistence agriculture and are net suppliers of labor in the economy. As can
be seen from Figure 1.4, SEZs districts witness an increase in the proportion of rural
land held by marginal and small farmers between 2005 and 2010.56 Marginal and
small landholdings increase by 7 percentage points. The corresponding increase in
the proportion of small and marginal land in non-SEZ districts from these states is
3 percentage points during the same time period. The increase in the proportion
of marginal and small landholdings in SEZ notified districts would increase the sup-
ply of agricultural labor in the countryside as output on small farms is not enough
to provide for the subsistence needs of farmers. This increased class of small and
marginal farmers would rely on private wage employment in agriculture to augment
their incomes.
Second, land acquisition also reduces landholdings of large and medium farmers who
are primary employers of agricultural labor. The proportion of agricultural land held
in medium and large farms declines by around 6 percentage points in SEZ districts
(Figure 1.4). The corresponding decline in non-SEZ districts is around 3 percentage
points. Further, SEZs create expectations for greater non-agricultural land use in set-
ting up residential facilities and shopping centers (Levien, 2013). This provides large
landowners with an opportunity to diversify agricultural land for non-agricultural use
56Landholdings smaller than 1 hectare are classified as marginal landholding between 1 hectare and 2 hectares are
classified as small. Landholdings between 2 hectares and 10 hectares are medium and landholdings greater than 10
hectares are classified as large.
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as SEZs increase the opportunity of cost of using rural land for agricultural purposes.
With industrial activity in the countryside, there are greater opportunities for non-
agricultural land use. The net impact of both these changes is a reduction in labor
demand. Therefore, land acquisition creates a situation of excess labor supply and
shrinking labor demand in the agricultural economy. These changes can extend upto
the medium-run and would impact agricultural earnings and well-being of agricultural
workers even after the initial round of land acquisition for SEZs.
1.6.2.4 Changes in Casual Agricultural Labor
Table 1.10 estimates the results for the difference-in-differences specification. We find
that in our preferred specification of column (3), labor time in agricultural employ-
ment increases by 2 percentage points from the baseline value of 18 percent which
is statistically significant. This translates into an increase of 7.2 workdays in a year.
Figure 1.9 shows the results for changes in casual agricultural labor in SEZ districts
using the event time framework. We find that in the short-run land acquisition in-
creases labor time spent in casual agricultural labor by around 4 percentage points
and in the medium-run, labor time in casual agricultural employment increases to 6
percentage points.
An increase in the proportion of time devoted to casual agricultural labor after land
acquisition for SEZs is counter-intuitive. Contrary to claims that SEZs would cre-
ate non agricultural employment which would crowd-out labor from agriculture, we
find that agricultural labor force participation actually increases. This paradoxical
result underscores the developmental challenge of ‘underemployment’ in agriculture.
Lanjouw and Murgai (2009) argue that agricultural employment provides subsistence
income for the uneducated, poor and low caste sections of the labor force. Similarly,
Abraham (2009) and Jatav and Sen (2013) show that the crisis of stagnant produc-
tivity, price instability and low incomes is increasing the distress of agrarian families.
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In this context, increasing labor time spent in agriculture is particularly alarming as
the influx of workers into this sector would depress wages and incomes further.
There may be two causes for this paradoxical result. First, land acquisition leads
to a decline in landholdings and labor time spent in self-farming as discussed above.
As land acquisition dispossesses small and medium farmers there is an increase in
the supply of casual landless workers in the rural economy. Second, creation of
non-agricultural employment in the SEZ sector has not been robust, particularly
for unskilled agricultural workers. The medium-run increase in time spent in casual
agricultural labor suggests that the small and marginal farmers dispossessed by SEZs
have not been absorbed by wage employment in the non-agricultural sector after the
advent of SEZs.
Agricultural labor is the predominant occupation in the states used in this study. In
states like Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat and Karnataka the proportion of
rural population engaged in agriculture is above 70 percent while the national average
is 64 percent in 2011-2012. At 77 percent, Maharashtra has the highest proportion
of rural labor force in agriculture (National Sample Survey Office, 2013). In this
scenario, an increase in labor time spent in agriculture would have adverse impacts
on agrarian incomes of workers in this sector. Therefore, SEZs may adversely impact
the rural economy by increasing the labor supply in this sector. The agricultural
sector provides workers with subsistence employment as it absorbs excess labor in
the rural economy. Therefore, the influx of landless workers dispossessed by land
acquisition and the sluggish rate of employment creation in the SEZ sector would
exert a downward pressure on agricultural incomes.
1.6.2.5 Agricultural Earnings and Wage Rates
Next, we discuss the impact of land acquisition for SEZs on agricultural earnings
and wage rates. From the difference-in-differences specification in Table 1.11 we
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find no change in agricultural earnings in treatment districts after land acquisition.
Similar to the increase in agricultural labor, this is an important result to explain
the dynamics of agricultural labor markets in India. Similarly, Figure 1.10 shows the
event time estimation results for real daily agricultural earnings in districts where
land was acquired for SEZs. We find that there is no statistically significant change
in real daily agricultural earnings. As suggested by Proposition 2 of Section 1.3,
labor demand in agriculture and consequently, earnings in agricultural employment
remain unchanged. As agricultural earnings remain constant, we examine district
level agricultural wage rates below.
Figure 1.5 presents the trends in district-level real agricultural wages in SEZ and
non-SEZ districts used in this study. We find that the wage rate of agricultural
employment is increasing in both SEZ and non-SEZ districts between 2005 - 2010.
The increase in agricultural wage rate can be attributed to the National Employment
Guarantee Act of 2005 which imposes a wage floor on private employment.57 The
increase in labor supply created by land acquisition explains why earnings may not
be rising in SEZ districts.
However, this increase in the wage rate does not translate into actual earnings by
agricultural labor as there is excess labor supply in these districts as seen by the Ta-
ble 1.10. This involuntary employment allows employers to keep their total wage bill
constant even when the agricultural wage rate is high. This is a paradoxical result as
it suggests that earnings decline even when the exogenously fixed wage rate increases.
The crisis in Indian agriculture is manifested by stagnant productivity, low rates of
technological adoption and high price volatility faced by farmers (Abraham, 2009).
57The National Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) of 2005 provides 100 days of employment to every rural
household at the legal minimum wage. This provides a wage floor for private employers as workers would not be
willing to work for wages lower than those paid by NREGA. This Act was implemented in a phased manner between
2006 – 2008 in all rural areas of the country including the districts in our sample. See Misra (2019b) for an overview
of the impact of NREGA on rural wages.
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In this context, land acquisition for SEZs and the slow rate of employment creation in
the SEZ sector ‘push’ workers into agricultural employment which depresses incomes
in this sector.
1.6.2.6 Robustness
We test the robustness of the difference-in-differences estimation strategy in three
ways. First, we construct a district-level panel to re-estimate the difference-in-
differences model since our identification rests on district-level variation in the timing
of SEZ notification. The results are presented in Table A.1. Second, we estimate
Equation 1.9 in a propensity score matching estimation framework in Appendix A.3.2.
Finally, we re-estimate the difference-in-differences model by dropping one state at
a time, since it is possible that a single outlier is driving the results. We present
further details in Appendix A.3.3. We find that our main difference-in-differences
results remain robust to all three alternative specifications.
We also test the robustness of our event time estimates. The main concern with the
event time identification strategy is that the location and timing of land acquisitions
for SEZs may be correlated with unobservable district level characteristics. However,
for all outcomes examined in Section 1.6.2, we find no evidence of preexisting trends.
For instance, if rapid industrialization in a district was driving land acquisition and
changes in rural labor market outcomes, we would expect to see evidence of a positive
pre-trend. In Figures 1.6 - 1.10, we find no existence of a positive pre-trend. In
other robustness checks for the event time framework, we test the robustness of our
estimates by including individual specific controls reported in Table 1.3 and district-
specific linear time trends. The results are presented in Figure 1.11. Our results are
robust to including these controls in all cases except time spent in non-agricultural
casual labor and earnings in the non-agricultural sector. Since land acquisition for
SEZs had a weak impact on non-agricultural employment generated in the rural
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economy (Table A.3), it is not surprising that after controlling for education, gender
and caste we find that SEZs do not increase non-agricultural employment and earnings
in the rural economy.
1.7 Mechanisms
Our results show that land acquisition for SEZs increases labor time spent in non-
agricultural casual labor and reduces labor time spent in self-farming. Further, we
find that agricultural wages do not increase in SEZ districts even as wage rates are
rising since there is an increase in agricultural labor supply created by dispossession
of small farmers. In this section, we discuss the possible mechanisms for these changes
in rural labor markets.
1.7.1 Agricultural Productivity
One possible explanation for changes in labor time spent in agricultural employment
is changes in agricultural productivity. If SEZs lead to an increase in agricultural
productivity, we would expect an increase in labor demand in agriculture and corre-
spondingly self-farming on small farms would decline. Land acquisition for SEZs can
have a positive impact on agricultural productivity if relatively less fertile agricultural
land is used for the setting up of manufacturing units and the land remaining under
agriculture is relatively more fertile or well-irrigated.
To test if this mechanism explains labor market changes in districts where land was
acquired for SEZs, we estimate impacts on agricultural productivity in Figure 1.12
using Equation 1.10. Table 1.4 shows the mean productivity of crops in SEZ districts
before 2006. The average productivity of food and cash crops was 4.57 tonnes per
hectare and 1.76 tonnes per hectare respectively.58 Figure 1.12a estimates changes in
58Food crops comprise of rice, wheat, pulses and cereals and cash crops comprise of oil, cotton, sugarcane and
soybean.
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agricultural productivity for the major food crops of the region. We find that there is
no statistically significant impact of SEZs on the productivity of food crops. Further,
Figure 1.12b shows changes in agricultural productivity for the major cash crops of
the region. We find that there is no impact of SEZs on the productivity of cash
crops as well. Therefore, we conclude that labor market changes after SEZs cannot
be attributed to changes in agricultural productivity.59
1.7.2 Land Use
We next examine land use patterns. Land use patterns in the agrarian economy
may change for two reasons. First, as SEZs are developed on agricultural land,
large landlords or rentier classes may transition from being agriculture to a pre-
capitalist class with diversified investments. For instance, many SEZ projects have
led to large landlords using agricultural land under their control to build housing
colonies near SEZ complexes (Levien, 2011). In some cases, large landlords would
anticipate increases in future land rates and decide to sell their land in the future.
Second, as land markets develop after the state relaxes regulations surrounding land
sales, small farmers become vulnerable to involuntary land grabs in the future ei-
ther by the newly emerging class of rural capital or by SEZ developers. Agricultural
landownership and sales are governed by traditional norms and customs (Levien,
2015a). Basu (2019) argues that land markets are thin and sale of agricultural land
takes place only when farmers are in distress. However, land acquisition for SEZs
weakens these traditional ties of farmers with agricultural land. Levien (2011) shows
that land sales increase significantly after SEZs were established in India. In this
scenario, farmers would be reluctant to invest in agricultural production as the un-
certainty related to agriculture increases. Several case studies find evidence of land
59In their study on agricultural wage formation for rice farmers in Bangladesh, Boyce, Ravallion, et al. (1991) find
that nominal wages are sticky and do not respond to changes in productivity and output prices. Therefore we cannot
expect wages to increase in the absence of any productivity improvements as shown by Figure 1.12.
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grabs by SEZs developers. For instance, Sen (2019) show that the provisions of the
SEZ Act allowed private developers to grab large tracts of land from farmers to set
up ancillary facilities and residential complexes around SEZs.
Both these factors would result in a decline in the proportion of agricultural land
under cultivation. Figure 1.13 shows changes in land use patterns estimated using
the event time framework. As suggested by the discussion above, the proportion of
agricultural land cultivated declines by around 5 percentage points in the medium-
run (Figure 1.13a). Similarly, the proportion of agricultural land left fallow increases
by around 4 percentage points in the medium-run (Figure 1.13b). Therefore, the
impact of SEZs on agricultural labor markets is not confined to a one-time transfer
of agricultural land from farmers for setting up of manufacturing units. In fact, land
acquisition for SEZs leads to changes in the medium-run in land use patterns in the
countryside. As farmers anticipate further changes in landownership due to changes
in factor prices for land and labor, agricultural land use declines.
This medium-run decline in agricultural land use is important as it suggests that the
indirect impact of SEZs on agricultural landownership is significant and adversely im-
pacts the welfare of small farmers and workers in the agricultural sector. Therefore,
changes in land use patterns may explain the reduction in time spent in self-farming
and an increase in the supply of agricultural labor. A decline in the proportion of agri-
cultural land under cultivation suggests that farmers may be reluctant to undertake
productive investments on their land as SEZs may provide them with opportuni-
ties to diversify away from agriculture. This increases the labor time spent in both
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors.
These findings corroborate evidence from field based studies that show the large
scale conversion of agricultural land for non-agricultural purpose has accelerated after
SEZs. Ghatak and Mookherjee (2014) show that land acquisition may lead to under
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investment in agricultural land by tenant farmers under sharecropping arrangements
when they fear that landlords may divert land away from agricultural production.
With more land being allotted for SEZs, townships and industries, land under culti-
vation has reduced significantly (Goswami, 2008). Further, we also empirically test
the findings from fieldwork based political economy literature which show that land
markets created by SEZs lead to the creation of a rural rentier class who profits from
buying agricultural land from farmers and developing real estate ((Levien, 2011);
(Levien, 2015b)).
1.8 Conclusion
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) established on agricultural land have the potential to
benefit the rural economy by creating non-agricultural employment and shifting labor
away from agriculture. In India, where over 64 percent of the rural economy works
in agriculture, crowding-out of labor away from agriculture has the potential to raise
rural wages and living standards. Using nationally representative sample survey data
on employment and a new data set compiled using archival research to determine the
date of land acquisition for SEZs, this chapter provides the first empirical estimates
of the impact of India’s SEZ policy on rural labor markets in districts where land is
acquired.
This chapter finds that land acquisition for SEZs led to a significant decline in labor
time devoted to self-farming and an increase in labor time spent as casual wage work-
ers in the agricultural sector. Contrary to expectations of a structural transformation,
the labor demand generated by the non-agricultural SEZ sector is marginal and not
sufficient to pull workers out of the traditional agricultural sector characterized by
low productivity and underemployment. Further, we argue that land acquisition for
SEZs has an adverse impact on income distribution in the rural economy. On the
one hand, real agricultural earnings remain stagnant, and on the other hand, in-
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frastructure development following the creation of SEZs in the region increases the
opportunity cost of using land for agricultural production for the elite. This creates
opportunities for large farmers to diversify land away from agricultural production.
Consequently, wealth inequality in the countryside worsens after SEZs.
Therefore, our findings suggest that SEZs adversely impact rural labor markets and
have detrimental effects on agricultural incomes. This is particularly surprising since
wage rates for agricultural labor are increasing over the time period in our study,
2006 - 2012. Consequently, farmers dispossessed from their land do not benefit from
increased employment creation and higher incomes generated by the SEZ sector.
This explains farmer resistance to land acquisition for SEZs and their reluctance to
part with their land which provided them with the means for subsistence production.
Further, SEZs cannot be considered as a one-time transfer of agricultural land for non-
agricultural use since we find that land acquisition continues to impact rural labor
markets even in the medium-run. This is because land acquisition drives for SEZs and
the expected increase in land values weaken traditional rules governing land sales in
the agrarian economy. This leaves small farmers vulnerable to land grabs by the local
elite in the future. Declining proportions of agricultural land used for cultivation and
an increase in the proportion of agricultural land left uncultivated (fallow) suggest
that land acquisition creates uncertainly over land ownership and security. Future
research on rural labor markets can explore the impact of uncertainly created by land
acquisition and its impact on distress sales of agricultural land, production decisions
and labor demand.
Since programs like SEZs are not successful in reducing the labor force engaged in
agriculture, development policy should focus on measures to improve agricultural
productivity and incomes as suggested by Byerlee et al. (2009). The neglect of the
agricultural sector has contributed to disproportionate concentration of poverty in
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rural areas (75 percent) in India. Policies like employment guarantee for rural workers
and, capital investment in agriculture should be prioritized at a time when economic
disparities in the countryside are widening at an alarming rate. This research suggests
that land acquisition for SEZs may aggravate the distress in the agrarian economy
by dispossessing farmers without creating non-farm employment and diverting land
away from agricultural production. Future research should focus on addressing the
bottlenecks to structural transformation as a means to improving the standard of
living for over 300 million small and marginal farmers in India.
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Note: This figure shows the procedure for setting up an SEZ based on the procedure laid down in the SEZ Act, 2005 and the minutes of the
meetings conducted by the Board of Approval (BoA) of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.
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Figure 1.2: Districts where SEZs were notified between 2006 - 2012
Note: This map shows the location of districts where SEZs were notified between 2006 - 2012 throughout
India. This study uses SEZ districts from the states of Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka,
Kerala, Telangana and Tamil Nadu.
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Figure 1.3: Number of SEZs Notified between 2006 -
2012 in States included in our Sample
Note: This figure shows the number of notified SEZs between 2006 - 2012.
This study uses SEZ districts from the states of Gujarat, Maharashtra,
Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Telangana and Tamil Nadu.
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Figure 1.4: Distribution of Landownership in SEZ Notified Districts
vs. Non-SEZ Districts
a: Land Distribution in SEZ Notified Districts
b: Land Distribution in Non-SEZ Districts
Note: This figure shows changes in the proportion of agricultural land held by each of the
four categories of landholdings - marginal (less than 1 hectares), small (between 1-2 hectares),
medium (2-10 hectares) and large (above 10 hectares). Data from 2005 presents pre-SEZ
land distribution and 2010 data corresponds to the post-SEZ land distribution. Data on land
distribution is taken from ICRISAT.
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Figure 1.5: Real Daily Agricultural Wage Rates
Note: This figure shows the trend in real daily agricultural wage rates using the
ICRISAT data. Trends are shown separately for districts where at least one SEZ
was notified and other districts.
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Figure 1.6: Proportion of Time Spent in Non-Agricultural
Casual Labor
Note: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 18-60
years of age across 4 NSS survey rounds (2004, 2007, 2010 and 2012). The figure
presents the effects of land acquisition for SEZs on proportion of time spent in
non-agricultural employment. These estimates are intent-to-treat effects of land
acquisition for SEZs relative to the round before land acquisition (τ = −1).
For instance, if land acquisition in a district occurred in 2009, the NSS surveys
conducted in 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2012 are denoted as τ = −2, τ = −1, τ = 0
and τ = 1, respectively. Estimates include district and year (round) fixed effects.
95% confidence interval is presented, standard errors are clustered at the district
level.
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Figure 1.7: Real Daily Non-Agricultural Earnings
Note: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 18-60 years of
age across 4 NSS survey rounds (2004, 2007, 2010 and 2012). The figure presents the
effects of land acquisition for SEZs on real daily non-agricultural earnings in rupees.
These estimates are intent-to-treat effects of land acquisition for SEZs relative to
the round before land acquisition (τ = −1). For instance, if land acquisition in
a district occurred in 2009, the NSS surveys conduced in 2004, 2007, 2010, and
2012 are denoted as τ = −2, τ = −1, τ = 0 and τ = 1, respectively. Estimates
include district and year (round) fixed effects. 95% confidence interval is presented,
standard errors are clustered at the district level.
65
Figure 1.8: Proportion of Time Spent in Self-Farming
Note: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 18-60 years
of age across 4 NSS survey rounds (2004, 2007, 2010 and 2012). The figure presents
the effects of land acquisition for SEZs on proportion of time spent in self-farming.
These estimates are intent-to-treat effects of land acquisition for SEZs relative to
the round before land acquisition (τ = −1). For instance, if land acquisition in
a district occurred in 2009, the NSS surveys conduced in 2004, 2007, 2010, and
2012 are denoted as τ = −2, τ = −1, τ = 0 and τ = 1, respectively. Estimates
include district and year (round) fixed effects. 95% confidence interval is presented,
standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Figure 1.9: Proportion of Time Spent in Agricultural Casual
Labor
Note: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 18-60 years
of age across 4 NSS survey rounds (2004, 2007, 2010 and 2012). The figure presents
the effects of land acquisition for SEZs on proportion of time spent in agricultural
employment. These estimates are intent-to-treat effects of land acquisition for
SEZs relative to the round before land acquisition (τ = −1). For instance, if land
acquisition in a district occurred in 2009, the NSS surveys conduced in 2004, 2007,
2010, and 2012 are denoted as τ = −2, τ = −1, τ = 0 and τ = 1, respectively.
Estimates include district and year (round) fixed effects. 95% confidence interval is
presented, standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Figure 1.10: Real Daily Agricultural Earnings
Note: Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals between 18-60 years
of age across 4 NSS survey rounds (2004, 2007, 2010 and 2012). The figure presents
the effects of land acquisition for SEZs on real daily agricultural earnings in rupees.
These estimates are intent-to-treat effects of land acquisition for SEZs relative to
the round before land acquisition (τ = −1). For instance, if land acquisition in a
district occurred in 2009, the NSS surveys conduced in 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2012
are denoted as τ = −2, τ = −1, τ = 0 and τ = 1, respectively. Estimates include
district and year fixed effects. 95% confidence interval is presented, standard errors
are clustered at the district level.
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Figure 1.11: Robustness Checks: Including District-Level
Linear Trends and Individual Controls
a: Non-Agricultural Employ-
ment b: Non-Agricultural Earnings
c: Self-Farming d: Agricultural Employment
e: Agricultural Earnings
Note: This figure presents the estimates for the event time specification using
district-level linear time trends and individual controls like age and education
mentioned in Table 1.3. Sample includes a repeated cross-section of individuals
between 18-60 years across 4 NSS survey rounds (2004, 2007, 2010 and 2012).
These estimates are intent-to-treat effects of land acquisition for SEZs relative to
the round before land acquisition (τ = −1). For instance, if land acquisition in a
district occurred in 2009, the NSS surveys conduced in 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2012
are denoted as τ = -2, τ = -1, τ = 0 and τ = 1, respectively. Estimates include
district and year fixed effects. 95% confidence interval is presented, standard errors
are clustered at the district level.
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Figure 1.12: Agricultural Productivity
a: Productivity of Food Crops
b: Productivity of Cash Crops
Note: The figure presents the effects of land acquisition for SEZs on agricultural productivity
using ICRISAT data. These estimates are intent-to-treat effects of land acquisition for SEZs
relative to the round before land acquisition (τ = −1). Food crops include - rice, wheat, cereals,
and pulses. Cash crops include - sugarcane, oil, cotton, and soy. Estimates include district
and year fixed effects. 95% confidence interval is presented, standard errors are clustered at
the district level.
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Figure 1.13: Agricultural Land Use
a: Proportion of Sown Land
b: Proportion of Fallow Land
Note: The figure presents the effects of land acquisition for SEZs on agricultural land use
using ICRISAT data. These estimates are intent-to-treat effects of land acquisition for SEZs
relative to the round before land acquisition (τ = −1). Estimates include district and year
(round) fixed effects. 95% confidence interval is presented, standard errors are clustered at the
district level.
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Table 1.1: Distribution of Notified SEZs by State and Year
State/UT 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
Jharkhand 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Chandigarh 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
Chhattisgarh 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2
Madhya Pradesh 1 0 0 1 0 0 4 2
Nagaland 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2
Punjab 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
Rajasthan 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 3
Goa 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3
Odisha 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 4
West Bengal 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 5
Uttar Pradesh 3 4 7 0 2 1 0 17
Haryana 1 5 6 3 2 2 0 19
Karnataka* 5 2 0 6 3 3 1 20
Kerala* 5 2 0 6 3 3 1 20
Gujarat* 4 4 6 7 0 1 0 22
Andhra Pradesh* 4 9 1 7 1 1 0 23
Telangana* 8 22 4 3 1 1 0 39
Maharashtra* 4 14 12 6 3 0 1 40
Tamil Nadu* 9 14 12 7 1 0 0 43
Total 53 90 55 49 20 14 5 286
Note: This table presents an overview of the number of SEZs notified in each year between 2006 - 2012 by
state/union territory (UT). States marked with ∗ are used in this study. These states account for 72 percent of
all notified SEZs in the country.
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Table 1.2: District Level Controls at Baseline (2004 - 2005)
Variable SEZ Districts Non-SEZ Districts p-value Source
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fraction Scheduled Castes 0.15 0.14 0.674 Census 2001
Fraction Scheduled Tribes 0.08 0.11 0.232 Census 2001
Fraction Literate Male 0.58 0.60 0.023 Census 2001
Fraction Literate Female 0.42 0.40 0.023 Census 2001
Fraction Male Labor Force 0.62 0.59 0.003 Census 2001
Fraction Female Labor
Force
0.38 0.41 0.003 Census 2001
Fraction Agricultural La-
bor
0.25 0.26 0.419 Census 2001
Fraction Cultivators 0.26 0.30 0.024 Census 2001
Population Density 360 263 0.007 Census 2001
Fraction Irrigated 0.36 0.30 0.086 Census 2001
Population below Poverty
Line
0.16 0.23 0.005 NSS (CES) 2004
Number of Districts 61 98
Note: This table shows the baseline means of district level controls used in all estimations. Columns (1) and (2)
present the mean values of controls for districts where land SEZs were notified and control districts respectively.
Column (3) presents the p-values of the student’s t-test of equality of means in columns (1) and (2). Column (4)
gives the data source used in this chapter. The 2004 NSS Consumption Expenditure Survey (CES) is used for
calculating the proportion of population below poverty line. All other controls are constructed using the Census
2001 Village Directories.
Table 1.3: Individual Level Controls
Variable SEZ Districts Non-SEZ Districts p-value
(1) (2) (3)
Age 36.08 36.05 0.988
Education (years) 5.56 5.41 0.853
Women 0.51 0.50 0.935
Married 0.76 0.77 0.979
Scheduled Tribes 0.08 0.10 0.596
Scheduled Castes 0.183 0.177 0.930
Other Backward Castes 0.51 0.48 0.77
Muslims 0.08 0.06 0.743
Household size 4.77 5.01 0.514
Number of Observations 92,959 108,736
Note: This table shows the mean of individual level controls used in all estimations using the 61st, 64th, 66th
and the 68th NSS Rounds. Columns (1) and (2) present the mean values of controls for districts where land
SEZs were notified and control districts respectively. Column (3) presents the p-values of the student’s t-test of
equality of means in columns (1) and (2). Individuals between 18 - 60 years are included in our sample.
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics: ICRISAT Data
Variable Mean Standard deviation
Real Agricultural Wage Rate 19.13 17.02
Productivity of Food Crops 4.57 3.80
Productivity of Cash Crops 1.76 5.65
Proportion of Net Sown Land 0.45 0.15
Proportion of Fallow Land 0.07 0.06
Note: This table shows the mean and standard deviation for real agricultural wages, agricultural productivity
and land use using ICRISAT data. District-level wage rates are deflated using the monthly, state-level price index
for rural laborers from the Indian Labor Bureau. Agricultural productivity is calculated in (tonnes/hectares) and
the proportion of net sown and fallow area is calculated using the total agricultural land at the district level.
Table 1.5: Outcome Variables at Baseline 2004-2005
Variable SEZ Districts Non-SEZ Districts p-value
(1) (2) (3)
Non-Agricultural Employment
Casual Non-Agricultural Labor 4.10% 3.01% 0.699
Non-Agricultural Wage Employment 6.33% 4.84% 0.700
Non-Agricultural Self-Employment 8.79% 6.30 0.569
Agricultural Employment
Self-Farming 23.67% 31.12% 0.287
Casual Labor in Agriculture 18.51% 22.41% 0.506
Domestic Work 22.20% 18.93% 0.610
Unemployed 8.87% 7.05% 0.623
Not in Labor Force 7.64% 6.43% 0.765
Non-Agricultural Daily earnings (real) 1.64 1.10 0.678
Agricultural Daily earnings (real) 4.16 4.40 0.882
Number of Observations 27,622 31,715
Note: This table shows the mean and standard deviation of labor market outcomes using the 61st Round (2004-
05) of the NSS. Columns (1) and (2) present the mean values of controls for districts where SEZs were notified
and control districts respectively. Column (3) presents the p-values of the student’s t-test of equality of means in
columns (1) and (2). Employment variables show the proportion of time spent in each activity. The mean values
are calculated using individuals between 18 - 60 years. Daily casual earnings are deflated using the monthly,
state-level price index for rural laborers from the Indian Labor Bureau.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SEZ x post 0.230 2.282 -1.115 1.063 -0.0453
(0.416) (2.398) (1.636) (0.899) (1.607)
Observations 157,925 65,667 61,261 157,925 71,647
R-squared 0.083 0.365 0.149 0.083 0.159
District FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES
District Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Note: This table reports the results for the difference-in-differences specification using a placebo treatment. This specification uses the 55th Round as the hypothetical
‘pre-period’ and the 61st Round as the hypothetical ‘post-period’. Column (1) presents the results for non-agricultural casual work. Column (2) reports the coefficient for
non-agricultural earnings and column (3) shows changes in self-farming. Column (4) corresponds to casual agricultural work and column (5) corresponds to daily agricultural
casual wages. Casual wages are deflated using the monthly, state-level price index for rural laborers from the Indian Labor Bureau. All district level time-invariant controls
are interacted with a dummy for the post-period. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.7: Difference-in-differences Estimates on Casual Non Agricultural Labor
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
SEZ x post 0.538* 0.552* 0.522*
(0.289) (0.289) (0.286)
Observations 201,695 201,285 201,285
R-squared 0.066 0.128 0.128
District FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Individual Controls NO YES YES
District Controls NO NO YES
Note: This table reports the results for the difference-in-differences specification for the proportion of time spent
in casual non-agricultural labor. All specifications include district and year fixed effects. Column (2) also includes
individual controls and column (3) includes individual and district level controls. All district level time-invariant
controls are interacted with a dummy for the post-period. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.8: Difference-in-differences Estimates on Real Daily Non-Agricultural Earn-
ings
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
SEZ x post 0.482** 0.506** 0.408**
(0.234) (0.235) (0.202)
Observations 201,695 201,285 201,285
R-squared 0.037 0.070 0.071
District FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Individual Controls NO YES YES
District Controls NO NO YES
Note: This table reports the results for difference-in-differences specification for real non-agricultural wages. All
specifications include district and year fixed effects. Casual wages are deflated using the monthly, state-level price
index for rural laborers from the Indian Labor Bureau. Column (2) also includes individual controls and column
(3) includes individual and district level controls. All district level time-invariant controls are interacted with a
dummy for the post period. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.9: Difference-in-differences Estimates on Self-Employment in Agriculture
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
SEZ x post -3.325** -3.118** -3.131**
(1.435) (1.479) (1.484)
Observations 94,799 94,725 94,725
R-squared 0.048 0.168 0.168
District FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Individual Controls NO YES YES
District Controls NO NO YES
Note: This table reports the results for difference-in-differences specification for time spent in self-employment
in agriculture. All specifications include district and year fixed effects. Column (2) also includes individual
controls and column (3) includes individual and district level controls. All district level time-invariant controls
are interacted with a dummy for the post-period. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.10: Difference-in-differences Estimates on Casual Agricultural Labor
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
SEZ x post 2.098*** 2.034*** 1.928***
(0.606) (0.590) (0.599)
Observations 201,695 201,285 201,285
R-squared 0.032 0.107 0.108
District FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Individual Controls NO YES YES
District Controls NO NO YES
Note: This table reports the results for difference-in-differences specification for time spent in casual agricultural
labor. All specifications include district and year fixed effects. Column (2) also includes individual controls and
column (3) includes individual and district level controls. All district level time-invariant controls are interacted
with a dummy for the post-period. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.11: Difference-in-differences Estimates on Real Daily Agricultural Earnings
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
SEZ x post 0.193 0.202 0.221
(0.210) (0.200) (0.196)
Observations 201,695 201,285 201,285
R-squared 0.008 0.051 0.051
District FE YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES
Individual Controls NO YES YES
District Controls NO NO YES
Note: This table reports the results for difference-in-differences specification for real casual agricultural wages.
All specifications include district and year fixed effects. Casual wages are deflated using the monthly, state-level
price index for rural laborers from the Indian Labor Bureau. Column (2) also includes individual controls and
column (3) includes individual and district level controls. All district level time-invariant controls are interacted
with a dummy for the post-period. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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CHAPTER 2
DOES HISTORICAL LAND INEQUALITY ATTENUATE
THE POSITIVE IMPACT OF INDIA’S EMPLOYMENT
GUARANTEE PROGRAM?
2.1 Introduction
The colonial land revenue system in India led to severe economic inequality and con-
centration of political power in certain parts of the country and this power imbalance
continues to be relevant today. Existing evidence suggests that social fragmentation
and concentration of political and economic power arising out of this institution af-
fects public goods provision (Banerjee, Iyer, and Somanathan, 2005) and agricultural
productivity (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005). However, if a public policy has the potential
to correct these historical imbalances, then it is important to study its impact not
just in providing income security to the poor as argued by Dre`ze (2005), but also
because such analyzes may hold valuable lessons for development policy design and
implementation. The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
(henceforth NREGA) is a policy that can potentially erode the economic hegemony
of large landowners as major employers in the Indian countryside. The guarantee of
public employment under NREGA can reduce landless workers’ dependence on large
landlords and increase their relative wage bargaining power.
The British categorized all cultivable land in India under landlord and non-landlord
systems. In the former, the responsibility for tax collection was vested in large land-
lords and in the latter, individual farmers or village communities were directly respon-
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sible for paying their taxes.1 In landlord districts, a class of large land-owners emerged
who became de facto owners of all cultivable land under their control. Consequently,
these landowning elites became influential in economic and political decision-making
and their domination continued even after India’s independence in 1947 when the
landlord-based revenue system was abolished (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005). This was in
sharp contrast to non-landlord districts where land was more equitably distributed.
The concentration of economic and political power in landlord regions adversely af-
fected the provision of public goods (Banerjee, Iyer, and Somanathan, 2007) and
agricultural investment (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005) in these districts.
The colonial land revenue institution, which created the large landlord class con-
tributed to the under-development of these regions which continues to persist today.
Table 2.1 presents a summary of district level characteristics including the propor-
tion of marginalized communities and labor force participation for landlord and non-
landlord districts.2 In 2004, 35 percent of the population in landlord districts was
below the poverty line while the corresponding figure for non-landlord districts was 24
percent. Further, literacy rates in landlord districts was only 46 percent in contrast
to 54 percent in non-landlord districts. The historical asymmetries of economic and
political power created by the institution of landlord-based revenue system provides
a unique opportunity to understand how political economy factors may obstruct the
implementation of public programs aimed at increasing rural wages.3
1The British assigned land tax liability by categorizing all cultivable land under their direct rule in India un-
der (a) landlord-based system (Zamindari), (b) non-landlord districts including individual cultivator-based system
(Ryotwari), and village-based system (Mahalwari) which are discussed in Section 2.2.
2Table 2.1 reports the mean of district-level characteristics for landlord and non-landlord districts. Districts that
were not directly controlled by the British and were ruled by Indian kings and princes are excluded from this study. At
India’s independence there were over five hundred small and large princely states. Prominent princely states included
Jammu and Kashmir, Hyderabad, Junagarh, Mysore and Travancore. Section 2 provides an overview of the colonial
land revenue system in India.
3In the remainder of this chapter the terms landlord and zamindari will be used interchangeably.
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In 2005, India legislated its flagship poverty-alleviation program, NREGA which en-
titles 100 days of work to every rural household at the legal minimum wage. It is the
largest public employment program in the world which generated 2.35 billion work-
days of employment in the financial year 2016-2017.4 NREGA impacts close to 50
million households in India and is thus a powerful tool for social and economic trans-
formation. Through its joint emphasis on social protection and livelihood security,
the program endeavors to empower the rural poor by instilling a new sense of identity
and bargaining power thus making economic growth inclusive for all in rural India.
Existing studies on NREGA stress on factors like limited administrative capacities,
low awareness of the program among beneficiaries (Ravallion et al., 2015), insuffi-
cient resource allocation (Banerjee and Saha, 2010), and corruption by bureaucrats
(Adhikari and Bhatia, 2010) and private contractors (Aggarwal et al., 2012) to ex-
plain poor performance of the program in certain states. This chapter provides the
first national level evidence to show that political economy factors like inequality in
landownership and concentration of political decision-making with the elite attenuates
the labor market impact of NREGA.
The creation of a landlord class by the colonial land revenue system and concentration
of socio-economic power associated with it can attenuate the impact of NREGA by
controlling its implementation at the local level. High inequality in landownership
in landlord districts creates monopsonistic labor markets characterized by surplus
labor which depress wages.5 Additionally, landlords also enjoy considerable political
influence in these regions and have control over local political institutions like the
4There is no official basis for providing 100 days of employment. During situations like drought, this limit can be
increased. For instance, in 2014, the government increased the legal limit to 150 days in response to a drought. More
details of the national level impact of NREGA can be found on the official NREGA website.
5Monopsonistic labor markets are characterized by few employers and many employees. Since, labor demand is
determined by few employers; both employment and wages at equilibrium are lower than those in competitive markets
(Bowles, 2009).
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Gram Panchayats (village assembles). Since the functioning of NREGA at the local
level depends on these institutions, the landowning elite have considerable influence
on its implementation. If the provision of NREGA is inadequate, it would not increase
the bargaining position of workers and wages would remain unchanged. Thus, in order
to protect their class interests, landlords thwart adequate NREGA provisioning using
their political control over local village assemblies. However, in non-landlord districts,
low levels of land inequality allow workers to demand greater provision of NREGA
from the local elite which increases their bargaining position and exerts an upward
pressure on wages.
There are three major contributions of this research. First, this chapter provides
the first empirical estimates of the role of the historic land tenure system in con-
ditioning the effect of NREGA on rural labor markets. Using temporal and geo-
graphical variation in NREGA implementation in difference- in-differences and triple
difference frameworks, this chapter finds that real casual wages rose by 6 percent in
non-landlord districts from a baseline mean of 390 rupees per month.6 This is equiv-
alent to an increase of 26 Indian Rupees (0.40 USD) in real terms in non-landlord
districts per month.7 This implies an 18 percent differential wage increase in non-
landlord districts compared to landlord districts. This wage increase is caused by a
one percentage point increase in labor-time spent by workers in public employment
in non-landlord districts. Correspondingly, labor-time spent in private employment
decreased by around 3 percentage points per day relative to the baseline mean. This
corresponds to a reduction of 5.4 days in private employment in the six months of
the lean season after the introduction of NREGA. However, the effect of NREGA on
6Casual wage is defined as wages paid for unskilled manual labor. Table 2.3 shows that the baseline value for the
natural log of daily casual wages in landlord and non-landlord districts is 2.5 and 2.6 respectively. This translates to
12 and 13 rupees per day in real terms.
7Using the 2009 exchange rate of 1USD = 66 INR.
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rural wages and private employment in landlord districts is relatively muted due to
the lower provision of public employment in these districts.
Second, this chapter disaggregates the impact of NREGA on private employment
which consists of private wage employment, self-employment and domestic employ-
ment and examines how these are conditioned by the historic land revenue system.
The decline in private employment witnessed in non-landlord districts is primarily
driven by a 2.6 percentage point decline in time spent in unpaid domestic work. This
translates into a reduction of 4.7 days in domestic employment over the entire lean
season. This is important because women in India disproportionately shoulder re-
sponsibility for unpaid work and a decline in time allocated to domestic work implies
that they benefit more from NREGA. Further, crowding-out of private employment
because of public works as suggested by Imbert and Papp (2015) may actually be
driven by a re-allocation of labor time from unpaid domestic work as opposed to from
private wage labor.
Finally, to understand how the land revenue system affects changes in agricultural
labor demand in response to NREGA, this chapter analyzes changes in agricultural
wages and time allocated to self-employment and private wage employment in agri-
culture. Like Berg, Bhattacharyya, Rajasekhar, et al. (2018) we find no impact of
NREGA on lean-season agricultural wages in landlord and non-landlord districts since
labor demand is low during this time. Additionally, in landlord districts people reduce
time spent in self-farming by 1.7 percentage points post-NREGA. This is because,
self-farming on small plots of land is a subsistence mechanism adopted by households.
When workers are provided employment under NREGA, they can substitute public
employment for self-farming to augment their incomes. This substitution would not
change the output produced by self-farming. This peculiar labor abundant feature
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of agricultural labor markets in developing countries has been extensively studied by
(Lewis, 1954) and (Sen, 1966) among others.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides an overview of
the colonial land revenue system in India and discusses its impact on the economic
development of the country. Section 2.3 discusses existing research on the functioning
of NREGA and section 2.4 discusses the data used in this chapter. Section 2.5 presents
the empirical methodology and section 2.6 presents the main results of this chapter.
Section 2.7 discusses changes in agricultural labor markets and section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Colonial Land Revenue System in India
In their seminal paper, Acemoglu, Johnson, et al. (2001) show that colonial rule
in non-settler colonies of Asia, Africa and Latin America led to the development
of extractive institutions which continued to impact economic development in these
countries even after independence.8 For instance, the institution of slavery resulted
in extreme economic inequality which adversely impacted both long-term economic
growth (Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000) and inclusive political participation like voting
rights (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2005) in the Americas. Nunn (2008) finds that four
centuries of trans-Atlantic slave trade continues to have a detrimental effect on post-
colonial economic development of African countries. In Peru, the forced mining labor
system (mita) continues to affect developmental outcomes like per-capita consumption
and public goods provision (Dell, 2010).
In India, the British instituted different land tax revenue systems in different parts
of the country. This assignment of land revenue system led to high inequality in
8Acemoglu, Johnson, et al. (2001) argue that European colonization was contingent on the disease-environment
of the region. In tropical regions where mortality rates for Europeans were higher, colonizers introduced extractive
institutions which maximized their authoritarian political control necessary for resource extraction. In contrast,
in regions where the prevalence of diseases was low, the colonizers decided to settle, and established Europe-like
institutions including property-rights and checks against government power.
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landownership under the landlord-based system known as the Zamindari or Malguzari
system enacted in Bengal Presidency, Oudh and Central Province.9 In these regions,
large landlords known as zamindars were responsible for tax collection from the entire
village or several villages. Other systems of tax collection were the Ryotwari system
and the Mahalwari system. In the former, individual cultivators owned land and
were directly responsible for paying taxes and in the latter, village level bodies owned
land and were jointly responsible for paying taxes (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005). These
systems were introduced primarily in Madras and Bombay Presidencies; and Punjab
and North Western Provinces respectively.10 The rest of India was under indirect
British rule and was governed by local kings and princes. These regions were known
as the Princely States. Iyer (2010) shows that these regions had a better provision of
public goods in comparison to regions under direct British rule.
The classification of districts in each category was based on the date of conquest.
Banerjee and Iyer (2005) find that territories conquered between 1820 and 1856 were
accorded ‘non-landlord’ status and those acquired before or after this period were
assigned as ‘landlord’ regions. This assignment was exogenous and not based on
agricultural productivity or other labor market considerations. The distribution of
land revenue system across British India can be seen in Figure 2.1.
This chapter classifies districts as landlord or non-landlord districts based on their
historic land revenue assignment. Landlord districts comprise of the malguzari or
malguzari regions and non- landlord districts consist of Mahalwari and Ryotwari
districts. Iversen et al. (2013) have argued that the Malguzari system of the Central
9Bengal Presidency comprised of present-day states of West Bengal, Bihar, Odisha and parts of Assam in India.
Oudh was a part of present-day Uttar Pradesh and Central provinces comprised of districts from the present-day
states of Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Jharkhand.
10Madras Presidency comprised of territories from modern day Tamil Nadu, parts of Karnataka, and Andhra
Pradesh (including Telangana). Bombay Presidency primarily comprised of Maharashtra and Gujarat. Additionally,
Punjab province comprised of the states of Punjab, Haryana and parts of Himachal Pradesh. Finally, North West
Province was made up of districts from western Uttar Pradesh.
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Provinces should not be classified under landlord-based system as it consisted of a
village ‘headman’ who did not have the same rights of evicting tenants at-will as the
‘zamindars’ of the Bengal Presidency. However, the defining feature of the colonial
land revenue system was the creation of a ‘landlord class’ distinct from the cultivator
who was recognized by the colonial government (Banerjee and Iyer, 2013). These
landlords could levy any tax rate on the tenant farmers under their control and were
free to keep the revenue that was left after paying the British (Banerjee and Iyer,
2005).
In malguzari regions, the village proprietor may be considered similar to large land-
lords in malguzari districts as they had control over taxation of large areas of land
under their control (Baden-Powell, 1892). Further, according to the Statistical Ab-
stract 1876 - 1885 published by the colonial government, 69 percent of the land area
(corresponding to 72 percent of villages) in Central Provinces were under the za-
mindari system (Banerjee and Iyer, 2013). Therefore, by becoming de facto owners
of land under their control, this landlord class increased its economic and political
influence by appropriating all productivity gains witnessed by nineteenth century
agriculture (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005).11
Extractive institutions concentrate political power in the hands of a few elites who ex-
tract resources from the rest of society (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013). Thezamindari
system is an extractive colonial institution which gave landlords ‘absolute control’ over
their tenant farmers as they could decide the tax rate and evict tenants if they failed
to comply. Over time the power and influence of large landlords continued unabated
11Appendix B.3 re-estimates the main results of this chapter after dropping the districts of Central Provinces using
the Iversen et al. (2013) classification. The main results of this chapter that the wage impact of NREGA is dampened
in landlord districts does not change. However, we find that landlord districts have increased provision of NREGA
if we drop the 31 districts in Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Chhattisgarh classified as malguzari. However, the
increase is not strong enough to positively impact wages in landlord districts. It is not surprising that the results
should somewhat change after dropping around 10% of the sample and this change suggests the need for further
investigation on the subject.
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and wealth-inequality soared. This inequality contributed to the economic stagna-
tion of the regions as class-based antagonism between large landlords and agricultural
workers prevented collective bargaining for public investment in zamindari districts
particularly between 1965-1980 (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005). Consequently, landlord
districts fell behind the others in the provision of public infrastructure and human
capital formation (Banerjee, Iyer, and Somanathan, 2005).
After India’s independence in 1947, several legislations aiming to correct the balance
of power between landlords and workers were enacted. In the early 1950s, the system
of zamindari was formally abolished and laws imposing a ceiling on land holdings
were legislated (Bardhan, 1984). These efforts did witness some success at the na-
tional level. For instance, Basole and Basu (2011) show that average landholding
size declined from 22 acres to 18 acres for large capitalist farmers between 1960 to
2003. However, during the same period the proportion of ‘effectively landless’ workers
increased by 14 percentage points.12
The marginal decline in the average size of land holding did not dampen the political
and social influence of large capitalist farmers in the countryside for two reasons.
First, political efforts to curtail the power of large landlords; by imposing a ceiling on
land holding size or tenancy reform in zamindari districts were largely unsuccessful
as state legislatures were predominantly controlled by land-owning classes (Besley
and Burgess, 2000).13 As a consequence, most Indian states never saw any large
scale land reform.14 In some cases, the abolition of zamindari led to the devolution
of land control and rural power from the old landlords (many of whom had already
12Basole and Basu (2011) classify all households as ‘effectively landless’ if they own less than 1 acre of land.
13Tenancy reforms aim to strengthen the position of tenant farmers by providing them with legal registration for
the land they cultivate to protect them against unlawful eviction by the landlord. In addition, these reforms formally
define how output would be shared between the cultivator and the landlord (Besley and Burgess, 2000).
14Notable exceptions being Kerala, and West Bengal. For a discussion on land reforms in India and its impact on
agricultural productivity see Ghatak and Roy (2007) and (Besley and Burgess, 2000).
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transitioned into predominantly urban lifestyles in urban centers) to a rising class
of rich peasants known as jotedars. Boyce (1987) shows that in West Bengal, the
jotedars became the principal obstacle to more far-reaching land reforms.15
Second, public sector contribution in the gross capital formation in agriculture (GCFA)
had started declining and private investment rose sharply from the 1980s (Gulati and
Bathla, 2001).16 As the state reduced its productivity enhancing investment in agri-
culture, the socio-economic domination of large landlords increased and increased
their influence and control the local decision-making. It was in this context that the
government enacted NREGA to increase rural incomes and agricultural productivity
in the countryside.
2.3 National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
2.3.1 Program Features
According to the National Employment Guarantee Act of 2005, the state would pro-
vide 100 days of employment to every rural household in India at the legal minimum
wage.17 If the state cannot provide employment within two weeks of people demand-
ing public employment, workers would be entitled for payment without work.18
Existing research has shown that NREGA has contributed to (a) increased agricul-
tural and rural wages (Berg, Bhattacharyya, Durgam, et al. (2012); Imbert and Papp
15Private households account for over 95 percent of private capital investment in agriculture and close to 75 percent
of private investment is aimed at increasing mechanization and irrigation of the land (Gulati and Bathla, 2001). These
investments are primarily undertaken by large landowners as are aimed at increasing the productivity of large-scale
capital-intensive agriculture.
16Private households account for over 95 percent of private capital investment in agriculture and close to 75 percent
of private investment is aimed at increasing mechanization and irrigation of the land (Gulati and Bathla, 2001). These
investments are primarily undertaken by large landowners as are aimed at increasing the productivity of large-scale
capital-intensive agriculture.
17The minimum wages are determined at the state level and vary considerably by state, industry and skill level.
For instance, in 2018, the minimum wage for unskilled workers ranged from 268 rupees per day in Bihar to 538 rupees
per day in Delhi.
18For a full discussion of the provisions and rights of citizens under the NREGA Act see Dre`ze et al. (2006).
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(2015)) and household savings (Ravi and Engler, 2015); (b) reduced distress migra-
tion from traditionally migration-intensive areas; (c) increased use of barren areas for
cultivation (Mann and Pande, 2012); and (d) increased nutritional intake by partici-
pants (Jha et al., 2011). Public works under NREGA also improve land quality which
contributes to productivity induced wage increases in addition to program-related
transfers (Deininger and Liu, 2019). For instance, leveling of agricultural land, and
creation of wells; and irrigation channels under NREGA enhance the agricultural
productivity of helps small and marginal farmers (Ranaware et al., 2015).
NREGA is a demand driven scheme which allows the poorest families to self-select into
the program (Dutta et al., 2012). Klonner and Oldiges (2014) find that NREGA not
only helped the most vulnerable sections (Schedule Castes and Scheduled Tribes) by
increasing their household consumption but also provided an income safety-net during
the lean season of agriculture. In 2008, around two-thirds of the workers surveyed
from six north Indian states were able to avoid hunger due to NREGA and around
75 percent respondents credited NREGA for helping them sustain their livelihoods in
the dry season of agriculture (Khera and Nayak, 2009). Overall, NREGA has allowed
rural households to increase consumption expenditure between 6.5 and 10 percent
with around a 12 percent increase for marginalized caste groups (Bose, 2017).
According to the NREGA Act of 2005, 33 percent of public employment created un-
der the scheme is reserved for women. Several studies have found that NREGA has
had a positive impact on female labor force participation (Azam, 2011), wages (Zim-
mermann, 2012) and political engagement in local decision-making (Girard, 2014).
Tsaneva and Balakrishnan (2018) find that in the first year of the program, women
living in districts where NREGA was implemented were less likely to experience
depression symptoms as the program provided them economic security and inde-
pendence. Afridi, Mukhopadhyay, et al. (2016) show that mother’s participation in
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NREGA increases time spent by children in school and leads to an improvement in
their grades. NREGA has also been shown to have a strong impact on children’s
grade progression, reading and comprehension; and math test-scores (Mani et al.,
2014).
Even though NREGA has contributed to improving economic and social indicators
across the country, NREGA implementation suffers from several problems like reduced
budgetary allocation, corruption, violation of people’s entitlements and insufficient
employment generation (Aggarwal, 2016). These shortcomings limit the ability of
NREGA to achieve its transformative potential. Indeed, problems of delayed wage
payments are effectively diluting the welfare effects of NREGA (Basu and Sen, 2015).
Further, the implementation of NREGA remains uneven across states and districts.
It is generally agreed that the states of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan, Himachal
Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh are the top performers in terms of employment creation
and enforcement of the entitlement (Dreze and Khera (2009); Dreze and Oldiges
(2007)). It is important to note that most districts in these states had the non-
landlord system of land revenue.19 However, evidence suggests that the poorer states
of Jharkhand and Bihar have not benefited significantly from NREGA (Dutta et al.
(2012); Bhatia and Dreze (2006)). Most districts in these states were placed under the
landlord-based system of land revenue. This disparity in the provision of NREGA
between districts in these states also translates into differences in NREGA’s labor
market impact.
Figure 2.2 presents the mean of rural casual (real) wages in landlord and non-landlord
districts where NREGA was introduced in the first two phases between 2006 and
19Large parts of states like Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Gujarat were ruled by Indian kings and
were indirectly controlled by the British. These Princely States are excluded from this study.
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2007.20 In 2004, before NREGA was introduced we can see that wages in landlord
districts were much lower than those in non-landlord districts. This is expected as
landlord districts lag behind non-landlord districts on several developmental indi-
cators as shown in Table 2.1. After the introduction of NREGA, there is a wage
increase in both districts but the increase in non-landlord districts is higher than the
corresponding increase in landlord districts. This is important since non-landlord dis-
tricts had higher wages even before NREGA. Therefore, it is important to investigate
whether the labor market impact of NREGA is weaker in landlord districts which
are poorer and in greater need of public employment? The next section discusses the
mechanisms by which the colonial land-revenue system may weaken the labor market
impacts of NREGA.
2.3.2 Theoretical Framework
In standard monopsonistic labor markets, both employment and wages at equilib-
rium are lower than those in competitive markets. Since these labor markets are
characterized by few employers, labor demand falls short of supply and involuntary
unemployment is created. Therefore, contrary to competitive labor markets, monop-
sonistic labor markets are characterized by rationed workers at equilibrium i.e. people
who would like to work at the prevailing wage but cannot find employment (Bowles,
2009). This mechanism forms the basis of wage suppression in monopsonistic labor
markets.
Rural labor markets in India are highly monopsonistic - characterized by high land
inequality and surplus labor. For instance, Rawal (2008) shows that the Gini co-
efficient of land ownership in India was around 0.76 in 2003. Additionally, over 40
percent of households in northern states like Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Jharkhand are
20For both landlord and non-landlord groups, districts that got NREGA in Phase I (2006) and II (2007) are included
in this figure These districts are considered ‘early’ or ‘treatment’ districts and phase III districts where NREGA became
operational in April 2008 are ‘late’ or ‘control’ districts.
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landless (Rawal, 2006). These states were primarily under landlord-based land rev-
enue system. Large landlords enjoy considerable political domination in these regions
and in the absence of any major land redistribution post-independence, this class has
managed to retain their wage setting power. Therefore, the classification of districts
by historical land revenue system not only provides us with an exogenous distribution
of land ownership but also helps us understand the role of the landowning elite in
local decision-making. This class has retained its control over local decision-making
and can influence the implementation of public programs like NREGA in order to
protect their class interests by keeping wages depressed.
The concentration of landownership in landlord districts creates a large class of small
and marginal farmers who rely on large landlords for subsistence. Small farmers lack
the resources and access to formal credit to undertake lumpy investment in agriculture
(Bardhan et al., 2000). Therefore, they rely on support from landowning elite for
informal credit (Pal, 2002) and cost sharing of purchased inputs (Bardhan, 1980).
Therefore, before the advent of NREGA, large landlords kept wages depressed using
a) monopsonistic labor markets and b) their control over political decision-making to
protect their class-interests.
In this context, NREGA was enacted to raise rural wages which were depressed for
decades. By recognizing public employment as a legal right, it provides an alternative
source of employment for rural workers. There are three reasons why it should exert
an upward pressure on rural wages. First, since NREGA employment pays the legal
minimum wage, it creates a wage-floor for private employers. Second, the guarantee
of public employment could increase the wage bargaining position of workers and
erode the wage setting power of the landowning elites. Finally, NREGA can raise
wages by creating durable public assets which can potentially increase the productiv-
ity of agriculture. If NREGA is successful in raising wages by providing alternative
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employment, it can challenge the hegemony of large landlords and correct the histor-
ical imbalance created by the institution of zamindari. Not only would higher wages
reduce profits, but the income-safety net provided to workers by NREGA could dilute
the socio-economic dominance of the landlord class.
However, the success of NREGA depends on how well it is implemented at the lo-
cal level. The implementation depends on the Gram Panchayats (village assemblies)
which receive applications for NREGA work by citizens and decide on which public
works should be created under NREGA (Dre`ze et al., 2006). If citizens were em-
powered, they would be able to collectively demand employment under NREGA and
ensure that their entitlements under the program - hundred days of employment and
payment of the legal minimum wages - take place on time. However, if workers cannot
effectively demand the provision of NREGA from the landowning elite; who control
local institutions, the latter can preserve their interests by reducing the provision of
public employment, resulting in insufficient NREGA provision. This insufficient pro-
vision of NREGA would not result in providing workers with alternative employment
to impact their wage bargaining power significantly.
In this case workers would continue to depend on large landlords for their subsistence.
In landlord dominated districts where land is concentrated with few large landowners,
labor markets are characterized by excess labor supply and wages would be deter-
mined by the subsistence needs of workers (Lewis, 1954). Therefore, landlords may
be able to keep wages depressed even after NREGA as a part of workers’ subsistence
expenditure is now met by wages received under public employment.
Since large landlords can use their market power to reduce the wage rate, there will
be no significant change in the time spent in private wage employment at equilibrium
as insufficient provision of NREGA does not alleviate workers’ dependence on large
landlords for subsistence. Further, inadequate provision of NREGA in these districts
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does not allow productivity enhancing durable infrastructure to be created and as
a result, there is no indirect impact of NREGA on wages through an increase in
agricultural productivity.
Low levels of awareness about the provisions of the Act and opaqueness in its func-
tioning may allow the local elite, usually the Pradhans (head of the village assembly)
to control the implementation of the program and restrict the supply of public em-
ployment (Misra, 2019b). Existing research shows that the provision of NREGA in
states like Bihar, Jharkhand and Odisha is insufficient and workers are rationed out
of public employment (Dutta et al. (2012); Louis (2006)). For instance, in Bihar,
over 78 percent of workers wanted to work under NREGA but could not get work.
In Chhattisgarh and Odisha, the village assembly and local officials refused to ac-
knowledge the demand for NREGA (Ambasta et al., 2008). Misra (2019c) finds that
in 2009-10, 53 percent of rural households in landlord districts wanted to work under
NREGA of which only 28 percent reported participating in the program. Therefore,
over 25 percent households were rationed out of NREGA employment. Contrary to
this, only 17 percent households were rationed in non-landlord districts.
In non-landlord districts, agricultural land is more equitably distributed and there is
no concentration of political power with the elite. Consequently, citizens would be
empowered to ensure better implementation of NREGA through social audits and
other accountability enhancing mechanisms. This enables rural workers to improve
their bargaining position with private employers as NREGA creates a wage floor. Fur-
ther, the involvement of workers in NREGA implementation at the local level ensures
that productivity enhancing infrastructure is created under NREGA which impacts
agricultural productivity and wages. For instance, in Maharashtra; Ranaware et al.
(2015) find that around 75 percent of NREGA works on private land belonged to
small (53 percent) and marginal farmers (22 percent). Therefore, the ability of work-
94
ers to ensure better provision of public employment under NREGA in non-landlord
districts would result in a stronger labor market impact of the program in these
districts, particularly in comparison to landlord districts.
2.4 Data and Outcome Variables
2.4.1 Data
The main source of data used in this chapter comes from the Employment and Unem-
ployment Rounds of the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) of India. Each
‘thick’ round of data has a sample size of about 120,000 households spread between
urban and rural areas.21 In each round, the NSSO collects data over four sub-rounds
in a year from July to June. The first two sub-rounds covering the period from July
to December correspond to the peak (rainy) season of agriculture and the last two
sub-rounds between January to June correspond to the lean or (dry) season of agri-
culture. The main specification of this chapter uses two ‘thick’ rounds covering the
period from 2004-05 to 2007-08. Data from the 61st Round from July 2004 to June
2005 forms the pre-program period and data from the 64th Round of NSSO spanning
July 2007 to June 2008 forms the post-program period. Data used in this chapter
consist of observations from rural areas during the dry season of agriculture since
public employment under NREGA is predominantly undertaken during this time of
the year.
The main identification strategy of this chapter relies on changes at the district level.
The main assumption of the identification strategy of this chapter is that before
the introduction of NREGA trends in labor market outcomes were similar across
treatment (phase I and II districts) and control districts (phase III districts). In
order to discuss pre-program trends in rural wages (figure 2.3), public employment
21Thick rounds are quinquennial rounds of surveys with a sample size of round 120,000 households. Thin rounds
conducted in the intervening period have a sample size of around 40 percent of the thick round.
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(figure 2.4) and private employment (figure 2.5) in Section 6, we use four rounds of
NSS data, the 55th round (1999-2000), 61st round (2004-2005), 64th round (2007-
2008) and 66th round (2009-2010). In addition, the falsification tests in Appendix B.1,
are conducted using the 55th and 61st rounds of NSS data which cover the period
1999-2000 and 2004-2005, respectively.
In addition to the NSS data, district level controls are constructed using several
sources of data. Demographic characteristics including caste composition, literacy
rates and workforce participation at the district level are created using the Primary
Census Abstract and the Village Directories of Census of 2001. District level poverty
head-count ratios have been constructed using the 2004 Consumption Expenditure
Round of NSSO. We also control for the date of British conquest of a region as
Banerjee and Iyer (2005) show that regions that fell under British rule before 1820
were highly fertile and witnessed greater exploitation and plunder.
Information on time-varying factors like the timing of local or state level elections
is compiled using data from the Election Commission of India. Information about
other concurrently running programs like the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojna
(PMGSY) is compiled from the program website and, data on districts affected by
left-wing movements is taken from the Planing Commission of India (2005). Finally,
information about phase-wise implementation of NREGA is taken from the web-
portal of NREGA. The mean values of district-level controls at baseline and their
sources are listed in Table 2.1.22
2.4.2 Assigning Colonial Revenue System to Districts
In addition to the NSS and the Census data, this chapter creates a new dataset
by matching district boundaries of British India (before 1947) to those in 2004 when
22Appendix B.2 discusses the construction of control variables in detail.
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NREGA was introduced. Banerjee and Iyer (2005) provide information about the land
revenue system for 169 districts in British India.23 However, geographical boundaries
of districts under colonial rule are significantly different from those today as districts
have been divided, renamed, or merged with other districts. Kumar and Somanathan
(2009) document changes in district boundaries from 1961 to 2001. By tracking
changes in district names and boundaries over time, we were able to map 169 districts
of British India to 289 present-day districts according to the Census boundaries of
2001.24 Of these, 130 districts had zamindari system and 159 districts had other
forms of land revenue systems.
Table 2.2 provides the break-up of these districts by state, land revenue system and
the phase of NREGA implementation. Our sample includes 20 out of 29 Indian
states. However, we only include districts which were directly under the British land
revenue system. Consequently, several districts from states like Rajasthan Andhra
Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat are not included in our sample. All districts
in states like Bihar, Jharkhand and West Bengal were placed under the landlord
system.25 Districts in southern and western states like Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu
and Karnataka were placed under non landlord-based revenue system. Several large
states like Assam and Uttar Pradesh had districts with both revenue systems. Since
the implementation of NREGA depends upon state and local level governments, the
fact that several states in our sample have both landlord and non-landlord districts
shows that state-level factors like differences in administrative capacity or state-level
policies do not impact our results.
23This excludes the Princely States and districts from present day Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar.
24NREGA was not operational in completely urban districts like Mumbai and Chennai which are excluded from
this analysis.
25In Appendix B.1 we exclude states like Bihar, Jharkhand and West Bengal and re-estimate the main results of
the model to confirm that the regression results for non-landlord districts are not affected by these states. Our results
hold even after excluding these states which show that factors like state-level administrative capacity does not impact
our triple-difference estimators.
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2.4.3 Employment and Wage Variables
The Employment and Unemployment Rounds of the NSSO provides information
on weekly time-use and earnings for each member of the household. This allows
us to calculate the percentage of time spent in public and private employment in
the rural sector. Further, private employment can be further decomposed into self-
employment, domestic work and private wage employment. Additionally, in order to
discuss changes in the agricultural sector, we construct variables for time spent in
self-employment and private wage employment in agriculture. For all employment
types, we calculate the daily wage rate by dividing the weekly earnings by the num-
ber of days worked in that employment. Further, these wages are deflated using the
monthly consumer price index for rural labor from the Indian Labor Bureau.
Table 2.3 shows the baseline mean values of our main labor market outcomes like
wages and employment. The causal daily wages earned by workers in landlord and
non-landlord districts were 2.55 and 2.60 natural log points respectively. This shows
that wages were similar before the introduction of NREGA.26 Further, before the
introduction of NREGA, people allocated close to 0.02 percent of their labor time
per-week in public employment in non-landlord districts. The corresponding propor-
tion was 0.2 percent for landlord districts. This shows that earlier targeted public
employment programs like Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY) worked in these districts
because these districts had a higher proportion of their population below the poverty-
line.27 However, these programs did not generate substantial public employment since
workers allocated less than one percent of their time per-week working under these
programs. Correspondingly, private work was the major source of employment for
26As NREGA requires beneficiaries to undertake casual manual labor and pays the minimum wage so individuals
with salaries or formal employment are not included in this chapter.
27Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY) was launched in April 1989 with the objective of providing employment for the
unemployed and under-employed persons in rural areas. See Neelakantan (1994) for a discussion on JRY.
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people in which they spent more than 80 percent of their time per week in both
districts.
2.5 Empirical Strategy
The assignment of NREGA was based on a poverty criterion. In the first phase the
200 poorest districts of the country received the program by February 2006. In the
second phase, another 130 districts got the program by April 2007. Finally, in the
third phase all districts of India were covered by April 2008. For this analysis, districts
that got NREGA in the first two phases would be considered ‘early’ or ‘treatment’
districts while phase three districts are considered ‘late’ or ‘control’ districts.
The ‘pre-period’ comes from the 61st Round of NSS (July 2004 - June 2005) before
NREGA was implemented. The 64th Round of NSS (July 2007 - June 2008) provides
the ‘post-period’ data where phase I and phase II districts were under the ambit of
NREGA (treatment or ‘early’) districts and phase III (control or ‘late’) districts were
not. Even though the last sub-round of data collection takes place between April and
June 2008, we can assume that due to administrative and bureaucratic delays, phase
III districts would not have been fully under NREGA in the first few months of its
roll-out. Imbert and Papp (2015) find that even in the second quarter of 2008, there
was a significant differential rise in public works in early districts which implies that
public works did not start in late districts immediately after April 2008.
2.5.1 Difference-in-Differences Framework
Recent studies have estimated the labor market impacts of NREGA using different
estimation techniques.28 Azam (2011), Imbert and Papp (2015) and Berg, Bhat-
28Some papers like Bell and Mukhopadhyay (2015) have used the election of a female sarpanch (elected head
of the village assembly) to instrument for endogeneity in NREGA participation. This is based on the finding that
NREGA implementation suffered initially from greater leakages and delays in villages with a woman sarpanch (Afridi,
Iversen, et al., 2013). These studies aim to correct for unobservable differences between households that participate in
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tacharyya, Durgam, et al. (2012) have used the spatial and temporal variation in
the implementation of NREGA in a difference-in-differences framework as their iden-
tification strategy. However, Zimmermann (2012) notes that NREGA roll-out was
not random and was based on an index of backwardness calculated by the Planning
Commission of India (PCI). This index was based on the poverty head-count ratio,
proportion of marginalized communities (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes),
agricultural wages and output per-worker using data from the mid-1990s. Conse-
quently, Klonner and Oldiges (2014) and Zimmermann (2012) use the fuzzy-regression
discontinuity design (RDD) using state-specific ranks based on the poverty index.
There are two reasons why RDD based estimates may not be applicable in the context
of this chapter. First, allocation of districts under NREGA was based on state-level
ranks from the backwardness index. There is evidence that political factors played
a role in determining district level allocation of NREGA (Gupta, 2006). Second, a
fuzzy-RDD would estimate the local average treatment effect by comparing changes
‘near’ the cut-off point (between phase II and phase III districts) which reduces the
sample size and hence the power to detect any meaningful effects. Since our sample
consists of only 289 districts which were directly under British colonial rule, the
fuzzy-RDD would reduce our sample further.
While the fuzzy-RDD may not be applicable in our estimation, the conventional
difference-in- differences estimator requires that the treatment be assigned randomly
across the population (Heckman et al., 1997). This random assignment ensures that
any unobservable characteristics that affect the outcome are controlled for as these
may be present in both groups. However, the poverty criteria in district selection
violates this assumption. In order to correct for this differential trend in ‘treatment’
NREGA and correspondingly use a village-level instrument. However, this chapter discusses the role of district level
land revenue institution and consequently, we need to control for district level factors that may bias our results.
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and ‘control’ districts, our estimation controls for time-invariant district level factors
like poverty, proportion of SC/ST, agricultural wage and productivity per-worker.29
Additionally, Zimmermann (2012) finds that districts affected by left-wing insurgency
movements were included in the first phase of NREGA. We also control for 55 districts
affected by left-movements. All district level controls are mentioned in Table 2.1.
The impact of NREGA on labor market outcomes in landlord and non-landlord dis-
tricts can be estimated separately using the difference-in-differences estimation de-
scribed by equation 2.1.
Yidt = β1NREGAd × postt + λ1Zd × postt + λ2Xdt + σHi + ηt + µd + idt (2.1)
where Yidt is the variable of interest (say ln deflated (real) wages) for an individ-
ual i in district d and during year-quarter t. NREGAd is a dummy equal to 1 if
the district got NREGA in the first two (early) phases and post is a dummy equal
to one if the observation is after 2006. Zd contains time invariant controls which
are interacted with a post-treatment dummy to capture trends correlated with the
controls. Time-invariant controls include proportion of marginalized communities,
poverty head-count ratio, and a dummy for whether the district was affected by left-
wing movements among others. Xdt are time varying district controls like normalized
deviation from mean rainfall and the length of road constructed in a year. All district
controls are listed in Table 2.1. Hi are individual controls listed in Table 2.4, ηt is
year-quarter fixed effects, µd are district fixed effects and all estimates are adjusted
for correlation idt over time within districts by clustering at the district level. Using
this regression framework, this chapter estimates the labor market impact of NREGA
in landlord and non-landlord districts separately.
29As a robustness check of the estimates, we formally incorporate criteria used to rank districts by poverty to
conduct propensity score matching and use the matched data to re-estimate the model in Appendix B.1.
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The NSSO provides sampling weights which are used to calculate summary statistics.
However, since both, NREGA and the institution of zamindari are district level phe-
nomena, our estimates should not be biased by smaller districts which may have a
fewer number of observations. Therefore, this chapter re-weights the data to ensure
that sum of all weights within a district-quarter is constant over time for each district
and proportional to the rural population (Imbert and Papp, 2015).30
2.5.2 Triple Difference Framework
In order to calculate the net or differential impact of NREGA between landlord and
non-landlord districts after the implementation of NREGA we construct a triple-
difference estimator. By using a dummy variable NL which takes a value of 1 if the
district did not have the zamindari system, we create a triple interaction term of
NREGA, post and NL for the triple-difference estimation. The estimated model is
given in equation 2.2 below.
Yidt = β1NL×NREGAd × postt + γ1NLd × postt
+ γ2NREGAd × postt + λ1Zd × postt
+ λ2Xdt + σHi + ηt + µd + idt
(2.2)
where Yidt is the variable of interest (say wages) for individual i in district d having
a historical land settlement pattern NL and during year-quarter t. The coefficient of
interest is β1 can be interpreted as the difference in the changes in an outcome (say
wages) after NREGA in non-landlord districts in comparison to the corresponding
changes in landlord districts. Therefore, landlord districts serve as a control group for
non-landlord districts in this estimation. In order to control for differences in district
level factors that may bias our estimates, we continue to include time-invariant district
30The results do not change significantly even with the original sampling weights provided by NSSO.
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controls interacted with a dummy for the post period. Coefficients γ1 and γ2 capture
the interaction terms.31 All other terms are explained above in equation 2.1.
2.6 Results: Changes in Rural Labor Market Outcomes
2.6.1 Trends in Labor Market Outcomes
Using NSSO data for the dry season (January to June) from 1999 to 2010, figure 2.3
shows the trends in the natural log of real wages in landlord and non-landlord districts
before and after NREGA was implemented. In landlord districts, wages were almost
identical between early and late districts. However, in non-landlord districts, early
districts had lower wages in comparison to the late districts (this is expected as early
districts were poorer). While wages had an upward trend in both districts, in non-
landlord districts the gap between early and late districts narrowed sharply after
NREGA. This is primarily because, wages in non-landlord districts under NREGA
rose more significantly in comparison to early districts which had the landlord-based
land revenue system.
Figure 2.4 shows trends in public employment. In the pre-program period (before
2007), the provision of public employment remained constant from 2000 to 2005 in
both landlord and non- landlord districts. However, there is a sharp discontinuity
in this trend post-NREGA as can be expected since NREGA provides guaranteed
public employment. After NREGA was implemented, there is a steep rise in public
employment for both landlord and non-landlord districts. The sharp increase in public
employment of ‘late districts’ witnessed by landlord districts in 2010 points to the
fact that by this time, NREGA was operational in all districts and the late districts
no longer provide a control for early districts. This figure underscores the importance
of including district level controls in my estimation.
31We do not include the third interaction term NREGAd ×NLd as this is time-invariant and will drop out of the
regression.
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Finally, figure 2.5 shows trends in private employment between 1999-2010. In non-
landlord districts, private employment falls significantly in early districts as workers
substitute NREGA for private employment. This explains crowding-out of private
employment in these districts. However, there is no impact on time spent in private
employment in landlord districts that received the program early (i.e. districts that
received the program by 2007). The gap between early and late landlord districts is
much smaller than that for non-landlord districts. This indicates that the effect of the
program on private employment was muted in landlord districts. Since the provision
of NREGA exerts an upward pressure on wages in non-landlord districts, it is not
surprising to find that labor demand would reduce and correspondingly, time spent
in private employment would also decline. However, by 2010, time spent in private
employment increases in both landlord and non-landlord districts. This may signal
that private labor demand increases over time in both landlord and non-landlord
districts. This could be because of enhanced agricultural productivity or reduced
public employment generated under NREGA as governments reduced budgetary al-
location over time. Next, we turn to empirically estimating the labor market impacts
of NREGA in landlord and non-landlord districts.
2.6.2 Regression Results: Changes in Rural Wages
Table 2.5 presents the estimation of equation 2.1 and equation 2.2 for the natural
log of real casual wages during the dry season. Each regression equation includes
district and year-quarter fixed effects. Columns (1) - (3) report the estimates of the
impact of NREGA on ln real casual wages in landlord districts and columns (4) -
(6) report the corresponding estimates for non-landlord districts. Finally, columns
(7) - (9) show the results of the triple-difference estimation. Each column presents
a different specification. Columns (3), (6) and (9) report the preferred specification
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including all district and individual level controls for the difference-in-differences and
triple-difference estimations.32
There is no effect of NREGA on real casual wages in landlord districts when year-
quarter fixed-effects and district and individual-level controls are included (columns
(1) - (3)). This is counter-intuitive as public employment under NREGA should
increase casual wages which includes both public and private wages. However, in
landlord districts collective bargaining power of workers is low which allows landlords
to keep wages depressed even after NREGA is introduced in these districts. The sit-
uation in non-landlord districts is quite different. Casual wages increased by around
6.4 percent in these districts (columns (3) - (6)) which shows that NREGA has been
far more successful in these districts. These estimates are comparable to the wage im-
pact of NREGA in ‘best performing’ states like Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh,
Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu which saw a wage increase of around 9 percent (Imbert
and Papp, 2015). Azam (2011) finds that casual wages in NREGA districts increased
by 5 percent in comparison to non-NREGA districts. Finally, the triple difference
estimation (columns (6) - (9)), show that in comparison to wage change in landlord
districts, there has been an 18 percent increase in non-landlord districts. This result
is robust to all the specifications presented in Table 2.5.
These results lend credence to the main hypothesis of this chapter that in landlord
districts, NREGA has not been successful in improving wages for casual workers.
Section 2.3 discussed the mechanisms by which the wage effect of NREGA may be
muted in landlord districts. If the provision of public employment under NREGA is
not sufficient, it may not be successful in raising the bargaining position of workers.
We now turn to examining changes in time spent in public employment to see whether
32This chapter estimates how colonial land revenue system attenuates the impact of NREGA. Therefore, in this
section we do not discuss the direct effects of NREGA on rural labor markets. Both difference-in-differences and triple
difference estimators use time-quarter and district fixed-effects. For direct effects of the program see Azam (2011);
Imbert and Papp (2015).
105
this divergence in the wage impact of NREGA can be explained by differences in
the provision of public works in these districts. Next, we turn to examining the
employment dynamics in these districts post-NREGA.
2.6.3 Regression Results: Changes in Public Employment
Table 2.6 presents the estimation of equation 2.1 and equation 2.2 for percentage of
time spent per day in public employment during the dry season. In all the spec-
ifications, there is a positive but insignificant impact on public employment in the
landlord districts. This is an important result as these districts were poorer than non-
landlord districts and NREGA was intended to provide livelihood to landless workers
and marginal farmers in poor districts. Further, since agricultural labor demand dur-
ing the dry season is weak (Basu, 2013), this sluggish increase in time allocated to
public employment in landlord districts shows that provision of public employment
in these districts would fall short of the demand.
Lower provision of NREGA employment in these districts could be because of the
political decision-making power of the landlord class or due to differences in adminis-
trative capacity (Dutta et al., 2012). However, NREGA implementation is determined
by state governments and several states like Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Assam
and Maharashtra had both landlord and non-landlord systems with similar admin-
istrative capacities and resources to implement NREGA. Therefore, administrative
capacity may not satisfactorily explain the insufficient provision of NREGA. Cor-
respondingly, the ability of local elite to control the implementation of NREGA to
protect their class-interests explain why it has not been able to emerge as a viable
alternative for private employment.
In contrast, there is a positive and statistically significant increase in public employ-
ment in the non-landlord districts. In these districts, time spent by workers in public
employment rose by around one percentage point in 2007-2008 from 0.02 percent in
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2004-2005. The difference in time spent under public employment between landlord
and non-landlord districts is insignificant but positive as shown by the coefficients on
the triple difference estimation. In order to look at corresponding changes in labor
demand, the next section tests the impact of NREGA in creating private employment.
2.6.4 Regression Results: Changes in Private Employment
We now turn to private employment in Table 2.7. The coefficient of private employ-
ment is insignificant for landlord districts. As discussed in Section 3b, this suggests
that workers in landlord districts continue to depend on large landowners for subsis-
tence as the provision of NREGA is insufficient to provide workers with a credible
alternative to private wage employment. The landowning elite in these districts exer-
cise significant political domination and can control the implementation of NREGA
to protect their class-interests by keeping wages depressed even after NREGA. Thus,
there is no meaningful impact of NREGA on private wage employment in these dis-
tricts.
In contrast, in non-landlord districts time spent in private employment decreased by
around 3 percentage points from its baseline value of 81 percent in 2004-2005. This
implies that in 2007-2008, workers were spending only around 78 percent of their time
in private employment in non-landlord districts and this change is significant at the
1 percent level. This result is similar to that shown by Imbert and Papp (2015) for
their ‘best performing’ states. This shows that NREGA impacts rural labor markets
by providing workers with an alternative to private employment. In non-landlord
districts, where time spent in public employment increased, rural wages rose and
correspondingly employers reduced labor demand.
Finally, on comparing the change in private employment in these districts, relative to
landlord district in the triple-difference specification, the results show a 3.5 percentage
point decline in private employment, but this is not statistically significant.
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To better understand the source of ‘crowding-out’ of private labor demand we dis-
aggregate private labor into its components - self-employment, domestic work and
private wage employment. From Panel A of Table 2.8, we see that in both land-
lord and non-landlord districts, there is an increase in time spent in self-employment
(including agricultural and non-agricultural self-employment) with the former being
larger (4.5 percentage points) than the latter (1.8 percentage points). However, this
change is statistically insignificant. In rural India, almost all households are involved
in some form of self-employment to augment their incomes. The large increase in self-
employment in landlord districts can be attributed to a fall in domestic and private
wage employment.
Further, Panel B of Table 2.8 shows that domestic employment also falls in both labor
markets. This result indicates that after NREGA, women may be substituting public
employment for unpaid work since they disproportionately shoulder the responsibility
of domestic work. This is consistent with Khera and Nayak (2009), Azam (2011)
and Zimmermann (2012) who show that women benefit more from NREGA. The
decline in unpaid domestic work is statistically significant in non-landlord districts
indicating that women may be participating more in these districts in comparison to
their counterparts in landlord districts. This shows that while private employment
may have fallen in non-landlord districts, the most significant share of this decline
can be attributed to changes in labor time for unpaid domestic work.
Finally, we see from Panel C of Table 2.8 that there is a negative, but statistically
insignificant effect on private wage employment in both landlord and non-landlord
districts. Therefore, we can conclude that the ‘crowding-out’ of private employment
is primarily because of women substituting unpaid work with public employment.
This increases their incomes and bargaining positions both within and outside the
household.
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2.7 Agricultural Labor Markets
The results derived above describe rural labor market dynamics post-NREGA. This
included both agricultural and non-agricultural labor in the rural areas where NREGA
employment is undertaken.33 However, agriculture forms a major component of rural
livelihoods, so it is important to estimate the impact of NREGA in agricultural
markets. In particular, the changes in deflated casual wages described in Table 2.5
correspond to casual wags earned in public or private employment. However, it may
be the case that the increase in casual wages is driven solely by NREGA wages. In
order to address these concerns, Table 2.9 re-estimates the difference-in-differences
and triple-difference estimates for the agricultural labor market.
2.7.1 Private Agricultural Wages
Panel A of Table 2.9 shows that NREGA does not have any statistically significant ef-
fect on agricultural wages in landlord and non-landlord districts separately. However,
the differential wage increases in non-landlord districts in comparison to landlord
districts is around 20 percent which is statistically significant. This implies that in
comparison to landlord districts, non-landlord districts witness an increase in agricul-
tural wages after NREGA. These findings are consistent with existing research which
finds that NREGA has contributed to increasing wages for unskilled agricultural labor
(Berg, Bhattacharyya, Rajasekhar, et al., 2018).
The fall in agricultural wages in landlord districts is a surprising result as NREGA is
expected to improve wages for casual workers. Two factors may explain this result.
First, workers employed as private agricultural labor during this period are those
33This chapter does not explicitly deal with changes in the non-agricultural labor market for three reasons. First,
this chapter looks at the rural economy and agriculture is the predominant occupation of the rural sector as most
families engage in some farming. Second, public employment under NREGA is used to create public works aimed at
increasing the productivity of agriculture. Existing research has stressed on this ‘non-transfer’ benefit of NREGA.
Consequently, we study whether colonial land revenue institutions dampen this effect. Finally, since NREGA employ-
ment is concentrated in the lean season of agriculture, its impact on the non-farm sector may not be direct. Therefore,
a full treatment of changes in these markets is beyond the scope of this chapter and future research may shed more
light the subject. See Binswanger-Mkhize (2013) for changes in the non-farm sector.
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engaged in permanent contracts with their employers. Basu (2013) shows that workers
in permanent contracts are paid less during the lean season as this reduction in
payment is compensated by job security over the year.
Evidence suggests that tied-labor contracts and involuntary unemployment still exist
in rural India. While states like Bihar, Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand
historically had some of the highest incidences of attached or tied-labor arrangements
(Bardhan, 1983), more recently evidence of tied-labor has also been found in Andhra
Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Punjab (Basu, 2002). In Andhra Pradesh
attached laborers are mainly males between the ages of 10-70 and are on yearly con-
tracts (Deshingkar and Farrington, 2006). Attached labor contracts are also observed
among the lower caste landless households in Rajasthan (Bhasin, 2004). In Punjab,
although the ratio of attached labor to casual labor is less than one, this ratio in-
creases with the size of land holdings (Singh, Singh, et al., 2007) which signals that
large farms are more prone to using tied-labor. Finally, village level studies in the
Telangana region of South India Motiram (2007) and Rawal (2006) in rural Haryana
also point to the existence of tied and attached laborers.
Second, since these results are derived for the dry season of agriculture when labor
demand is low, large employers can depress wages further as labor supply exceeds
demand (Basu, 2013). Since NREGA provides some income support to workers,
large land-owners may use their wage-setting power to reduce private wages as a part
of workers’ subsistence is met by public works. As landlord districts are poorer than
non-landlord districts, workers may have fewer outside options and rely mostly on
agricultural employment for their survival. This is similar to the impact of NREGA
on rural wages discussed above in section 2.6. This result shows that the success of
NREGA in raising agricultural wages is limited in landlord districts. In non-landlord
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districts, workers may resist wage cuts as greater provision of NREGA enables them
to bargain with private employers for higher wages.
2.7.2 Self-Employment in Agriculture
We turn next to self-employment reported in Panel B of Table 2.9. In non-landlord
districts, workers increase time spent in self-farming, but this change is not statisti-
cally significant. On the other hand, in landlord districts, workers reduce time spent
in self-farming by around 1.7 percentage points and this result is significant at the 5
percent level. Since landlord districts are characterized by high land inequality, small
and marginal farmers are ‘effectively landless’ and they may actively substitute labor
away from self-farming to either NREGA employment or other private employment.
Since farming on very small plots of land does not allow farmers to sustain their
livelihoods, as Basole and Basu (2011) show, most people own less than one acre
and are effectively landless. However, since alternative employment is lacking, people
continue to work in self-farming. NREGA employment allows workers to substitute
self-farming with public employment without affecting agricultural productivity. On
the other hand, in non-landlord districts, NREGA has no impact on time spent in
self- farming. This is because NREGA improves the productivity of self-farming in
these regions. These regions have lower inequality in landownership and public works
increase the productivity of self-farming.
2.7.3 Private Wage Employment in Agriculture
Finally, panel C of Table 2.9 looks at the private labor market. I find that there is
a sharp decline in the percentage of time spent in private agricultural employment
during the lean season. In non-landlord districts people reduce the time spent in
private agricultural employment by around 5 percentage points. This is consistent
with results presented above in Table 2.7 which show that private employment in non-
landlord districts reduces due to rising wages after NREGA. Studies have shown that
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employers have adopted labor-saving agricultural technologies in response to rising
wages after NREGA (Bhargava, 2014). There is no statistically significant change in
time allocated to private agricultural employment in landlord districts. This further
shows that NREGA has not emerged as a credible alternative to private agricultural
employment in these districts.
2.8 Conclusion
Employment guarantee programs have the potential to dent both transient and per-
sistent poverty by providing income support to workers. This can improve rural wages
for more than 260 million marginal farmers and landless workers engaged in Indian
agriculture. While the overall impact of NREGA is positive and encouraging, consid-
erable regional heterogeneity exists in performance between regions and across social
groups. In a marked departure from existing research, this chapter presents evidence
for the role of political economy factors in explaining the regional heterogeneity of
NREGA. The ability of NREGA to raise rural wages by providing public employment
is stymied in the districts where the historical colonial land revenue system led to the
creation of a large landlord class. In contrast, in non-landlord districts, NREGA has
had a positive impact on casual wages.
Further, in comparison to the landlord districts, there is a decline (crowding-out)
of private employment in non-landlord districts. However, this change is primarily
driven by a reduction in time allocated to unpaid domestic labor which is performed
primarily by women. In terms of agricultural labor markets, this chapter finds that
time spent in self-employment declines in landlord districts as workers substitute
work on subsistence farms with public employment. Therefore, this chapter shows
that historic inequalities that NREGA had the potential to redress, are attenuating
its impact in districts that need it the most. In comparison to their counterparts in
non-landlord districts, workers in landlord districts may be at a twin disadvantage.
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First, these districts have monopsonistic labor markets characterized by the presence
of a powerful landlord class. As a result, rural wages do not improve even after
NREGA as the landlord class can depress wages using their market power.
Second, these districts have worse development indicators (like poverty headcount
ratio) but the actual time spent by workers in NREGA employment is lower than in
non-landlord districts. This suggests that in these districts the provision of NREGA
may be insufficient to augment the incomes of small and marginal farmers. This is
consistent with several studies that find evidence of considerable rationing of NREGA
employment in Bihar, Jharkhand Odisha (Mukherjee and Sinha, 2013). These states
were almost exclusively characterized by the landlord system of land revenue.
As India completes more than a decade of this historic legislation, it is distressing to
see that the political commitment to this scheme stands diluted. Some commenta-
tors like Bhagwati and Panagariya (2014) have supported the present government’s
proposal of confining NREGA to the poorest 200 districts of the country citing fiscal
constraints and leakages due to ‘poor targeting’ because of the demand-driven na-
ture of the scheme. However, Besley and Coate (1992) show that public ‘workfare’
programs will succeed if the demand for employment under the pro- gram exceeds
private employment opportunities available to workers. Since, NREGA employment
is primarily provided in the lean season of agriculture when private labor demand is
low, workers who self-select to work in public employment do not have alternative
employment available to them. Further, several studies using national and field level
data have concluded that the scheme is mostly availed by the poor and participa-
tion by people from the top consumption quintile is merely 10 percent (Sabhikhi,
2012). This shows that the scheme is not poorly targeted. Further, as Abreu et al.
(2014) have argued, productivity enhancing public works under NREGA add to the
non-transfer benefits of the program which augment the welfare effects of the pro-
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gram. Therefore, efforts must be made to improve the implementation of NREGA,
particularly in landlord districts.
The first step towards strengthening NREGA would include increasing the adminis-
trative capacity at the grassroots level including among village assemblies and block
level officials. Second, steps should be taken to ensure greater democratization of local
decision-making to ensure that the participatory nature of the scheme is not diluted.
Finally, NREGA should actually be implemented as a right of workers and elected
representatives must be held accountable for its inadequate provision and timely com-
pensation must be paid if work cannot be provided under the program. Uncovering
specific challenges faced by workers in landlord districts in accessing NREGA em-
ployment are fruitful avenues for future research.
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of Land Revenue System
Source: Adapted from Banerjee and Iyer (2005)
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Note: This figure shows the mean of rural wages for both landlord and non-landlord
groups before (2005) and after (2008) the first two phases of NREGA. For both time
periods this figure is constructed for districts that got NREGA in Phase I (2006)
and II (2007). Real wages are constructed by deflating the nominal wages using the
monthly state-level consumer price index (CPI) for rural labor. Nominal wages are
constructed using the National Sample Survey (NSS) 2004 - 2008 and state-level price
index for rural laborers from the Indian Labor Bureau.
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Figure 2.3: Trends in Ln Deflated Wage
Source: National Sample Survey (NSS) 1999 - 2010
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Figure 2.4: Trends in Public Employment
Source: National Sample Survey (NSS) 1999 - 2010
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Figure 2.5: Trends in Private Employment
Source: National Sample Survey (NSS) 1999 - 2010
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Table 2.1: District Level Controls
Variable Non-Landlord Landlord p-value Source Time-Varying
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fraction Scheduled Castes
(SC)
0.17 0.20 0.00 Census 2001 No
Fraction Scheduled Tribes
(ST)
0.08 0.10 0.39 Census 2001 No
Fraction Literate 0.54 0.46 0.00 Census 2001 No
Fraction Male Labor Force 0.66 0.70 0.00 Census 2001 No
Fraction Female Labor
Force
0.34 0.30 0.00 Census 2001 No
Fraction Agricultural La-
bor
0.51 0.51 0.68 Census 2001 No
Population Density 396 643 0.00 Census 2001 No
Fraction Irrigated 0.46 0.48 0.42 Census 2001 No
Fraction Unirrigated 0.54 0.52 0.42 Census 2001 No
Log Agricultural Wage 3.62 3.59 0.77 NSSO (EUS) 2004 No
Fraction Casual Agricul-
ture
0.22 0.20 0.17 NSSO (EUS) 2004 No
Fraction Casual Non-
Agriculture
0.07 0.05 0.01 NSSO (EUS) 2004 No
Fraction Cultivators 0.25 0.24 0.67 NSSO (EUS) 2007 No
Fraction Non-Agricultural
Business
0.09 0.10 0.11 NSSO (EUS) 2004 No
Fraction Salaried Work 0.05 0.03 0.00 NSSO (EUS) 2004 No
Proportion below Poverty
Line
0.24 0.35 0.00 NSSO (CES) 2004 No
Agricultural Productivity
per Worker (normalized)
0.04 -0.02 0.55 Ministry of Agriculture No
Left-wing Dist (2004) 0.01 0.23 0.00 Planning Commission Yes
Deviation rainfall (normal-
ized)
0.14 0.19 0.39 Univ. of Delaware Yes
Road Construction 32.62 31.06 0.74 PMGSY website Yes
Election Year 0.43 0.54 0.06 Election Commission Yes
Number of Districts 159 130
Note: This Table shows the mean values of district level controls used in all estimations. Column 1 and 2 present
the mean values of controls for non-landlord and landlord districts respectively. Column (3) presents the p-values
of the student’s t-test of equality of means in columns 1 and 2. Column (4) gives the data source used and col-
umn (5) states whether the controls are time varying or not. The 61st Round of NSSO data is used to calculate
baseline means reported in this Table. The Employment and Unemployment Survey is used for calculating labor
force participation variables and the Consumption Expenditure Survey is used for calculating the proportion of
population below poverty line. Proportion of population comes from Census 2001 and information on irrigated
land is taken from Village Directory, Census 2001. Productivity per worker (normalized) is calculated using data
on output and prices from the Ministry of Agriculture and number of agricultural workers from NSSO. Data on
the proportion of districts affected by left-wing insurgency comes from Planning Commission report, 2005 and es-
timates of deviation of rainfall (normalized) from the mean of quarterly rainfall from 1970 - 2010 is constructed
using data from the University of Delaware Earth System Research Library. Finally, data on annual road con-
struction is taken from the website of the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojna (PMGSY) and dummies for years
preceding state or village body (panchayat) election is taken from the Election Commission of India website.
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Table 2.2: Distribution of Districts by Land Tenure System and NREGA Phase
Phase 1 District Phase 2 District Phase 3 District
State District Non-Landlord Landlord Non-Landlord Landlord Non-Landlord Landlord
Andhra Pradesh 10 3 1 2 1 0 3
Assam 21 5 1 6 0 9 0
Bihar 30 0 20 0 10 0 0
Chhattisgarh 7 0 3 0 4 0 0
Gujarat 10 3 0 3 0 4 0
Haryana 5 0 0 1 0 4 0
Himachal Pradesh 2 0 0 1 0 1 0
Jharkhand 15 0 13 0 2 0 0
Karnataka 10 0 0 2 0 8 0
Kerala 6 2 0 0 0 4 0
Madhya Pradesh 15 0 8 0 3 0 4
Maharashtra 24 6 4 5 1 7 1
Meghalaya 7 2 0 3 0 2 0
Odisha 18 3 5 1 3 0 6
Punjab 6 1 0 2 0 3 0
Rajasthan 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Tamil Nadu 27 6 0 4 0 17 0
Uttar Pradesh 60 9 11 6 8 22 4
Uttaranchal 2 0 0 1 0 1 0
West Bengal 13 0 7 0 5 0 1
Total 289 40 73 37 37 82 20
Note: This Table shows districts in each state used in this chapter. Districts are classified according to
their land revenue system and the phase when NREGA was implemented in it. Data on phases is taken
from the NREGA website and information about land settlement system by district is taken from Baner-
jee and Iyer (2005). Districts of British India are matched to boundaries given in Census 2001 using Ku-
mar and Somanathan (2015). Districts for which data on boundaries was not available and those un-
der rule by Indian kings and princes (Princely States) during colonial rule are excluded from this chapter.
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Table 2.3: Labor Market Outcomes at Baseline
Variable Non-Landlord Landlord p-value
(1) (2) (3)
Ln Deflated Wage 2.6 2.5 0.30
Public Work 0.02% 0.19% 0.64
Private Sector Work 81% 83% 0.71
Self Employment 33% 31% 0.55
Domestic Work 26% 35% 0.08
Private Wage Work 22% 18% 0.29
Unemployed 6% 5% 0.64
Not in Labor Force 12% 11% 0.85
Observations 57,989 67,553
Note: This Table shows the mean values for labor market outcomes at the baseline level. All values are restricted
to persons aged 15 to 60. Natural log of daily wages are deflated using the monthly, state-level price index for
rural laborers from the Indian Labor Bureau. Percentage of time spent in private, self and public employment
is calculated using the Employment and Unemployment Round of NSSO data 2004. Column (1) and (2) present
the mean values of labor market outcomes for between non-landlord and landlord districts respectively. Column
(3) presents the p-values of the student’s t-test of equality of means between landlord and non-landlord districts.
Table 2.4: Individual Level Controls
Variable Non Landlord Landlord p-value
(1) (2) (3)
Age 33.29 33.07 0.88
Education (years) 4.76 3.76 0.06
Women 0.50 0.50 0.97
Married 0.70 0.74 0.42
Scheduled Tribes 0.09 0.10 0.67
Scheduled Castes 0.20 0.23 0.59
Other Backward Castes 0.46 0.39 0.24
Muslims 0.12 0.14 0.68
Household size 5.63 5.87 0.48
Self-employed (agriculture) 0.37 0.39 0.84
Proportion Agricultural Labor 0.24 0.27 0.65
Individual Observations 67,553 57,989
Note: This Table shows the mean values of individual level controls used in all estimations. Column (1) and (2)
present the mean values of controls for non-landlord and landlord districts respectively. Column (3) presents the
p-values of the student’s t-test of equality of means between non-landlord and landlord districts. The 61st Round
of he Employment and Unemployment Survey of NSSO is used to calculate baseline means reported in this Table.
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Table 2.5: Changes in Ln Deflated Wages Between Landlord and Non Landlord Districts in the Dry Season
DD: NREGA by Landlord Districts DD: NREGA by Non-Landlord Districts DDD: By NREGA and Non Landlord
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
NREGxNLxpost 0.198*** 0.180*** 0.177***
(0.0615) (0.0630) (0.0638)
NLxpost -0.137*** -0.136** -0.162***
(0.0509) (0.0560) (0.0565)
NREGxpost -0.0860* -0.0748 -0.0608 0.112*** 0.0629** 0.0636** -0.0862* -0.0883 -0.0809
(0.0496) (0.0572) (0.0597) (0.0368) (0.0306) (0.0293) (0.0493) (0.0557) (0.0576)
Observations 9,437 9,437 9,433 10,940 10,492 10,490 20,377 19,929 19,923
R-squared 0.327 0.336 0.395 0.449 0.459 0.592 0.406 0.411 0.508
District FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year-Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District Controls x post NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES
Individual Controls NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This Table shows results for three panels. Columns (1) - (3) show results of a difference-in-differences for landlord districts and columns (4) - (6)
for non-landlord districts and column (7) - (9) show results of a triple difference. Each column presents results from a separate specification. Natural log
of daily wages are deflated using the monthly, state-level price index for rural laborers from the Indian Labor Bureau. Data on on employment is calcu-
lated using the 61st Round (pre-period) and the 64th Round (post-period) of NSSO data. We use weights proportional to the district population and all
district level time-invariant controls are interacted with a dummy for the post period. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.
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Table 2.6: Changes in Public Employment Between Landlord and Non Landlord Districts in the Dry Season
DD: NREGA by Landlord Districts DD: NREGA by Non-Landlord Districts DDD: By NREGA and Non Landlord
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
NREGxNLxpost 0.743 0.413 0.472
(0.750) (0.791) (0.793)
NLxpost -0.243* -0.896*** -0.932***
(0.136) (0.298) (0.309)
NREGxpost 0.475* 0.868 0.825 1.219* 0.936** 0.936** 0.476* 0.531 0.506
(0.274) (0.554) (0.555) (0.700) (0.396) (0.396) (0.273) (0.466) (0.469)
Observations 59,743 59,743 59,582 63,067 59,458 59,458 122,810 119,201 118,814
R-squared 0.054 0.061 0.066 0.099 0.107 0.107 0.071 0.075 0.078
District FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year-Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District Controls x post NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES
Individual Controls NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This Table shows results for three panels. Columns (1) - (3) show results of a difference-in-differences for landlord districts and columns (4) -
(6) for non-landlord districts and columns (7) - (9) show results of the triple difference estimation. Each column presents results from a separate spec-
ification. Public employment is a percentage of time spent by individuals in working on public employment. Data on employment is calculated us-
ing the 61st Round (pre-period) and the 64th Round (post-period) of NSSO data. We use weights proportional to the district population and all dis-
trict level time-invariant controls are interacted with a dummy for the post period. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.
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Table 2.7: Changes in Private Employment Between Landlord and Non Landlord Districts in the Dry Season
DD: NREGA by Landlord Districts DD: NREGA by Non-Landlord Districts DDD: By NREGA and Non Landlord
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
NREGxNLxpost -4.670* -4.097 -3.502
(2.403) (2.549) (2.265)
NLxpost 2.964 3.631* 3.432*
(2.064) (2.195) (1.855)
NREGxpost 1.688 1.213 1.272 -2.984** -3.593*** -2.927** 1.686 1.230 1.262
(2.070) (2.606) (2.264) (1.230) (1.202) (1.146) (2.065) (2.362) (2.057)
Observations 59,743 59,743 59,582 63,067 59,458 59,232 122,810 119,201 118,814
R-squared 0.027 0.028 0.275 0.032 0.034 0.281 0.030 0.031 0.276
District FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year-Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District Controls x post NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES
Individual Controls NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This Table shows results for three panels. Columns (1) - (3) show results of a difference-in-differences for landlord districts, columns (4) -
(6) for non-landlord districts and columns (7) - (9) show results of a triple difference estimation. Each column presents results from a separate spec-
ification. Public employment is a percentage of time spent by individuals in working on public employment. Data on employment is calculated us-
ing the 61st Round (pre-period) and the 64th Round (post-period) of NSSO data. We use weights proportional to the district population and all dis-
trict level time-invariant controls are interacted with a dummy for the post period. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.
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Table 2.8: Decomposing the Effect of NREGA on Private Employment
Landlord DD Non Landlord DD Triple Difference
(1) (2) (3)





NREGxpost 4.526 1.754 3.955
(2.924) (1.975) (2.646)
Observations 59,582 59,232 118,814
R-squared 0.235 0.185 0.205





NREGxpost -2.204 -2.615** -2.541
(1.829) (1.285) (1.867)
Observations 59,582 59,458 118,814
R-squared 0.580 0.048 0.522





NREGxpost -1.050 -2.200 -0.152
(2.669) (1.647) (2.416)
Observations 59,582 59,232 118,814
R-squared 0.173 0.172 0.173
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Panel A, Panel B and Panel C report the regression results for Self Employment, Domestic Em-
ployment and Private Wage Employment respectively. Each column presents results from a separate spec-
ification. Column (1) and (2) report the results of a double difference estimation for landlord and non-
landlord districts respectively. Column (3) reports the results of the triple-difference estimation. All re-
gressions include district and individual level controls defined in Table 1 and Table 4 respectively. All
employment variables are calculated using the 61st and 64th round of NSSO. We use weights propor-
tional to the district population and standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.
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Table 2.9: Effect of NREGA on Agricultural Labor Markets in the lean season
Landlord DD Non Landlord DD Triple Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Ln Agricultural Wage
NREGxNLxpost 0.197***
(0.0742)




Observations 5,414 5,733 11,147
R-squared 0.466 0.661 0.564





NREGxpost -1.693** 0.337 -1.050
(0.711) (0.479) (0.680)
Observations 59,582 59,232 118,814
R-squared 0.047 0.034 0.037





NREGxpost -5.411 -4.805** -3.998
(3.974) (1.944) (3.569)
Observations 31,287 35,734 66,869
R-squared 0.177 0.130 0.187
Year-Quarter FE YES YES YES
District Controls x post YES YES YES
Individual Controls YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
* Note: This Table shows the impact of NREGA on agricultural labor markets. Panel A, Panel B and Panel
C report the regression results for log of agricultural wage (deflated), self-employment and private wage casual
employment agriculture. Each column presents results from a separate specification. All rates are calculated
using the 61st and 64th Round of NSSO data which is spread over four sub-rounds in a year. All regressions
are estimated for the dry season. All regressions include district controls mentioned in Table 1 and Table 4 re-
spectively. In addition, each specification includes year quarter and district fixed effects. Re-weighted sampling
weights are used in these regressions and robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.
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CHAPTER 3
NO EMPLOYMENT WITHOUT PARTICIPATION: AN
EVALUATION OF INDIA’S EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM
IN EASTERN UTTAR PRADESH
3.1 Introduction
The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) is the
largest rural welfare program in the world. Enacted in 2005, this scheme guarantees
100 days of employment in a year to every rural household at the legal minimum wage.
The Act was operational in the 200 poorest districts by February 2006, another 130
districts got the scheme in the second phase in April 2007 and finally by 2008, the
entire country was under this ambit. This legal work entitlement impacts close to 50
million households in India and is thus a powerful tool for social and economic trans-
formation. Through its joint emphasis on social protection and livelihood security, in
principle, the scheme endeavors to empower the rural poor by instilling a new sense
of identity and bargaining power and make economic growth inclusive for all in rural
India. However, lack of transparency in its implementation and awareness of legal
entitlements of workers has diluted the demand-driven nature of the program. This
chapter presents an analysis of the awareness of legal entitlements and responsibilities
of various stakeholders in the implementation of NREGA in one of the poorest regions
of the country. Further, we discuss the impact of NREGA on agricultural produc-
tivity and wage bargaining by landless workers who are the intended beneficiaries of
NREGA.
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Public workfare programs have enjoyed a long and distinguished presence in the expe-
rience of economic development around the world and their potential benefits depend
on their ability to create income safety-nets for the poor.1 This program improves
upon earlier employment schemes in two ways. First, it employs workers directly and
prohibits the hiring of private contractors as here is a long history of private contrac-
tors exploiting workers by underpaying them and harassing workers (Ambasta et al.,
2008). Second, public works under NREGA do not use labor displacing technology
in order to maximize employment generation under NREGA.
NREGA is a demand driven program based on the principle of self-selection (Dutta
et al., 2012). It treats employment as a legal right and if the state is unable to
provide employment for participants then it is obliged to pay workers without work.
Public employment generated through NREGA is meant to generate productive as-
sets that increase agricultural productivity and provides livelihood security. These
include works aimed at natural resource management like irrigation works and af-
forestation. Moreover, public works can also be aimed to specifically improve the
productivity of agricultural land owned by the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and
other disadvantaged sections of society. Finally, labor can also be employed to build
rural infrastructure like toilets, roads and food grain storage structures (Dre`ze et al.,
2006).
In 2018, NREGA completed a decade of being in operation throughout the coun-
try. Several academic studies and newspaper editorials were written to analyze each
aspect of this historic legislation. Evidence suggests that public works leading to
capital formation in agriculture have three potential effects on welfare (i) The direct
effect of job creation for those employed (Klonner and Oldiges, 2014), (ii) Increase in
1India has a long history with these programs since the 1960s. Schemes like Jawahar Rozgar Yojana, Employment
Assurance Scheme, Food for Work Program, Jawahar Gram Samridhi Yojana and Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana
were forerunners to NREGA. Subbarao (1997) provides an overview of India’s public employment programs.
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labor demand in the lean season of agriculture which raise wages (Azam, 2011); and
(iii) creation of public goods which increase agricultural productivity (Berg, Bhat-
tacharyya, Durgam, et al., 2012). NREGA has exerted an upward pressure on wages
causing around 20 percentage point shift away from labor-intensive technologies by
small farmers and low-powered technologies (Bhargava, 2014). In addition, Imbert
and Papp (2015) show that increase in wages for households in the poorest 30 per-
cent of the population accounts for around 31 percent of the total welfare gains from
the program. Correspondingly, others have argued that public works under NREGA
contributed to increasing the productivity of agriculture which contributed to the
non-transfer benefits of the program (Deininger and Liu (2013); Abreu et al. (2014)).
in practice, NREGA suffers from several problems like reduced budgetary allocation,
corruption, violation of people’s entitlements and insufficient employment genera-
tion (Aggarwal, 2016). Further, the implementation and performance of NREGA
varies considerably across states and districts. While states like Andhra Pradesh,
Chattisgarh, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu have
successfully created more than 100 days of employment under the program (Imbert
and Papp, 2015), but other states like Jharkhand and Bihar have lagged behind in
the provision of NREGA employment under the program (Dutta et al. (2012); Bhatia
and Dreze (2006)). Existing studies have identified limited administrative capacities,
low awareness of the program among beneficiaries (Ravallion et al., 2015), insuffi-
cient financial allocation for NREGA (Banerjee and Saha, 2010), and corruption by
bureaucrats (Adhikari and Bhatia, 2010) and private contractors (Bhagat, 2012) to
explain poor performance of the program in certain states.
While the provision of NREGA in these regions in UP has has been inadequate.
Dutta et al. (2012) shows that in 2009-10 over 54 percent of the households in UP
that demanded work under NREGA but have not been provided public employment
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guaranteed under the Act. Paradoxically, the same study found that the demand for
NREGA work in UP is also low. Only around 35 percent of rural households officially
demanded employment under NREGA when the national average was around 45 per-
cent. This is surprising since UP has a highest proportion of the population below
the poverty line in comparison to any state of the country. This lack of demand for
NREGA suggests that workers may not be fully aware of their rights to demand public
employment which is NREGA’s unique feature. This chapter aims study how aware-
ness among beneficiaries and public officials determines the functioning of NREGA in
one of the poorest regions of the country where NREGA has been operational since
its inception. Prompted by high incidence of poverty, prevalence of bonded labor
in agriculture and high Maoist insurgency, we conducted in-depth household level
surveys with NREGA beneficiaries and semi-structured interviews with government
officials in 12 Gram Panchayats of Halia block in Mirzapur district of eastern Uttar
Pradesh (UP).
This study contributes to the existing literature on the functioning of NREGA in three
ways. First, in addition to collecting formation from NREGA participants, we also
conducted informal interviews with bureaucrats at the state, district and block level to
understand various processes associated with the program. These include information
about the flow of finances, data entry process and the role of block and district level
development officers in supporting the endeavours of the Gram Panchayats. Second,
we record people’s perceptions about NREGA implementation and the role of various
stakeholders to assess their awareness of various provisions of the Act. Third this
study verifies information on the number of work days and wage payments mentioned
on NREGA website with the information provided by the beneficiaries. We find that
official statistics are not consistent with people’s own claims about their participation.
This discrepancy in NREGA records prevails because workers are not aware or able
to access these records from the NREGA website.
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Our findings suggest that even though NREGA has been India’s flagship poverty al-
leviation program for more than a decade, government functionaries at the state and
local level have little awareness of their responsibilities and administrative capacity
to ensure sooth functioning of NREGA at the grass-roots level. While it does pro-
vide people with some income support, but its provision is inadequate to provide an
income-safety net to beneficiaries. A primary reason for this is that implementation of
the program on the ground diverges considerably from the provisions of the NREGA
Act of 2005. The creation of public employment under NREGA rests on the princi-
ple of recognizing employment as a right which workers can demand from the state.
In order to safeguard the interest of workers, several decentralization measures were
introduced in its functioning. However, in the surveyed villages all decision-making
authority was concentrated with the elected head of the village assembly (Pradhan).
This concentration of power creates patron-client relationships of exchange between
the Pradhan and workers which generates rents for the former and safeguards his
class interests.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents an overview of
the survey region and discuses the sampling process and methodology of data col-
lection used in this study. Section 3.3 presents the findings of our interviews with
government officials and shows how processes necessary to increase workers’ partici-
pation in NREGA functioning are not followed. Section 3.4 analyzes the findings of
our household surveys of NREGA beneficiaries and section 3.5 reports the findings
from our focus-group discussions on how NREGA is impacting agricultural produc-
tivity and labor demand. Section 3.6 argues that lack of awareness among NREGA
beneficiaries serves the vital purpose of protecting the interests of the local elite and
finally section 3.7 concludes with some policy implications of this study.
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3.2 Choice of District and Data Collection
The aim of this study is two folds. First, we document the functioning of district and
block level administrative framework which is responsible to implement NREGA. Sec-
ond, we discuss the challenges faced by people in participating public employment
under NREGA in one of the poorest districts of Uttar Pradesh. In order to ad-
dress these concerns we conduced informal discussions with several state and district
level officials and undertook household level surveys of NREGA participants between
November 2016 and March 2017. This section presents an overview of the survey
district and presents our sampling and data collection strategy.
3.2.1 Mirzapur
This study was conducted in the Halia block of Mirzapur district of eastern Uttar
Pradesh.2 There are two reasons why it is important to document the functioning
of NREGA in this region. First, this region is characterized by the presence of the
kol community which is one of the most-backward communities of the country and
is forced to work in tied-labor arrangements in agriculture. Second, this region is
affected by Maoist movement and the developmental impact of NREGA has been
instrumental in improving the relationship of tribal communities and the Indian state.
Therefore, it is important to remove the bottlenecks in NREGA functioning to ensure
that the promises made to citizens of the region are fulfilled and their trust in the
state is restored. Lack of proper implementation and embezzlement of NREGA funds
in the region has attracted considerable media attention and has been the subject of
a high-level official inquiry (PTI, 2014).3
2Blocks or tehsils are administrative sub-division of a district created for rural development. Halia is one of the
12 administrative blocks of Mirzapur.
3For instance, Singh (2009) records instances of corruption and other problems with NREGA implementation in
the region.
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Mirzapur located in the eastern part of Uttar Pradesh (UP), is one of the poorest
200 districts of the country and among the fifteen poorest districts of UP (Haq,
2017).4 This district was covered under NREGA in the first phase in 2006. It is
a predominantly rural district with 86 percent of its total population of around 2.5
million residing in rural areas. Over 65 percent of the total labor force is employed
in agriculture.5
Selected demographic indicators are given below in table 3.1. The proportion of
marginalized communities, particularly the Scheduled Castes is 28 percent in Mirza-
pur while the state-level average is 23 percent. Socially backward communities like
SCs and STs are over-represented in NREGA participation as the incidence of poverty
is higher for these groups. For instance, in 2011, 45 percent of the Scheduled Tribes
living in rural India were below the poverty line in comparison to only 15 percent of
those belonging to the upper castes. Correspondingly we find that 5 percent of our
sample of NREGA beneficiaries comprises of STs, when their share in district-level
population is only 0.7 percent. Further, literacy rates among these groups (56 percent
for SCs and 57 percent for STs) is also lower than the state average of (60 percent
for SCs and 64 percent for STs).
3.2.1.1 Kols
Following the pioneering work of Srinivas and Marriot (1955), a number of researchers
have analyzed the role of caste identity in determining people’s access to public goods,
their ability to engage profitably in trade and to raise capital through collateral
(Banerjee and Somanathan, 2007; anderson, 2011; Verma, 1991; Dreze, Sen, et al.,
1999). Rural wages and the incidence of poverty differ along gender, caste and reli-
4In the 2003 ranking of districts by poverty, Mirzapur was ranked 180 out of the 447 backward districts of the
country (Commission et al., 2005).
5This includes the percentage of cultivators and agricultural wage laborers.
134
gious lines. For instance, in 2004; daily wages for women were lower than the legal
minimum wage in most states in comparison to men (Basu, 2013). Social stratifica-
tion along caste and gender lines may also reduce certain groups’ access to NREGA,
who may continue to remain impoverished in regions where these inequalities are
more pronounced.
In addition to widespread poverty and higher incidence of marginalized communities,
the district is also home to the kol community. The kols are a tribal community of
Central India who live primarily in the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand,
Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Tripura. This community is classified as Sched-
uled Tribes (ST) in all states except UP where they are classified as Scheduled Castes
(SC). According to the Census of India, (2011) the total population of the community
is estimated at 1.7 million, of which around 300 thousand kols live in eastern UP.6 The
kols like most tribal adivasi groups of the country, have traditionally depended on
forest produce for subsistence. The kols of Central India have been among the most
disadvantaged groups in the country and their development indicators have lagged
behind other tribal communities. For instance, in a study of body-mass index (BMI)
of adult males in Central India, Adak et al. (2006) find that over 51 percent of the
kols in the region suffered from severe to mild chronic energy deficiency.
In the three decades following India’s independence in 1947, these groups have been
dispossessed of their lands and denied access to forests under various developmental
paradigms. These groups have been dis and have been displaced and rendered home-
less for the construction of large dams and industrial townships (Guha, 2007). This
process of dispossession of adivasis accelerated under the neoliberal policies followed
by the Indian state since the 1990s. Verma (2016) shows that till 1990s, 40 percent of
all displaced social groups were adivasis and policies of involuntary land transfer for
6Madhya Pradesh has around 900 thousand kol population which is the highest in the country.
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setting-up of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) increased the dispossession of this group
significantly. Further, this group has suffered violet atrocities and human rights viola-
tions by the police and other agencies as they organize resistance movements against
land grab attempts by the state (Baviskar, 2003).
The kols of southern UP work primarily as wage workers in agriculture and quarry
mining industries. Most kol households either do not own agricultural land or own
uneven, rocky or less-productive land.7 They dwell in stone or katcha houses without
basic amenities like electricity, clean water or access to health care (Rashid, 2013).
Srivastava et al. (2005) finds that the kol of Halia block in Mirzapur are among the few
communities where bonded labor in agriculture has continued unabated. These tied-
labor arrangements among kols represent inter-linked factor markets characterized by
debt-bondage where workers are forced to work for large agricultural landlords (often
over generations) in order to service a short debt or loan taken from their employers.
In a detailed study of bonded workers in Halia block of Mirzapur Shankar (1996)
find that workers traditionally take a small loan in order to meet the expenses of a
marriage or funeral (shradh) and has to pledge their labor to the landlord who does
not charge interest on the loan. Further, workers are paid using food-grains.8 In
addition, this labor-tying arrangement also involves a component of share-cropping.
The kol workers were given a small plot of land (0.06 ha) for subsistence farming and
the landlord claimed a share of the produce based on the credit and inputs like seeds
and fertilizers supplied by them in the production process.
7A full account of struggles for kol landownership can be found here.
8The wages in kind are mostly given in kodo which is an inferior rain-fed crop (Shankar, 1996).
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3.2.1.2 Maoist Movements in the region
The presence of bonded labor in the Halia block of Mirzapur provides a unique oppor-
tunity to study the impact and functioning of NREGA in one of the most backward
regions of the country. Further, this region is affected by armed left-wing Maoist
movements by virtue of being situated at the border of Madhya Pradesh and Uttar
Pradesh. Socio-economic exclusion and high incidence of poverty has contributed to
these struggles in the region. Borooah (2008) finds that the probability of a district
being affected by extremist movements increases with rise in poverty and decreases
with increase in literacy.
While 41 percent of UP’s population is below the poverty-line, Mirzapur has a higher
concentration of poverty. Using the 2004, National Sample Survey (Consumption
Expenditure Survey) we find that the poverty rate in Mirzapur is around 53 percent.
High levels of poverty coupled with Maoist insurgencies has contributed to the listing
of the district among 170 extremely backward districts and among the 55 extremist
affected districts of the country (Commission et al., 2005).9 There is some evidence of
NREGA has succeeded in creating an income safety-net for people and improved their
participation in anti-Maoist operations (Khanna and Zimmermann, 2017). However,
insufficient fund allocation and other implementation challenges are dampening the
impact of NREGA (Banerjee and Saha, 2010).
3.2.2 Sampling and Data Collection
This chapter presents the findings of a field study conducted in the Halia block of
Mirzapur district. There are two components of the study. First, we document the
district and block-level administrative processes involved in the provision of NREGA
and second, we discuss the impact of NREGA and gaps in implementation and the
9See Kumar, Rana, et al. (2015) for details of the Maoist movement in eastern Uttar Pradesh
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awareness of the rights of workers under the program. Correspondingly, we collect
data from government officials and NREGA beneficiaries. In this section we present
the data collection strategy of this chapter.
3.2.2.1 Administrative Data Collection
This chapter is the first to document the experiences and information provided by
officials involved in the provision of NREGA. Between August - November of 2017,
we conducted several rounds of semi-structured interviews with the officials involved
in NREGA implementation at the state, district and block levels. First, we discussed
the role of the state government in the implementation of NREGA with the officials
of the Ministry of Rural Development in the state capital of Lucknow. Second, we
contacted the office of the Chief Development officer (CDO) of Mirzapur to document
the procedure of data entry, funds transfer and recording un-met demand for NREGA
work at the district level. Finally, we contacted the office of the Block Development
Officer (BDO) to assess the administrative capacity at the grass-roots level involved
in the provision and supervision of NREGA works in the Halia block of Mirzapur.
3.2.2.2 Household-level Survey Data
In order to understand the impediments to NREGA participation and timely wage
payment in one of the most backward regions of the country we conduced household
level surveys of NREGA beneficiaries in 12 Gram Panchayats of Halia block between
November 2017 - February 2018. The NREGA web-portal provides detailed infor-
mation about NREGA workers at the village level including the number of days and
the name of projects in which NREGA beneficiaries have worked. Using the work
records for 2017 from the NREGA web-portal, we randomly selected around 1100
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households for our study. Of these, we were able to trace around 973 households who
were surveyed for this study.10
Our surveys included both quantitative and qualitative questions about household
characteristics and assets, indebtedness profiles of household members and their
sources of income including agricultural and non-agricultural earnings. Further, we
asked beneficiaries about their participation in and awareness of the provisions of
NREGA. These included detailed questions about the number of days they worked
under NREGA, wages paid and conditions of work. In addition, we recorded people’s
perceptions and experiences with negotiating with the Pradhans or BDO for their
entitlements under NREGA. Table 3.2 provides the break-up of sample households
by their caste and Gram Panchayat (GP). Fuliyari and Gaurava are the largest GPs
in the sample and they collectively contribute to around 40 percent of the sample.
While, all GPs in the sample are affected by Maoist activity, the villages of Fuli-
yari, Parshiakala, Deohyat, Khutha and Gaurava are right at the border of Madhya
Pradesh are more prone to insurgent activities. The village of Halia was less than 5
kms from the district headquarters and had banks, ATM machines within the largest
agricultural market of the region.
These household level surveys were conducted in respondents homes so they feel com-
fortable in answering questions about NREGA wages received and their perceptions
about the role of their elected representatives and government officials. In addition,
we also conducted two focus group discussions asking people about the impact of
NREGA on agricultural productivity, incomes and employment opportunities. These
focus group discussions were held in the villages of Halia and Fuliyari where around 10-
10Most villages had a population less than 2,000 people and settlements were organized along caste lines. Therefore,
it was fairly easy to identify and survey individuals from these households. In many cases we were informed that
some individuals on our list had migrated out of the village a few years ago or were deceased. The inability of
ou team to locate around 120 households may indicate the presence of fudging of muster-rolls similar to existing
studies like Adhikari and Bhatia (2010). However, we are unable to ascertain whether these were indeed instances of
‘ghost-workers’ and suggest the need for future research on this issue.
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15 cultivators and agricultural wage workers were asked to discuss whether NREGA
was having any spillover impact in agriculture. In several villages we were invited by
the Pradhan for a meeting to discuss the functioning of NREGA and the problems
faced by them. However, this would have interfered with our findings so we decided
ot to meet with the Pradhans.11
The summary statistics is given below in Table 3.3. We see most NREGA beneficiaries
were below the poverty line and lived in katcha houses without access to clean drinking
water and toilets. The respondents of all social-groups, relied primarily on public-
distribution of food at subsidized rates for rations. Most households had solar energy
panels installed on their roofs which generally powered one LCD lamp and a mobile
charging plug point for around ten hours in a day. These solar panels were installed
under government programs where beneficiaries had to pay only 10 percent of the
total cost. Further, most households had few durable assets other than bicycle and
mobile phones. In most cases, the mobile phones were used primarily by men and
women did not report owning mobiles.
3.3 State and Local Administrative Set-up
Existing research on the implementation of NREGA has focussed primarily on im-
proving the transparency of the village assemblies (Gram Panchayats) through social
audits (Kumar and Sah, 2015) and capacity building and greater monitoring (Aiyar
and Samji, 2006). Other studies have discussed th role of caste and gender affiliations
of elected representatives (Johnson, 2009) and funds utilization and state-level capac-
ity for proper implementation of NREGA (Chakraborty, 2007). However, few studies
have focussed on the bureaucratic capacity and opaque information flow within the
administrative set-up created to oversee the provision of NREGA, particularly in the
11In some cases, the Pradhans offered to arrange for surveys to be conducted in his house but we rejected these
offers.
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poorer states.12 This study aims to fill this lacuna in the existing literature, particu-
larly since research on the role of the state and local governments in the functioning
of NREGA in Uttar Pradesh is scarce.
The implementation of NREGA rests on the coordinated and timely functioning of the
state, district and local governments. Himanshu (2013) outlines the responsibilities of
each of these institutions in the planning, provision of public employment and wage
payments under the program. This scheme is largely financed by the Central govern-
ment but under Section 32 of the NREGA Act, the responsibility of implementing
it is vested with state and local government or the Gram Panchayats (Mookherjee,
2014). The ability of workers to participate in local governance institutions like the
Gram Panchayat the Gram Sabha is pivotal in ensuring that NREGA is successfully
implemented at the village level.13 For instance, in states like Chhattisgarh, demands
for social audits of NREGA have often resulted in confrontation between citizens’
groups and local elites. Such confrontations result in a high degree of opaqueness in
the functioning of the program in these states (Shah, 2008).
3.3.1 Role of the State Government
However, the actual implementation of NREGA suffers from considerable challenges
both at the state and local level. At the state-level the major constraint faced by
officials in the state NREGA secretariat is the lack of adequate number of officials to
implement the various administrative duties. Most employees are contractual data-
12Notable exceptions include Raabe et al. (2010) who conduct an analysis of NREGA implementation using case
studies in Bihar and Aiyar and Samji (2009) who study the role the state government of Andhra Pradesh in the
implementation of NREGA.
13The Gram Panchayat is the village council with elected leader(s) and the Gram Sabha is the village assembly
comprising of all adult members of the village. Finally, an official of the rank of Block Development Officer serves as
the Program Officer of NREGA who is responsible for the smooth running of the program in her block. Citizens are
supposed to apply for work to the Gram Panchayat which is also responsible to maintain job cards and implement
the works sanctioned by the block level officials. The Gram Sabha is required to monitor the execution of works under
NREGA (Dre`ze et al., 2006). Therefore, the program relies heavily on the ability of people to demand and monitor
its implementation.
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entry staff with high turnaround rates. The administration was also unaware of its role
in appointing district level officials like the Employment Guarantee Assistant (Gram
Rozgar Sahayak) and the Program Officer (PO). We were told that these officials
were determined at the district level and the state authority does not interfere with
local decisions.
Next, state level NREGA operations in UP do not have any programs to increase
awareness of NREGA provisions among the beneficiaries and increasing transparency
in its functioning. Not only is this in violation of the responsibilities of the state
government, but also contributes to the lack of information about participant rights
and entitlements that we find in our field study. Further, state government should
engage of professional agencies for technical support and improving the quality of
data collected under the program. This aspect of the scheme is also neglected. In fact
officials were aware of local research institutes working on these issues but reported
having no official collaboration with them. This disjoint between the ‘perceived’ and
‘practised’ responsibility of the state government was also witnessed in the case of
social audits. NREGA Act requires state governments to establish competent agencies
to conduct social audits of NREGA functioning and asset creation. However, state-
level officials contested this claim and stated that financial audits are conducted by
the Central government and local bodies like the Panchayats decide to inspect public
works completed under NREGA.
Finally, on the question of finances the officials were reluctant to answer any ques-
tions. Most officials maintained that there was no delay in releasing funds from the
State Employment Fund (SEF) to districts or the submission of district-wise utiliza-
tion certificates to the Central government. In fact any instance of insufficient or
delayed fund transfer was blamed on delays in data entry. While there was general
acknowledgment of the fact that funds were inadequate to pay workers on time, but
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officials were not willing to explain these deficiencies.14 Therefore, the state level ad-
ministrative set-up in UP does not adequately fulfill its obligations under the NREGA
Act and this reflects in poor implementation of the program at the local level.
3.3.2 Role of the District Level officials
The Chief Development Officer (CDO) is the main district level officer responsible
for smooth functioning of NREGA. Through our meetings with the CDO and his
staff, we found the CDO conducted bi-weekly meetings with all BDOs to tackle the
bottlenecks associated with NREGA. Further, the CDO had a large staff dedicated to
data entry and maintaining records. However, we found of records of lists of projects
sent by Gram Sabhas for ratification and information about works completed were
incomplete. Further, according to the records maintained by the CDO, all workers
under NREGA were paid full wages on time. However, on meeting with workers in
the village we found that this was not the case in reality. This points to the fact that
records of public employment created and wages paid on the NREGA portal does not
match with the actual experience of workers. The data entry staff at the CDO’s office
showed us that his records match those supplied by the block level officials. Contrary
to the provisions of the Act the CDO does not inspect or monitor the public works
completed under NREGA which are under the supervision of the Block Development
Officer (BDO).
3.3.3 Role of the Block Level officials
Successful implementation of NREGA depends critically on block level officers dis-
charging their duties in a transparent manner. However, it was at this level that we
found that procedures were most opaque and diverged from the rules considerably.
For instance, there was no Program Officer (PO) to oversee the implementation of
14Public officials may be wary of pointing to the role of the state government in delaying or mismanagement of
NREGA finances. However, our study could not ascertain these issues in detail.
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NREGA. The PO is the main authority to accept applications for NREGA work,
scrutinizing proposals and creating NREGA employment. In the absence of the PO,
NREGA provision and transparency mechanisms within the Act are diluted. For
instance, there are no direct employment requests made to block level officials and
monitoring of NREGA works is seldom undertaken. When asked about social-audits,
we were told that there was never a request for these audits from the Gram Pan-
chayats. Further, NREGA muster rolls were created by contractual data entry staff
and suffered from delays due to electricity shortage and computer malfunctions. The
BDO himself primarily works out of another district and seldom visits the block.
Therefore, information about NREGA responsibilities was limited in the Halia block
administration office. We were told that the office simply compiles the lists of num-
ber of work days generated under NREGA based on the information provided by the
Pradhans.
However, the officials at the BDO’s office denied any corruption and leakages in
NREGA funds transfer claiming that all payments were directly made by the state-
government into the bank or post-office accounts of NREGA workers. Further, as
evidence of the disjoint between the provisions of NREGA Act and its implementation
at the local level, we were told citizens have never approached the BDO for any
NREGA related issue. All NREGA related matters are discussed in periodic meetings
that the BDO holds with the Pradhans. Correspondingly, the officials at the BDO’s
office believed that NREGA was working well in their block in comparison to the
neighbouring block but they knew that no new durable assets were being created
under NREGA in the block. Given this lack of administrative and technical capacity,
information and demands for accountability, it is not surprising that the provision of
NREGA in the block is well below the national average and suffers from wage delays
and other shortcomings which are discussed in the next section.
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3.4 Assessing the Functioning of NREGA
The goal of this chapter to understand the impediments to NREGA employment and
commensurate wage payment to workers. This section breaks down NREGA partici-
pation into its stages to discuss potential challenges to its successful implementation.
These include application for public employment under NREGA, the timely provi-
sion of public employment and wage payment, supporting facilities at work sites and
finally the presence of an efficient grievance redressal mechanism.
3.4.1 Applying for NREGA works
In order to ensure that the demand driven nature of the program is maintained the
procedure of application for NREGA employment involves two steps. First, house-
holds who anticipate working under NREGA must register with the Gram Panchayat
(GP) which issues a job-card to all applicants which is valid for five years Dre`ze et al.
(2006). Second, any household with a valid job-card can request NREGA employ-
ment by submitting an oral or written application to either the Gram Panchayat or
the NREGA program officer.
Our survey revealed that close to 90 percent of the respondents had NREGA job cards
issued by the GP. Most respondents (close to 95 percent) claimed that the Pradhan
helped them in getting a job-card. Panel A of Table 3.4 shows that there is little
inter-caste variation in the proportion of households with a valid job card. However,
this percentage is significantly lower for Muslim households (76 percent). While the
small sample of Muslim households in this study restricts our ability to explain this
divergence, but most respondents claimed that they were not sure if the Pradhan
made their job card or not. However, they regularly participated in NREGA works
in their villages.
While most households had a valid job card, but none of the job cards had any entry of
the work done in the last six-months. In addition, in four villages (around 30 percent)
145
of the sample, the job cards for the entire village were kept with the Pradhans and not
the individual households. When we asked the respondents to show us the job-cards,
in most cases they could retrieve them from the Pradhan’s house. In these cases, the
respondents stated that job cards were always kept with the Pradhan and they had
never questioned this practice.
The condition of registering with the GP and having a valid job card was met by most
households, around 70 percent households had ever placed a formal request (oral or
written) for NREGA employment either to the BDO or the Pradhan. Some people
had informally asked the Pradhan for NREGA work but received no acknowledge-
ment for this request. Most respondents were unaware of their role in demanding
employment under NREGA. It was believed that NREGA works would begin only
when the Pradhan ‘desires’. In fact, over 50 percent of the respondents believed that
NREGA works are undertaken in the village because the Pradhan wanted to help
them during the lean season of agriculture. This shows that in practice, the promise
of demand driven employment guarantee is diluted as workers are unaware of the legal
provisions of the Act. This also explains why official records of NREGA works in the
region do not show any unfulfilled work demand during any time.15 Since people do
not request the provision of public employment, there is no mechanism to record how
much work people actually want under NREGA. When we asked our respondents how
many days in a year would they like to work under NREGA, the majority answered
that they would like to work under NREGA for as much as possible and 60 percent
of the respondents were unaware of their legal entitlement of 100 days of NREGA
employment per household.
15According to the data processing staff at the office of the Central Development Officer (CDO) there is no unfulfilled
demand for NREGA in the district. According to the NREGA website, there are a few cases of unfulfilled work demand
from the previous years. We were told that this is actually a data entry problem and does not signify any unmet-work
demand under NREGA.
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3.4.2 Provision of NREGA employment
In the absence of any formal work application and entry in job cards showing a
record of public employment created under NREGA, the actual provision of NREGA
in the region does not correspond to demand. In 2016, workers reported working
under NREGA for an average of 29 days. The number of days worked were roughly
equal for men ans women (29 and 28 respectively). Panel B of Table 3.4 shows
that marginalized communities (SCs, STs OBCs and kols) reported working for more
than 31 days in a year while upper castes and Muslims worked for around 25 days.
This suggests that the participation of poorer sections of society is more in NREGA.
Several studies using national and field level data have concluded that the scheme
is mostly availed by the poor and participation by people from the top consumption
quintile is merely 10 percent which means that the scheme is ‘not poorly targeted’
(Sabhikhi, 2012).16 Field data from Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Rajasthan and
Maharashtra collected in 2010, show that small and marginal farmers mainly benefited
from NREGA except in distress prone districts of Anantpur and Yavatmal where
larger farmers also participated and gained from NREGA (Kareemulla et al., 2010).
Female participation in NREGA at 18 percent in UP is among the worst in the coun-
try as the national average in 2012 was around 47 per cent (Mann and Pande, 2012).
Our study shows at only 12 percent of the women worked under NREGA. This is par-
ticularly alarming since 33 percent of public employment created under the scheme
is reserved for women. Several studies have found that NREGA has had a positive
impact on female labor force participation nationally (Azam, 2011) and political en-
gagement in local decision-making (Girard, 2014). Tsaneva and Balakrishnan (2018)
find that in the first year of the program, women living in districts where NREGA
16This is important as concerns are raised about leakage to the non-poor Bhagwati and Panagariya (2014).
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was implemented were less likely to experience depression symptoms as the program
provided them economic security and independence.
Even when the actual provision of NREGA remained low, we found no evidence
of any discrimination in people’s participation based on gender, religion or caste of
the household. This is contrary to evidence from Rajasthan where low provision of
NREGA compared to its demand, led to rationing of work based on the caste and of
the village head Sarpanch (Mukhopadhyay, Sharan, et al., 2015). In addition, none
of the respondents reported having paid any bribes to help secure NREGA work or
wages. In 76 percent households public employment was primarily performed by men
while in others, both men and women participated in NREGA.
The number of work days reported by respondents differed significantly from the
official records on the NREGA website. For instance, the average number of workdays
according to the records was only 25. Our findings suggest that there is significant
discrepancy in official records of NREGA employment. Panel B of Table 3.4 shows
considerable inter-caste variation in the difference between the official record and
the actual number of days that people claimed to have worked. For instance, the
Scheduled Castes and OBC households reported having worked for an average of 28
and 32 days respectively. However, according to the official records they worked only
for 21 and 24 days respectively. This implies that work-days were under-reported for
marginalized groups. This means that some of the labor performed by these groups
was not recorded in the official statistics and correspondingly they were not paid for
this labor.
The trend was different for upper caste households who reported having worked for 25
days but official records indicate that they worked for 37 days. Therefore, there was
significant over-reporting of work days in this case. This implies that these groups
got paid more than what they worked for. The experience highlights corruption
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as an important factor in the provision of NREGA similar to existing literature.
Corruption in the form of fudging of muster rolls, flawed work measurement, non-
payment of minimum wages and delays in wage payments is widespread across the
country (Adhikari and Bhatia, 2010).
Further, we found no evidence of year-long agricultural labor contracts or tied-labor
arrangements which would hinder worker’s ability to participate in NREGA. For over
81 percent of households engaged in self-farming or wage employment, NREGA em-
ployment augmented their income time without causing any significant substitution of
private or self-employment by NREGA. This is contrary to Imbert and Papp (2015),
who find significant crowding-out of private wage employment post-NREGA. The
insufficient and unpredictable nature of NREGA provision does not allow farmers
to change their labor supply decisions in response to public employment. Further,
since NREGA employment occurs in the lean season of agriculture, labor demand in
agricultural markets and in self-farming is low.17 Further, most employers are flexible
and adjust their own labor demand to allow workers to participate in NREGA.18
When we tried to ascertain people’s perceptions about NREGA supply, an overwhelm-
ing majority agreed that the provision of employment under NREGA is insufficient.
However, there was little awareness about its causes. Around 60 percent of the re-
spondents claimed that the Pradhan “tries his best” to create NREGA employment
but has no budget to do so. Most people said that the provision of NREGA has
remained consistently low ever since its inception.
17The majority of respondents claimed that they would prefer NREGA to remain operational throughout the year
including the peak season of agriculture. This shows that labor demand in the rural economy (agricultural and
non-agricultural) is insufficient to provide employment to workers at any point during the year.
18In most cases, private employers (agricultural and non-agricultural) adjusted the timing of their labor demand
by a few days to accommodate NREGA employment.
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Therefore, our findings suggest that NREGA has not altered the social relations of
production within the rural economy. This is primarily because the actual provision
of NREGA does not vary by demand but is fixed exogenously by the Pradhan. The
number of work days created under NREGA is not sufficient to meet the consumption
requirements of poor households in the region.
Most states have not been able provide 100 days of employment in a year and con-
sequently many people in rural India who want NREGA work have not been able
to get it (Mukhopadhyay, Sharan, et al., 2015). However, the average of 29 days
of NREGA in this region is lower than other regions including the worst performing
states. For instance, during the period between 2013 and 2016, NREGA has been able
to generate 45 days of work in a year for each participating household in rural India.
Mukhopadhyay, Sharan, et al. (2015) find that the number of work days supplied was
much less than what was demanded in Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha and Rajasthan.19
3.4.3 Payment of Wages
Similar to the provision of NREGA employment, the nature of wage payment after
the work also diverged considerably from the norm. Our study found that there is no
set schedule for NREGA payment in the survey villages. Payment for NREGA works
must be made weekly or fortnightly (Dre`ze et al., 2006). The primary purpose of em-
ployment guarantee is to raise people’s incomes during the lean season of agriculture.
Therefore, delays in payment effectively dilute the welfare effects of NREGA (Basu
and Sen, 2015). Around 84 percent of the respondents claimed that NREGA pay-
ments were delayed by over two-weeks and NREGA payments are directly credited in
the workers’ bank accounts.20 While this is a violation of the provisions of NREGA,
19The provision of NREGA remained low in Jharkhand even during acute agricultural crisis when it was most
needed.
20This is different from the experience in Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, and Odisha where work is allocated to groups of
workers and wages are paid to the group leader so individual workers receive less than their official wage (Banerjee and
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studies from the neighbouring state of Bihar found even longer delays. For instance,
in Bihar, 38 percent of payments are delayed by more than 60 days (Ravallion et al.,
2015).
Over 92 percent of the respondents claimed to have bank or post-office accounts and
produced bank passbooks to show NREGA payments. In the remaining cases, the
money would be paid in cash by the Pradhan. In some cases, respondents had given
signed blank bank-withdrawal slips linked to their accounts to the Pradhan who would
withdraw the money and pay cash to workers.21 In around 39 percent of cases no
wages were paid to workers even when they participated in NREGA.
Panel C of Table 3.4 shows that based on the number of days respondents claimed
to have actually worked, the average daily wage rate paid for NREGA employment
was 65 INR (0.9 USD).22 The actual wage rate differed considerably between social
groups. For instance, on the one hand the upper castes and Muslim households
received an actual wage rate of 86 and 73 INR respectively. On the other hand,
the actual wage rate for SCs (including kols) and OBCs was only 63 and 69 INR
respectively. The lowest wage rate was recorded for the STs who earned less than
60 INR a day under NREGA. However, if we compare daily wage rates based on the
number of days officially reported on the NREGA website, we find that the average
wage rate was 78 INR and there was relatively little variation between wage rates
between social groups.23
Saha, 2010). Further, several instances of collusion between local elected body and bank officials to reduce payments
received by workers have been recorded by Adhikari and Bhatia (2010).
21In principle bank-withdrawal slips can be used only by the account holder to withdraw money but according to
the respondents, the Pradhan can operate their bank accounts without them being present.
22Using 2017 exchange rate 1 USD = 69 INR.
23Some respondents claimed that the Pradhan assured them that they will get another payment related to NREGA
in the coming weeks. However, the CDO’s office confirmed that all NREGA wages for the year were paid.
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We were not able to discern any difference in wages paid to men and women workers.
This is particularly important since prior to NREGA, daily wages received by women
were lower than the legal minimum wage in most states in comparison to men (Basu,
2013). Using natioanlly representative data (Zimmermann, 2012) has shown that
female wages have risen considerably after NREGA. Moreover, Desai et al. (2015)
finds that around 45 percent of women working under NREGA during 20011 - 2012
were either not working earlier or were working exclusively on family farms in 2004-
2005 . Therefore, NREGA gave several women their first opportunity to earn a cash
wage and consequently their material living and household bargaining position have
significantly improved.
Surprisingly, more than 88 percent of the households were aware that the minimum
wage in the district was around 100 INR per day but were not aware that the minimum
wage laws applied to NREGA employment. Further, most respondents felt they were
paid a fair amount since their neighbours and friends received similar wages. While
most respondents remembered the dates and amounts of NREGA earnings, they could
not calculate their wage rates and compare whether their earnings were commensurate
with the number of days worked. Lack of awareness coupled with lack of education
may explain people’s inability to determine whether they are paid fair wages. For
instance, the household head in 69 percent of the households was uneducated. This
number was much lower for upper castes (39 percent).
Existing research identifies delays in payments as a major impediment to the success-
ful implementation of NREGA. Problems of delayed wage payments are effectively
diluting the welfare effects of NREGA (Basu and Sen, 2015). Payment delays have
increased since 2008 with the movement from cash payments to payments through
bank and post office accounts and the complex procedures needed to approve pay-
ments for NREGA workers (Ravallion et al., 2015). However, evidence on the role
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of technology is mixed as (Banerjee, Duflo, et al., 2014) find that an e-governance
reform led to a 25 percent decline in program expenditure with no adverse impact on
employment. Other improvements at the local level include the use of technology in
administering the program and wage payments. Payments based on Aadhar numbers
result in people getting wages on time in Jharkhand (Bhatti, 2012).24
3.4.4 Supporting Facilities at work site
According to Dre`ze et al. (2006) NREGA work-sites are required to be located within
5 kilometres of the village and should have provision for safe drinking water, shade for
children and periods of rest, first-aid box with adequate material for emergency treat-
ment for minor injuries and other health hazards connected with the work [Schedule
II, Para 23]. All respondents agreed that NREGA works were undertaken very close
to the village (in most cases less than on kilometre). However, most respondents
agreed that apart from the provision of drinking water, no other facility was provided
at the work-site. Workers reported that in the past, minor incidents had occurred
at the NREGA work-site. In addition, most respondents reported that they had
never demanded any additional facilities at the work-sites as they were unaware of
the provisions of the Act.
Panel D of Table 3.4 shows that most workers agreed that in their experience no
health or child care facilities are provided at NREGA work sites. In some cases women
workers suggested that they had to delegate child-care to other family members and
would benefit if there was any form of child-care support while they worked. However,
they had never made a formal or informal request for this as they did not think it was
mandatory under the Act. Further, most women agreed that their primary concern
was lack of adequate work and timely payment under NREGA and consequently,
24Aadhar is the unique identity number given to every resident of India.
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they would refrain from demanding work-site child-care facilities as that might upset
the Pradhan. This creates impediments to women’s participation in NREGA as they
disproportionately bear child care responsibilities within the household.
3.4.5 Grievance Redressal
Over 90 percent of the respondents claimed that they had problems with the inad-
equate provision of NREGA and delayed wage payments. However, in most cases
they would only discuss this with the Pradhan who would blame lack of budgetary
allocation for the poor provision of NREGA. None of the respondents claimed to have
approached the BDO, NREGA PO, or any bureaucrat to discuss problems related to
NREGA implementation.
Additionally, none of the respondents ever approached any elected representative
except the Pradhan to discuss their grievances about NREGA. This is consistent
across social groups as seen from Panel E of Table 3.4. In fact, nobody claimed
raising this issue in the Gram Sabha or the village assembly. This shows that people’s
perception of NREGA differs considerably from its actual provisions. People have not
realized that NREGA is a demand driven program and they are entitled to 100 days of
employment at the minimum wage. Most people claimed that they had no knowledge
about the provisions of NREGA and relied on the Pradhan’s interpretation of the
rules and procedures to help them with their problems.
3.4.6 Assets Created under NREGA
In eight out of twelve villages the respondents claimed to have worked under two
NREGA works. The construction of a water reservoir (talaab) and a mud katchcha
road. Both of these were existed and were verified by our team. In the remaining
four villages workers only worked on a water reservoir which could not be completed
as works had been halted owning to insufficient funds. Over 70 percent respondents
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claimed that the water reservoirs helped with agricultural production but claimed
that they have been working on the same reservoir for several seasons as it needs
frequent repairs. More than 80 percent of the respondents had no knowledge of any
list of prospective works maintained by the Gram Panchayat. Finally, most workers
did not know that NREGA works were meant to improve the productivity of their
agriculture. It was believed that the government chose which public assets were to
be created under NREGA and local participants had no say in the process.
While productive assets created under NREGA can create non-transfer welfare gains
for the local economy as they increase the productivity of agriculture (Abreu et al.,
2014). However, the experience of this region shows that this element of the pro-
gram is not implemented seriously. Creation of durable assets is also a significant
source of corruption in NREGA. For instance, public employment to create wells
was undertaken in Jharkhand and corruption and bribery were rampant during the
construction process (Bhagat, 2012). Lack of accountability through social audits
and public disclosure of payment rolls hinders the ability of workers to examine fund
utilization certificates prepared by the officials Ambasta et al. (2008). However, bet-
ter implementation of the program can help in minimizing corruption and increasing
transparency in NREGA. For instance, creating correct incentives for officials reduces
theft by around 64 percent (Niehaus and Sukhtankar, 2013). Better implementation
of NREGA can increase private market wages by around 6 percent and decrease days
without work by 7 percent (Muralidharan et al., 2016).
3.5 Impact on Agriculture
It is important to investigate whether the creation of productivity enhancing assets
under NREGA has had an impact on agriculture in this region for three reasons.
First, as mentioned above, this region is traditionally characterized by the incidence
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of tied-labor and among the most backward districts of the country.25 Correspond-
ingly, it is important to study whether NREGA has been successful in helping prevent
indebtedness by raising the productivity and incomes in agriculture. NREGA em-
ployment enables peasants to withstand adverse weather shocks and the agricultural
lean season when private labor demand is low (Bardhan, 1980). For instance, in 2008,
around two-thirds of NREGA workers in North India avoided hunger and around 75
percent respondents credited NREGA for helping them sustain their livelihoods in
the dry season of agriculture (Khera and Nayak, 2009). This, in turn may reduce
their reliance on informal credit to meet their consumption or investment needs and
reduces migration to urban areas.26 Empirical estimates on the impact of NREGA
shows that NREGA increased the consumption expenditure of the most vulnerable
sections (Schedule Castes and Scheduled Tribes) during the lean season of agriculture
Klonner and Oldiges (2014).
Second, raising agricultural productivity through public works is an important non-
transfer benefit of NREGA which augments the direct income-transfer under the
program (Deininger and Liu, 2013). However, creation of productivity enhancing as-
sets under NREGA requires coordinated push from the farmers and Gram Sabhas and
the block level officials. As mentioned above, we found no evidence of any planning
or proposals for possible works under the program and there was no mechanism for
involving local farmers in deciding the nature of public assets created. Finally, most
NREGA beneficiaries in our sample were wage workers for most months in a year.
Existing research shows that the guarantee of alternative employment would increase
the bargaining position of workers and exert an upward pressure on rural wages ((Im-
25The Backwardness Index comprises of agricultural productivity per worker, agricultural wages, and the proportion
of SCs and STs in the population (Commission et al., 2014)
26In 2002, informal loans from moneylenders or employers accounted for around 42 percent of total rural credit in
India (Pradhan, 2013).
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bert and Papp, 2015), (Basu, Chau, et al., 2009)). Studies using national level data
show that NREGA has allowed rural households to increase consumption expenditure
between 6.5 and 10 percent with around 12 percent increase for marginalized caste
groups (Bose, 2017). In addition, the scheme has had a positive impact in reducing
child labor by around 10 percent (Mani et al., 2014).
3.5.1 Agricultural Profile of the Region
Table 3.5 provides an overview of the proportion of agricultural cultivators and wage
workers by social group. Around 74 percent of our respondents engaged in some
form of agricultural production and rice, wheat and mustard are the major crops of
the region. Among these, 46 percent own the land they cultivate and the remaining
54 percent work as share-croppers on the land of large landlords. While we did not
find any incidence of bonded labor in over 390 kol households that we surveyed,
but around 65 percent kol households engaged in share-cropping adhiya where the
landlord claimed about half the total produce. The incidence of share-cropping among
the kols was the highest among all social groups. As already noted, share-cropping on
land owned by the landlord (who also provides credit and inputs for production) is an
important component of tied-labor arrangements in this region. However, none of our
respondents reported that they were forced to work for their landlords exclusively.27
Further, members from most households that engage in self-farming also work as
agricultural wage workers as incomes from agriculture are not sufficient to meet their
subsistence needs. Most households cultivate small plots of land (less than 0.5 acre)
and over 97 percent of the respondents produced solely to meet their subsistence
27The landlord occasionally asks share-croppers to work in his house during weddings and other ceremonies without
any monetary payment. In the focus group discussions, we found that this practice was not practices across castes
and was not confined to the kols. People in the region distinctly remember that kols were forced to work on the
landlord’s farms for 1kg rice and a bottle of local liquor, but reported that this practice does not exist any more.
While we did not any incidence of debt-bondage in our sample, future research is needed to determine whether the
practice is actually extinct from the region.
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needs. They relied predominantly on household labor and over 90 percent never
hired any additional workers. The remaining 26 percent of the respondents work as
landless labor in agriculture and non-agricultural wage employment. Even among
cultivators, household members engage in wage labor for six to nine months in a
year. The agricultural produce for these households lasts between three to six months
depending on the farm and family size. While 67 percent of all cultivators (and 60
percent of kol cultivators) reported taking a loan from the the landlords or local
money lenders, none of them reported any work conditionality attached to the loan
repayment schedule. Interest rates charged were between 15 - 25 percent per month
and none of the respondents had ever approached a bank or any formal lending
institution for credit. None of the respondents felt that banks would lend them
any money even when all of them had bank accounts and even ATM debit cards.
Most loans were taken to buy inputs for agriculture (67 percent), financing household
consumption and medical expenses came next (15 percent).
3.5.2 Role of NREGA on agricultural productivity and wages
Several studies have shown that NREGA positively impacts agricultural productiv-
ity (Berg, Bhattacharyya, Durgam, et al., 2012) and raises agricultural wages (Berg,
Bhattacharyya, Rajasekhar, et al., 2018). However, our findings suggest that NREGA
had little impact on the intensity of inputs like fertilizer, machinery and labor de-
mand. This is not surprising since we we found little evidence of durable assets being
created under NREGA. Further, contrary to evidence from other states; none of the
NREGA works in the region were conducted in the fields belonging to marginalized
communities. This is particularly important as kol farmers were granted landown-
ership of rocky and semi-barren land on the outskirts of several villages under the
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Uttar Pradesh Land Ceiling Act of 1972.28 Under Category II of the permissible works
under NREGA, public employment can be used to undertake individual works to im-
prove the land belonging to “scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, de-notified tribes and
other families below the poverty line (Dre`ze et al., 2006). In contrast, Ranaware et al.
(2015) finds that in Maharashtra around 75 percent of NREGA works on private land
belonged to small (53 percent) and marginal farmers (22 percent) However, our study
found that no such works were ever undertaken in the rocky fields belonging to the
kol farmers who could have benefited immensely from such productivity enhancing
work on their land.
Second, we investigate the impact of NREGA on agricultural wages. Our respondents
claimed that NREGA had no impact on their wage bargaining position vis-a-vis
private agricultural employers. On a few instances when workers had demanded
higher wages, the landlords simply refused and in the absence of other alternative
employment workers had no choice but to accept the wages offered by the landlords.
This was also true during the lean season of the year when NREGA employment was
primarily undertaken. Since the provision of NREGA was erratic and unpredictable,
it did not emerge as a credible alternative to private employment. Further, owning
to stagnant agricultural productivity there was no increase in labor demand during
the harvest season and consequently there was no upward pressure on agricultural
wages. On several instances, workers reported having worked at wages below the
legal minimum.
Therefore, contrary to the experience of better performing states like Andhra Pradesh,
Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu where NREGA has a positive impact on rural wages
28under the Land Ceiling Act of 1972, the maximum land size for agricultural holding was fixed at 12.5 acres.
Any landholding above this size was confiscated by the state and redistributed among the landless workers, primarily
belonging to the marginalized social groups. However, there has been limited real redistribution under the scheme
and most land transferred is barren or non-agricultural land. See Singh and Mehrotra (2014) for a full discussion on
land reforms in UP.
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and crowded-out private employment ((Dreze and Khera, 2009), (Imbert and Papp,
2015)), in the most backward regions of the country, the full potential of NREGA
is not realized. In fact its implementation does not allow cultivators to increase
the productivity of their agriculture or workers to improve their wage bargaining
potential. It simply serves as an erratic and unpredictable source of income for a few
days in the year. Almost all respondents claimed that NREGA earnings were spent
in household consumption and was not sufficient to increase their savings or provide
for agricultural investment. Next, we discuss how lack of transparency and citizen’s
participation in the provision of NREGA is leading to elite capture and corruption in
its implementation.
3.6 Lack of Awareness and the Local Political Economy
All respondents agreed that NREGA provides indispensable income support which
helps increase consumption during the lean months of agriculture. However, as the
preceding discussion showed, there was surprisingly little awareness about its provi-
sions and workers entitlements among our respondents. In this section, we discuss
that lack of awareness of workers’ rights and the duties of elected representatives and
government functionaries under NREGA contributes to the formation of client-patron
exchanges between workers and the local elite and and corruption in the provision of
NREGA.
3.6.1 Role of the Pradhan
The previous discussion shows that Pradhan plays a pivotal role in NREGA provision,
wage payment the record collection in every gram panchayat. In most cases, people
approach the Pradhan with most of their NREGA related queries. However, when we
questioned people on whether the Pradhans discharge their duties as mandated by the
NREGA Act, we found that the Pradhan did not keep any records of existing works,
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number of days of employment created and wages paid in a transparent manner.
Further, NREGA job-cards were never updated with particulars of the number of
days worked and wages paid. In several cases the Pradhan kept the job cards so
people had no idea of the wages they were actually paid and the number of days of
work that got registered in the official records. This increases the opaqueness in the
functioning of NREGA.
Paradoxically, almost all respondents had a positive view of the role played by the
Pradhan in helping them with NREGA related difficulties. Table 3.6 shows that
most respondents thought that inadequate provision of NREGA and delays in wage
payments were minimized because of the efforts of the Pradhan. It was believed
that the Pradhan even pays the panchayat mitra a monthly salary of 5000 INR for
maintaining NREGA records for the entire village. In addition, our respondents never
met or interacted with any of the government functionaries like the Program Officer
or saw the BDO inspect any work site. Even in Halia village which is located within
a few kilometres from the Block headquarters, 80 percent of the respondents agreed
that they had never heard of the Program Officer and less than 6 percent of the
respondents said they ever spoke to any one from the BDO’s office.
Our study shows that in this region, the village Pradhan ot just controls all facets
linked to NREGA implementation in his Gram Panchayat, but has also emerged
as the link between citizens and government officials. This central position of the
Pradhan is primarily because of a total lack of awareness of the provisions of NREGA
among the beneficiaries. And in the absence of any transparency measures like social
audits, this concentration of political and social power with the Pradhan leads to
the client-patron exchanges and corruption in the functioning of NREGA. Table 3.6
shows that around 90 percent or more respondents of all social groups believed that
the provision of NREGA depends solely on the Pradhan who has consolidated his
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position considerably in the local economy. Respondents explained that if they have
to approach the Pradhan with their NREGA related complaints, they could not afford
to antagonize him in any way. They also explained that NREGA had been a major
issue in the previous local body elections in the region.
Experiences from Jharkhand where local body elections have not been held since
1978 also show that local institutions like the Gram Sabha lacks the administrative
capacity to implement NREGA (Bhatia and Dreze, 2006). The absence of village
assemblies seriously dilutes the legal entitlement of NREGA as these assemblies are
pivotal in ensuring that NREGA is implemented when people demand employment
from the state. In most cases, this lack of administrative capacity is also reflected in
the delay in appointment of officials at the village and block level.29 In fact, these
deficiencies in public personnel and institutional capacity allows public officials to
restrict the number of job cards and regulate the supply of NREGA workdays Bhatia
and Dreze (2006).
3.6.2 Patron-Client Exchanges NREGA Implementation
According to Scott (1972) patron-client relationship consists of exchanges between
“an individual of higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his own influence and
resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client)
who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including
personal services, to the patron”. Such repeated exchanges between between a iden-
tifiable agents within a community is form of rent seeking in developing countries.
The patron spends a part of the rents created in one period to provide protection and
access to scarce resources to clients in their networks to maintain their influence and
authority which allows further rounds of rent-seeking (Khan and Jomo, 2000). The
29Officials at the local level include panchayat sevaks or panchayat mitras and gram rozgar sevaks and block level
officials include supervisors, engineers etc.
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pivotal role played by the Pradhan in the functioning of NREGA in his Gram Pan-
chayat establishes him as the principle patron in the repeated provision of NREGA
which creates rents for the local elite.
Dutta et al. (2012) attribute the low demand and participation rates in NREGA in
Bihar, Jharkhand and Odisha to low information and awareness. As workers are un-
aware of their rights under NREGA, they rely on the Pradhan for the provision of
NREGA. The Pradhan in turn, benefits from lack of transparency in the functioning
of NREGA to control its supply to suit the interests of local landholding elite and
appropriate NREGA funds. At the same time, the Pradhan spends some resources
to ensure that workers continue to trust and rely on him to address their concerns
and grievances related to the functioning of NREGA. By excluding the role of com-
munity participation and decision-making through the Gram Sabhas, the Pradhans
not only dilute the demand driven provisions of NREGA, but also create opaqueness
in the implementation of NREGA. This arrangement suits government functionar-
ies as workers do not approach the PO or BDO with requests for NREGA and the
official records can show that there is no unfulfilled demand for NREGA in their
regions. Such complicity between lower-level government officials and local elite has
been studied extensively in the Indian context. For instance, Bardhan (1998) argues
that professionals, large landlords and capitalist form dominant coalitions in India
which exclude the poor from political participation and economic prosperity. The
professional class comprises of educated elites including government officials, urban
elite and petty-bourgeoisie.
NREGA empowers workers to demand for employment and wages which not only
improves their incomes in the short-run but can also weaken their reliance on the
local elite. This would weaken the ability of large landlords to keep wages depressed
and demand accountability from the officials. Therefore, collusion between these
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groups can effectively dampen the provisions of the Act and generate rents for both
groups.
3.6.3 Corruption in NREGA Implementation
If NREGA employment is provided for 100 days in a year and wages are paid on time,
the wage bill of large landlords would rise. In most cases the Pradhan or his extended
family members are major employers of agricultural labor. Therefore, it is in their
interest to curtail the supply of NREGA. Further, ignorance of official procedures
creates avenues for corruption and fund embezzlement.
Our surveys revealed that the number of days worked by individuals recorded on the
NREGA website differed significantly from the number of days workers claimed to
have worked. As we were conducting our study shortly after NREGA works ended for
the year and since most workers worked on similar projects, it was easy to calculate
the number of days that each member of the household worked under NREGA. On
average, around 42 percent of our respondents reported working more days under
NREGA than what was officially recorded and the remaining workers had worked
fewer number of days. This discrepancy also existed in their wages paid, as pay-
ments are released based on the official number of days worked by people. Therefore,
workers whose work days were under-reported in the official statistics, were paid less
and others were paid more for the same number of days worked. However, workers
themselves were unable to calculate whether they were paid according to the number
of days they worked or not.
Finally, The Pradhan maintained control of payment schedules and in some cases,
he was also in possession of bank account details and withdrawal slips linked to
workers accounts. Individual NREGA beneficiaries had no idea how much money was
deposited in the account by the state, but only knew the cash payment received by
the Pradhan. This discrepancy in NREGA records and opaqueness in wage payment
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is maintained by the Pradhan as he controls data entry for NREGA works at the
village level. Further, several respondents believed that the Pradhan submits several
requests to the BDO to ensure the release of NREGA funds. This is important to
ensure that corruption rent-seeking continue through the patron-client engagements
devised by the Pradhan.
3.7 Policy Implications
By documenting the functioning of NREGA in one of the poorest regions of UP,
this chapter aims to explain why NREGA may not be performing well in eastern
Uttar Pradesh. Using semi-structured interviews with government functionaries and
NREGA beneficiaries we find that lack of awareness of workers’ entitlements, poor
administrative capacity, corruption and collusion between the bureaucracy and local
level elected officials contribute to poor and opaque implementation of NREGA at
the local-level. Consequently, the program has not emerged as a credible alternative
source of employment fo workers who are among the poorest in the country.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature by arguing that lack of awareness
about the provisions of NREGA not only limits the participation in public works
but also serves as a basis for patron-client relationships to emerge between the local
elites, primarily the Pradhans and NREGA beneficiaries. By centralizing all decision-
making and NREGA record keeping practices, the Pradhans are able to engage in
rent seeking through corruption and also protect their class interests by keeping rural
wages depressed. This arrangement also suits local administrators as it insulates them
from day to day monitoring and implementation of NREGA. However, this collusion
between the local elite and and government officials effectively dilute the demand
driven nature of NREGA.
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Periodic social audits and people’s participation in its implementation acts as checks
and balances on elected representatives and government officials at the local level.
However, our study shows that these measures have not been introduced in eastern
UP. Similarly, no few durable assets have been created to augment agricultural pro-
ductivity in the region. As consequence the spill-over benefits of NREGA have not
been realized and there is no change in agricultural productivity or labor demand.
The aim of this study is not to argue for a reduction in the provision of NREGA
as suggested by Bhagwati and Panagariya (2014). But to identify the bottlenecks in
proper functioning of NREGA. First, there is an urgent need to increase awareness
and administrative capacity at the state and district level. These offices were severely
understaffed and ill-equipped to handle the administrative work load of NREGA. This
under-staffing leads to sub-contracting of important data entry and verification work
to part-time employees at the state level and to people affiliated to the Pradhans at
the village level. Not only does it dilute the transparency provisions of the Act, bt
also creates avenues for corruption.
Second, information about the provisions of NREGA is shockingly absent even after
10 years of its existence. In the absence of awareness of entitlements, the demand
driven nature of the program is diluted. Therefore, public information campaigns and
local self-help groups must be strengthened to ensure that the guarantee of public
employment is maintained and NREGA emerges as a credible alternative to low wage
and seasonal agricultural employment. Finally, there is a growing gap between the
performance and impact of NREGA between states and regions. Therefore, there is
a need to understand the role of local political economy factors that condition and
complicate the functioning of NREGA. The role of local elite and their collusion with
government officials effectively exclude NREGA beneficiaries from participating in
the planning process employment generation under the program.
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Figure 3.1: Mirzpur, Uttar Pradesh
a: Uttar Pradesh
b: Mirzapur
Table 3.1: Socio-Economic Characteristics of the Sample
Variable Sample Mirzapur Uttar Pradesh
(1) (2) (3)
Percent Scheduled Castes 38 28 23
Percent Scheduled Tribes 5 0.9 0.7
Rural Literacy Rates 32 67 65
Scheduled Castes Literacy Rate 35 56 60
Scheduled Tribes Literacy Rate 39 57 54
Percent Cultivators 31 23 36
Percent Agricultural Labor 46 42 36
Population 973 2 million 155 million
Note: This table shows population percentages of socio-economic indicators of our sample, the district of Mirzapur
and the state of Uttar Pradesh in columns (1), (2) and (3) respectively. The values for the sample characteristics
are calculated using survey data which comprises of a random sample of NREGA workers in 2016. The district and
state-level measures are taken from the Census of India, 2011. All state and district level statistics are reported
for rural sectors of the economy including the total population estimates.
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Table 3.2: Distribution of social groups by Gram Panchayats in the sample
Name of the Village Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes Other Backward Tribes Muslims Kols Upper Caste Hindus Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Babura Bhairodayal 21 0 5 0 14 0 40
Babura Kala 5 2 10 0 11 0 28
Babura Raghunath 13 0 0 6 11 0 30
Badauha 4 3 0 0 24 0 31
Banawa 81 0 17 1 0 2 101
Deohut 13 6 0 2 40 0 61
Fuliyari 60 20 38 0 126 13 257
Gaurva 8 2 5 2 105 2 124
Halia 45 4 0 4 25 0 78
Khutha 48 9 0 0 5 0 62
Maheshpur 63 3 25 16 0 1 108
Parshiyakala 10 0 8 3 32 0 53
Total 371 49 108 34 393 18 973
Note: This table shows the distribution of our sample across the twelve Gram Panchayats of Halia block of Mirza-
pur.
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics: Household Characteristics
Variable Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes Other Backward Tribes Muslims Kols Upper Caste Hindus
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average Household
Size
5.40 6.04 5.62 5.94 5.65 5.67
Average Age 44.75 44.94 44.45 45.06 44.61 40.05
Women-headed
Households
0.33 0.26 0.35 0.18 0.41 0.44
Illiterate 0.65 0.62 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.39
Below Poverty Line 0.64 0.59 0.66 0.50 0.57 0.78
Ration Card 0.94 0.92 0.85 0.94 0.90 0.94
Katcha Floor 0.98 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.99 1.00
Solar Energy 0.80 0.86 0.81 0.91 0.88 0.94
Water from open
wells
0.89 0.93 0.93 0.97 0.92 1.00
Toilet 0.15 0.06 0.07 0.18 0.07 0.17
Bicycles 0.82 0.69 0.81 0.88 0.77 1.00
Mobile Phone 0.47 0.39 0.41 0.35 0.48 0.56
Farm animals
(mostly goats)
2.05 2.00 2.16 2.38 2.00 2.44
Migration 0.33 0.45 0.50 0.62 0.31 0.55
Number of House-
holds
371 49 108 34 393 18
Note: This table presents socio-economic characteristics of surveyed households by social group. Average house-
hold size refers to the number of individuals living in a separate dwelling and average age refers to the age of the
household head. Literacy status is reported for the head of the household. For all other indicators, the table re-
ports the proportion of households headed by women or own a certain asset like bicycle or mobile phone. Farm
animals reports the average number of animals owned by the household and migration refers to the proportion of
households from which at least one member lives and works outside the village for more than six months in a year.
Table 3.4: NREGA Participation by our Respondents
Variable Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes Other Backward Tribes Muslims kols Upper Caste Hindus
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)








0.80 0.88 0.79 0.56 0.83 0.94
Households involved in
NREGA planning
0.22 0.12 0.23 0.29 0.24 0.22
Panel B. Provision of
NREGA employment
Participation by Women 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.06
No of NREGA workdays
(Respondents)
27.81 31.00 31.81 25.18 30.66 25.00
No of NREGA workdays
(Official)
20.62 20.67 24.18 18.35 29.65 36.39
— Provision of 100 days of
NREGA
0.07 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.17
Payment without Work 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.06
Panel C. Payment of
Wages
Bank or Post Office Ac-
count
0.92 0.92 0.94 0.91 0.92 0.89
Reported Legal Minimum
Wage
97.22 99.86 104.08 110.62 95.26 102.33
Average daily wage re-
ceived under NREGA
63.06 59.37 68.93 63.45 70.89 86.08
Delay of two weeks or more 0.72 0.80 0.63 0.50 0.72 0.89
Panel D. Supporting Facil-
ities at work site
Absence of Health-care fa-
cilities
0.97 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.98 1.00
Absence of Childcare Fa-
cilities
0.93 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.94 1.00
Panel E. Grievance Re-




0.93 1.00 0.95 0.88 0.94 0.89
No impact of NREGA on
overall welfare
0.95 0.96 0.95 1.00 0.95 0.94
No impact of NREGA on
savings
0.10 0.18 0.07 0.06 0.15 0.17
Should NREGA continue 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1
Number of Households 371 49 108 34 393 18
Note: This table summarizes the different aspects of NREGA participation by the respondents. The
responses are based on participant’s awareness, perceptions and experience in working with NREGA.
Average number of work days and average daily wages (in nominal terms) are based on actual
work done and payments received by our respondents. All other variables are proportions of house-
holds who report not having applied for NREGA employment or receiving payment without work
etc. These replies are based on workers’ past experiences with NREGA planning and implementation.
Table 3.5: Agricultural Profile of Survey Respondents
Variable Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes Other Backward Tribes Muslims Kols Upper Caste Hindus
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Self-Farming 0.71 0.65 0.83 0.56 0.76 0.83
Share-cropping 0.33 0.37 0.40 0.15 0.65 0.10
Agricultural Labor 0.46 0.53 0.56 0.53 0.43 0.39
Non Agricultural Labor 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.15 0.07 0.17
Small landholding size 0.61 0.55 0.67 0.94 0.47 0.33
Medium landholding size 0.34 0.33 0.27 0.06 0.48 0.61
Large landholding size 0.05 0.12 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.06
Farming for sale 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.015 0.11
Number of House-
holds
371 49 108 34 393 18
Note: This table shows the agricultural profile of the surveyed households by social group. Self-farming, share-
cropping, agricultural and non-agricultural labor are measured as proportions of survey respondents with house-
hold members engaging in these occupations. Small landholding refers to a farm-size of less than one acre, medium
land holding size is greater than one acre but less than four acres and a land holding is characterized as large if
it is greater than four acres. The values in the table report the proportion of households owing small, medium or
large landholding by social category and whether they produce for the sale in markets.
Table 3.6: Role of the Pradhan in NREGA Implementation
Variable Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes Other Backward Tribes Muslims Kols Upper Caste Hindus
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NREGA ever discussed
in Gram Panchayat
0.11 0.22 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.11
Ever Approached BDO 0.22 0.35 0.13 0.09 0.24 0.39
Ever Approached PO 0.11 0.22 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.11
Pradhan solves NREGA
issues
0.93 1.00 0.95 0.88 0.94 0.89
Pradhan solely responsi-
ble for NREGA
0.89 0.96 0.89 0.79 0.92 0.94
NREGA has consoli-
dated the position of
Pradhan
0.92 0.88 0.94 0.97 0.89 0.83
Number of House-
holds
371 49 108 34 393 18
Note: This table shows the experience of NREGA beneficiaries in our survey and presents their perceptions
about the role of the Pradhan in the functioning of NREGA. The values in the table are the proportions of
households who have approached the village assembly (Gram Sabha), Block Development Officer or Program
Officer with any NREGA related issue. The last two rows of the table report the proportion of our respon-
dents who agree with the claim that the Pradhan is solely responsible for implementing NREGA and that the
socio-economic position of the Pradhan has improved because of the central role played by them in its provision.
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 1
A.1 Land Acquisition and Farmer Resistance
Since 1950s, India has acquired around 50 million acres of agricultural land for various
infrastructural, developmental and mining purposes. This has led to a displacement
of close to 60 million people (Ren, 2017). Instances of ‘land grabs’ for developmental
purposes like publicly owned infrastructure projects, dams and privately owned SEZs
are ubiquitous in India (Sud, 2014). The SEZ Act of 2005, presents another example
of development induced population displacement in India. Land for setting up SEZs is
acquired by the firms directly by negotiating a ‘fair’ price from farmers and cultivators.
The rules for acquiring land for SEZs were based on the Land Acquisition Act of
1894. Under this law the state could allow for transfer of ownership of any privately
owned land if it is considered necessary for ‘public purposes’. The compensation
to the original owners of land was based on the official value of the land. This
official value is significantly lower than the market value. However, this law has no
provision for seeking consent by all those who stand to lose their land. In theory,
the Land Acquisition Act can only be applied to cases where acquiring land would
serve some public purpose by the government as authorized by the law. However,
land acquisition attempts have been criticized for diverting fertile agricultural land
away from agriculture by acquiring it at cheap rates for real estate development
without rehabilitating the farmers who lose their land (Wadhwa, 2010). Further,
there is no provision for the rehabilitation of land owners and tenant farmers who
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lose their livelihoods because of SEZs. In fact state governments often try to reduce
compensation paid to farmers using fraudulent and violent means (Ren, 2017).
Farmer agitations in the eastern states of Odisha and West Bengal have garnered the
most media attention. In a project involving the South Korean Steel giant POSCO,
in Odisha the state government manipulated records to reduce compensation paid
to farmers and suppressed farmer agitations violently. This prompted international
outrage and organizations like the Amnesty International issued statements against
human rights violations involved in land acquisition attempts by the state (Amnesty,
2013). In the case of POSCO, villagers organized a resistance movement by erecting
barriers, forming human chains, and drawing enough media attention to make vio-
lent removal politically difficult till 2011 (Levien, 2012). In West Bengal, in 2007, in
Nandigram, police fired upon local farmers protesting against land acquisition initi-
ated by the state government to attract an Indonesian firm to build a chemical plant
which killed 12 villagers (Ren, 2017).
There are also instances of farmer agitations in Northern India. In 2010, thousands of
farmers marched into the national capital from the neighboring state of Uttar Pradesh
to oppose the “forcible” acquisition of their land by the state government for setting
up SEZs. Cornered over sustained land acquisition protests, the state government
decided that it would no longer be involved in acquiring land directly for private
sector projects. Pai (2010) documents that farmers in Greater Nodia in Uttar Pradesh
were allowed to independently negotiate land prices with SEZ developers and sign
agreements which both parties respected. In other cases, state governments of Punjab
and Haryana were forced to revisit their land acquisition policies and offer generous
compensation to farmers facing dispossession. This included skill development and
promise of employment, additional plots of land and 33 year annuity payments (Kaur,
2010). In Chandigarh, farmers themselves demanded the rights for setting up IT
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enabled SEZs and controversial land acquisition plans by the government were stalled
and investigated for corruption (Express News Service, 2009). Similarly, in 2010
farmers in Nindar village of Jaipur in Rajasthan dug holes in the earth which farmers
(both men and women) occupied day and night (Khaled, 2007).1 SEZs in the northern
and eastern part of India have failed to become operational and only 28 percent of
all functional SEZs are situated in this region. Major SEZs in Bengal and Odisha
were scrapped even before they became notified as land related agitations by farmer
organizations deterred land acquisition attempts by the state.
Farmer agitations have also been seen in the states included in this study. In a detailed
study of land acquisition in Andhra Pradesh, Rawat et al. (2011) find that land acqui-
sition was not based on consent and in several cases, land distributed to marginalized
communities under previous government programs was forcefully acquired for SEZs.
Further, in Chittor district of Andhra Pradesh, compensation between INR 250,000
(USD 3,571) to INR 300,000 (USD 4,285) per acre was paid to large landowners and
small farmers were not paid any compensation but were promised employment op-
portunities in the SEZs (Balagopal, 2007). In 2009, around 4,000 farmers staged a
rally against acquisition of 5,000 acres of land for industrial purpose in villages near
Sanand by Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation (PTI, 2013). In Maharash-
tra several SEZ projects were canceled owing to difficulties in land acquisition and
protests by farmers (Sebastian, 2012). Major capitalists also expressed frustration
at the reluctance of state governments in helping them acquire land for setting up
SEZs as farmer agitations make elected representatives highly unpopular with their
constituents (Layak et al., 2012). Farmer protests against land acquisition are also
documented in Nandagudi in Karnataka, Baikampady in Mangalore and Raigad in
Maharashtra. These protests were often against forced eviction of farmers from fer-
1A synopsis of farmer struggle against land acquisition can be found here.
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tile agricultural land. For instance, in Kakinada in Andhra Pradesh, an oil based
SEZ project was approved on over 9,000 acres of land which was used by farmers for
double cropping of paddy in a year (Balagopal, 2007).
Forceful eviction of farmers from their land and insufficient and unjust compensation
paid to farmers is the primary reason for farmer agitation against SEZs throughout
the country.2 However, there is considerable state level variation in the politics and
protests across India since every state can formulate its own policies regarding land
acquisition. Bedi and Tillin (2015) examined the multifaceted stances of state gov-
ernments toward land acquisition and identified a set of different responses to rural
protests. For instance, they find that governments resorted to violent crackdown
in Odisha and West Bengal but offered incentives to defuse opposition in Rajasthan.
Further, states also manipulated legal and procedural processes to facilitate land deals
in Gujarat and Maharashtra while co-opting resistance in West Bengal and Goa, and
non-response such as in Karnataka. Further, Vijayabaskar (2010) shows that land
acquisition for SEZs in Tamil Nadu was completed without significant farmer resis-
tance. They argue that the state level variations need to be understood within local
political and economic contexts.
A.2 Theoretical Framework: Derivations
In this section we first derive the factor prices in competitive and monopsonistic
labor markets and then calculate the differential rents that would be generated by
land acquisition. We then proceed to deriving the equilibrium values of labor demand
after land acquisition.
2See Jenkins, Kennedy, and Mukhopadhyay (2014) for details of various protest movements against land acquisition
for setting up of SEZs in India.
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A.2.1 Factor Prices before Land Acquisition
Differences in factor prices of land and labor in competitive and monopsonistic labor
markets generate rents for landowners. From Equation 1.2 we can see that each elite
will employ, nia = na/e, where na = 1 − Nc. Consequently, the production function
for the elite before land acquisition can be written in per-capita terms as follows:
yr = ψf(li/na) (A.1)
Factor prices of land and labor before land acquisition under competitive labor mar-
kets are as follows:3
∂Y r
∂na
















where the superscript, c refers to competitive labor markets. Next, we turn to monop-
sonistic or repressive labor markets represented by the superscript, m. If small farms
are not sufficient to sustain the families of small farmers, we can assume that na = 1.
4
In this case, the employers, e will be able to exercise market power to depress wages
below the competitive wage. We assume that wages now have a lower bound defined
3In a perfectly competitive market, employers will hire workers upto the point where wages equal their marginal
product and since the production function is linearly homogeneous, the marginal products can be expressed in terms
of a single factor (land per unit of labor).
Y r = ψF (li∈r, nia)







4This implies that the main worker in the household spends all of her time working as a wage worker. Other
members of the household may be engaged in self-cultivation on small family owned farms.
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by the legal minimum wage wg and the marginal productivity of small farms τ .5
Therefore, the fallback position of a small peasant comprises of wage earned in public
employment and the returns from cultivating their land, lp.
For instance, let us assume that employers are willing to pay a small increment  over
and above the fallback position of workers. Since some workers are always rationed
out of monopsonistic labor markets, they would be willing to accept a lower wage in
order to get employed. This would exert a downward pressure on wages and labor
markets would clear only when workers are indifferent between working for the elite
or their fallback position. More formally,
wmpre = τ + w
g (A.4)
Correspondingly, the rate of return on land is given by the following.
Rmpre =
ψf(le)− (τ + wg)
le
(A.5)
where wmpre is the wage rate that would prevail under repressive labor market con-
ditions and Rmpre is the return on per-unit of land (le) owned by the elite. Next we
derive factor prices after land acquisition. However, in order to ensure that private
labor markets clear, we add an assumption on the behavior of wages.
Assumption 2: wcpre > τ +w
g. For labor markets to clear, we assume that the sum
of legal minimum wages and average productivity of small farms is lower than the
wages in private agricultural employment.
5This could be the wage earned through participation in public employment programs like the National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA).
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A.2.2 Factor Prices after Land Acquisition
We now derive factor prices that would prevail under competitive and repressive labor
markets after land acquisition has taken place. The returns to labor and land in the






























where, w1cpost is the wage rate that would prevail in agricultural markets under com-
petitive labor market conditions and w2cpost is the wage rate in non-agricultural pro-
duction under competitive labor markets. Correspondingly, R1cpost, R2
c
post are the
return on per unit of new land holding of an elite (L) after land acquisition for agri-
cultural and non-agricultural land respectively.
After land acquisition we assume that all small farmers have been dispossessed of
their land. Therefore, lp → 0 and small-farmers are converted to wage workers.
Further, the elite have diversified their production to include both agricultural and
non-agricultural production. Since workers no longer engage in any cultivation, Y p =
0, we assume that their wages now have a lower bound defined only by the legal
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minimum wage, wg. Therefore, the wages in both agricultural and non-agricultural












where wmpost is the wage rate that would prevail under repressive labor market con-
ditions, R1mpost is the return on per-unit of land under agricultural production and
R2mpost is the return on per-unit of land under non-agricultural production. (L) is the
proportion of land devoted to non-agricultural production by the elite and wg is the
legal minimum wage that the elite have to pay the workers in both agricultural and
non-agricultural labor markets.
The above exposition shows that both before and after land acquisition, the elite
appropriate rents using their economic power by virtue of inequality in landownership.
However, the rents in the latter case are greater as non-agricultural production is
associated with higher total factor productivity. Correspondingly, the rent after land
acquisition can be written as follows.
∆Rpost = (R1
m
post −R1cpost) + (R2mpost −R2cpost) (A.13)
We now define rents from labor repression before land acquisition using Equation 1.5.
∆Rpre =
ψf(le)− (wg + τ)
le
− ψf ′(le) > 0 (A.14)
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After land acquisition, small farmers lose their land and τ = 0, therefore we can write









where (1−L) is the proportion of elite land used for agriculture after SEZs and L is the
proportion of land diverted away from agriculture. Equation A.14 and Equation A.15,
state that the returns to per unit of land under monopsonistic labor markets are
greater than the marginal productivity of land in competitive labor markets both
before and after land acquisition.
A.2.3 Optimization Problem faced by the Elite
The equation below presents the optimization problem faced by large landowners.
pi(nna, npa) = max
nna,npa
{
npaψf((1− L)/npa) + nnaφf(L/nna)− αR¯− wg(nna + npa)
}
subject to (1− α)R¯ ≥ ∆Rpre
(A.16)
where the prices for non-agricultural output have been normalized to unity and the
constraint is an implicit function of nna.
6
6The constraint can expanded using Equation 1.7. The constraint simply states that the elite will convert their
agricultural lands for non-agricultural use if the residual rents after making the necessary changes would be greater
than the rents they were appropriating before SEZs. That is,
(1− α)R¯ ≥ ∆Rpre where















Assuming the above constraint is satisfied with an equality and using the Lagrangian












f ′(L/nna)− α ∂R¯
∂nna
− wg = 0 (A.17)
∂pi
∂npa
= ψf((1− L)/npa)− ψ
npa
f ′((1− L)/npa)− α ∂R¯
∂npa
− wg = 0 (A.18)
ψf((1− L)/npa)− wg
(1− L)/npa − ψf
′((1− L)/npa) + φf(L/nna)− w
g
L/nna







where the left-hand side of Equation A.19 is the expression for ∆Rpost from Equation
A.14 and the right-hand side is expanding R¯ using Equation 1.7. We can now solve
for the equilibrium value of n∗na and np
∗
a using the condition that the total labor
demand in agricultural and non-agricultural employment should equal total labor
supply (normalized to unity). Therefore, enna + enpa = 1.
A.2.4 Proofs of Propositions
A.2.4.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1: Non-agricultural labor demand after land acquisition increases when
total factor productivity associated with SEZ production increases.




> 0. We use the Implicit Function Theorem and
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− f ′′(L/nna) > 0
Since f
′′
< 0. Correspondingly, we can see that F 1φ > 0. Similarly, we have
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A.2.4.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2: Agricultural labor demand and agricultural income will decline as
the elite divert more land from agricultural to non-agricultural land use.
This proposition implies that, (∂npa
∂L
< 0) and (∂wa
∂le
> 0). We use the Implicit Function
Theorem and the first-order conditions defined in equation A.19 and to prove the first
part of Proposition 2. The first-order conditions can be re-arranged as follows.
∂pi
∂λ
= F 2 =
ψf((1− L)/npa)− wg




























































We now turn to incomes in agricultural employment. We know that wages paid in
agriculture are determined by the legal minimum wg. Further we showed above that
labor demand in agriculture would decline after landlords divert a part of their land
away from agriculture. Correspondingly, total earnings in agricultural employment
would also fall.
A.2.4.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3: Labor demand in the SEZ (non-agricultural) sector falls short of
labor supply which creates involuntary unemployment for dispossessed workers who
are forced to work in the agricultural sector.
Using the first-order conditions derived in Equations A.17 - A.19 we can derive the
non-agricultural labor demanded by landlords as an implicit-function of α, npa and
wg. However, this proposition argues that labor demand generated by the SEZ sector
would fall short of labor supply dispossessed from self-farming. Since all small farmers
engaged in agricultural production, and since the SEZ sector is associated with higher
productivity, we assume that labor supply available to work in the SEZ sector = 1.
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Therefore, all workers would be willing to work in non-agricultural employment and
only those who are not absorbed by the SEZ sector would continue working in the
agricultural sector. We can now substitute the value of φf ′(L/nna) from Equation















where A = (ψf(1 − L)/npa − wg) and B = (φf(L/na) − wg). We can see from
Equation A.22 that n∗na < 1 if α ≤ 1.
To prove that n∗na < 1, let us assume that n
∗
na = 1. In this case, the value of α would
be given by the following.
α = 1 +
∆RpreeL(1− L)
∆RpreeL(1− L)− (eB(1− L)2 + AL2(1− e)) > 1
Since α is a proportion of rents invested by landlords, it cannot be greater than 1.
Therefore, labor demand generated by the SEZ sector cannot be equal to 1.
A.3 Robustness Checks
The primary concern for any causal inference is that changes that are observed after
land acquisition for SEZs could be caused by other changes happening in the economy
over time. This section addresses these concerns by reporting three robustness checks
to assess the validity of the results shown in Section 1.6. First, we use a district-level
panel to estimate the impact of land acquisition on rural labor markets. Second,
we use propensity scores to match the treatment and control districts and re-run
our main difference-in-differences specification on the restricted sample of matched
districts. Third, we re-estimate Equation 1.9 by dropping one state at a time.
183
A.3.1 District Level Panel
The main specification of the chapter uses individual level observations from the
southern and western states of India. However, since our identification strategy relies
on the temporal and geographic variation in land acquisition between districts, we
re-estimate the difference-in-differences model presented in Section 1.5 by aggregating
data at the district level from the seven states included in the study. More specifically,
we estimate the following specification.
Ydt = βTdt + λ1Zd × 1{t>2006} + σHi + pit + µd + dt (A.23)
where Ydt is the outcome variable say time spent in self-farming in district d in time t.
Zd is a set of time-invariant district level controls mentioned in Table 1.2. pit capture
survey year fixed effects and µd are district fixed effects. All estimates are adjusted
for correlation over time within districts by clustering at the district level.
Table A.1 presents the estimates for Equation A.23. Columns (1) - (2) estimate
the impact of land acquisition for SEZs on non-agricultural casual employment and
earnings. Using district-level data we find that land acquisition has no impact on non-
agricultural labor demand and earnings. This is not surprising as the main results of
this chapter showed that land acquisition had a marginal impact on non-agricultural
labor demand and earnings (Table 1.7 and Table 1.8).
Columns (3) - (5) present the results for self-farming, time spent in casual agricultural
employment and agricultural earnings respectively. We find that similar to the main
specification of this chapter, presented in Tables 1.9 - Table 1.11, land acquisition
reduces time spent in self-cultivation by 3.5 percentage points and increases time
spent in casual labor by 4 percentage points. These results are significant at the
95 percent level. Finally, we find that land acquisition does not impact agricultural
earnings at the district-level. Thus, the results indicate that the results in the main
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specification of this chapter are robust to using a district-level panel which reduces
the sample size of the study considerably.
A.3.2 Propensity Score Matching
In this section, we employ propensity score matching to test the main results pre-
sented in this chapter. This method is used when selecting a subset of compari-
son units similar to the treatment units is difficult because units must be compared
across several pre-treatment characteristics. Matching is based on the concept of
contrasting the outcomes of program participants with the outcomes of ‘comparable’
non-participants (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). To estimate a treatment effect for each
treated person, the outcome (like wage or private employment) is compared to an
average of the outcomes for matched persons in the untreated sample. Matching on
the propensity score is essentially a weighting scheme, which assigns a higher weight
to similar comparison units when computing the estimated treatment effect to ensure
unbiased estimates of the treatment (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). Matching can be
used to create a comparable control group if treatment is not random (Rosenbaum
and Rubin, 1985). Propensity scores are particularly useful when matching can take
place on a number of covariates and when the control population is much larger than
the treatment population (Stuart, 2010).
Since we are interested in the labor market impacts of SEZs, we use determinants of
rural labor supply like the proportion of marginalized caste (Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes who are predominantly landless groups), literacy rates, labor force
engaged in agriculture and the proportion of the population below poverty line to
create a matched sample of control districts from the seven states included in our
study. Marginalized communities are predominantly landless and the incidence of
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poverty is disproportionately high for these groups (Gang et al., 2008).7 Figure A.1
shows the distribution of propensity scores between treatment and control units. We
find that the first two bins of treated districts have no comparison units and there are
fewer controls that are matched to treatment districts in bins 0.6 to 1. The matching
estimation will therefore, drop the treatment districts that do not have comparable
control districts. Table A.2 provides the summary statistics for the district level
controls after matching. Using 130 non-SEZ districts in the southern and western
states, we match 87 districts to 62 districts where SEZs were notified. Matching
control districts on district level covariates reduces the median bias from 18.2 in the
unmatched sample to 4.8 in the matched sample.
Table A.3 presents the difference-in-differences estimation results using matched dis-
tricts. Columns (1) - (5) resent the results for non-agricultural casual employment,
non-agricultural real earnings, self-farming, casual agricultural employment and agri-
cultural earnings respectively. All regressions include district controls and individual
controls. In addition, district and year fixed effects have been applied to all specifica-
tions. We find that our difference-in-differences results are robust to the construction
of a control group using propensity score matching on district-level time invariant
characteristics. We find that in comparison to a matched control group, in districts
where SEZs were notified, the proportion of labor time spent in non-agricultural em-
ployment increased by 0.6 percent while self-farming declined by around 5 percent.
Correspondingly, proportion of time spent in agricultural labor increased by around
2 percent.
However, when we confine our control group to a matched sample, we find that
there is no statistically significant impact on both agricultural and non-agricultural
7Deaton (2003) shows that in 1990 - 2000, close to 30 percent of rural India lived below the poverty line. While
the SCs and STs together represent 24 percent of the population, 47 percent of rural poverty is concentrated in this
group (Gang et al., 2008).
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real earnings. In our standard difference-in-differences estimator, non-agricultural
real earnings were increasing. These results support our main hypothesis that SEZs
create excess supply of rural labor which depresses wages in both agricultural and
non-agricultural sectors. This is important as both agricultural and non-agricultural
employment increase significantly. Therefore, wages are sticky and do not respond
to increased demand in non-agricultural employment. This can be explained by the
large agricultural labor force, created by land acquisition which exerts a downward
pressure on wages in the countryside.
A.3.3 Difference-in-Differences Estimation: Excluding One State at a
Time
Our sample is confined to SEZ districts in the southern and western states of India
which account for 72 percent of all notified SEZs. In order to ensure that our results
are not driven by SEZ districts in any one state, we re-estimate Equation 1.9 by
dropping observations from one state at a time. The results are shown in Table A.4.
We find that the increase in non-agricultural employment is primarily driven by Ma-
harashtra and Andhra Pradesh. If we exclude these states from our sample, we find
that land acquisition for SEZs have no impact on time spent in non-agricultural la-
bor. Therefore, SEZs in other states do not contribute significantly to employment
creation in the non-agricultural casual labor. This is particularly true for Tamil
Nadu and Karnataka. This is not surprising since the aggregate impact of SEZs on
non-agricultural labor was small in magnitude.
Table 1.8 shows that incomes in the non-agricultural sector increased by around 5
percentage points. This result is robust to the exclusion of all states except Kerala.
One reason for no impact of SEZs on non-agricultural wages in Kerala is the fact that
Kerala has the lowest proportion of rural force engaged in agriculture (31 percent).
Correspondingly, employment in the non-agricultural sector is significantly higher
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than other states. This would keep non-agricultural wages depressed in Kerala even
after land acquisition SEZs.
Next we turn to self-farming. We find that the results are consistent to the exclusion
of all states except Gujarat. The fact that Gujarat witnessed a significant decline to
drive an overall reduction in self-farming by 3 percentage points (Table 1.9) suggests
the need for future research exploring landholding patterns in SEZ districts in Gujarat.
With respect to changes in casual agricultural labor, Table A.4 shows that the main
results of the chapter reported in Table 1.10 are consistent with the exclusion of each
of the seven states used in the sample.
Finally, we turn to changes in agricultural incomes. The main results of this chapter
reported in Table 1.11 show that land acquisition has no impact on agricultural
earnings. This result is also consistent with the results in Table A.4. We find that
the exclusion of any one state does not alter this result.
A.4 Data and Variable Creation
A.4.1 International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics
(ICRISAT)
Data on agricultural productivity is calculated using data from the International
Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) India.8 The ‘Meso’
dataset of ICRISAT contains information on annual crop area and production, irri-
gated area, monthly rainfall, livestock, agricultural implements and operational hold-
ings for all districts in 19 major states in India.9 This allows us to construct a district
level panel to compute changes in agricultural production area under cultivation over
8ICRISAT
9The states included in the ICRISAT data are Andhra Pradesh (including Telangana), Gujarat, Haryana, Kar-
nataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, Odisha,
Assam, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttarakhand.
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time. ICRISAT collects data on cereals, pulses, oilseeds and selected cash crops from
1966 - 2010. As our sample corresponds to the major southern and western states,
using the ICRISAT data we calculate total annual yield of major food crops and cash
crops for the states in our sample.10
In addition to data on agricultural productivity, ICRISAT also provides district level
means of agricultural wages for both men and women using information from the
Ministry of Agriculture. We use district level agricultural wages from the ICRISAT
data to determine changes in wage rates in the agricultural economy due to land
acquisition for SEZs. While the NSS provides us with the earnings received at the
individual level by workers in each employment category, the wage rate data from
ICRISAT allows us to study trends in wage rates in agriculture. Table 1.4 presents
the summary statistics for variables constructed using the ICRISAT data for the
districts where SEZs were notified.
A.4.2 Census of India
In addition to the NSS data, district level controls for the proportion of marginalized
communities (SC/ST), literacy rates and the proportion of population below poverty
are constructed using the 2001 Census of India. Demographic characteristics including
caste composition, literacy rates and workforce participation at the district level are
created using the Primary Census Abstract and the Village Directories from Census,
2001. Table 1.4 provides the descriptive statistics for all district level controls used
in the chapter.
10Food crops comprise of rice, wheat, pulses and cereals and cash crops comprise of oil, cotton, sugarcane and
soybean.
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A.4.3 Employment and Wage Variables
The Employment and Unemployment Rounds of the NSS provide information on
weekly time use and earnings for each member of the household. This allows us to
calculate the percentage of time spent per day in public and private employment in
the rural sector. Further, private employment can be further decomposed into self-
employment, domestic work and private wage employment. Additionally, in order to
discuss changes in the agricultural sector, we construct variables for time spent in self-
employment and private wage employment in agriculture. For all employment types,
we calculate the daily wage rate by dividing the weekly earnings by the number of
days worked in that employment. Further, these wages are deflated using the monthly
consumer price index for rural labor from the Indian Labor Bureau.
A.4.4 Poverty Rates
Data on poverty headcount-ratio comes from the Consumption Expenditure Survey
of the 61st Round of NSS data (2004 - 2005). We use state level poverty lines using
the monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) reported in the data. We construct
estimates of the proportion of people living below the state level poverty line for
every district using the Uniform Recall Period (URP). All district level controls are
presented in Table 1.2
A.4.5 Land Use
The Directorate of Economics and Statistics at the Ministry of Agriculture publishes
annual data on rural land use for all states in India. We use land use data for states
included in this study between 2000 - 2012. Rural agricultural land is classified as
- area under cultivation (net sown area), fallow land (area under cultivation which
has not been used for agricultural production for at least one year, but not more
than five years) and cultivable waste land (area under cultivation but not used for
agricultural production for over five years). We use this classification of rural land
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to create the proportion of land under cultivation and fallow land by dividing land
under each category by the total agricultural land in a district. Table 1.4 presents
the summary statistics for the proportion of fallow land and land under cultivation
for districts where atleast one SEZ was notified.
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Figure A.1: Distribution of Propensity Scores across SEZ Districts
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SEZ x post 0.395 0.356 -3.482** 4.166** 1.132*
(0.391) (0.247) (1.649) (1.667) (0.634)
Observations 600 600 600 600 600
R-squared 0.726 0.813 0.671 0.581 0.807
District FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
District Controls x post YES YES YES YES YES
Note: This table reports the results for the difference-in-differences specification using a district-level panel. Column (1) presents the results for non-agricultural casual
work. Column (2) reports the coefficient for non-agricultural earnings and column (3) shows changes in self-farming. Column (4) corresponds to casual agricultural work
and column (5) corresponds to daily agricultural casual wages. Casual wages are deflated using the monthly, state-level price index for rural laborers from the Indian Labor
Bureau. All district level time-invariant controls are interacted with a dummy for the post-period. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1193
Table A.2: Matched District Level Controls
Variable SEZ Districts Matched Non-SEZ Districts p-value
(1) (2) (3)
Fraction SC 0.16 0.16 0.992
Fraction ST 0.087 0.101 0.648
Fraction Literate Male 0.589 0.588 0.827
Fraction Literate Female 0.41 0.412 0.827
Fraction Male Labor Force 0.601 0.604 0.793
Fraction Agricultural Labor 0.533 0.524 0.763
Fraction below Poverty Line 0.32 0.30 0.45
Number of Districts 62 87
Note: This table shows the mean values of matched district level controls. Columns (1) and (2) present the mean
values for districts where SEZs were notified and matched-control districts respectively. Column (3) presents the
p-values of the student’s t-test of equality of means in columns (1) and (2).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SEZ x post 0.639* 0.157 -4.695*** 2.423*** 0.224
(0.354) (0.198) (1.497) (0.678) (0.196)
Observations 173,077 173,077 85,072 173,077 173,077
R-squared 0.056 0.058 0.160 0.104 0.051
District FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES
District Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Note: This table reports the results for difference-in-differences specification using the matched sample where districts were matched using propensity scores based on
district-level characteristics. Column (1) presents the results for non agricultural casual work. Column (2) reports the coefficient for non-agricultural earnings and column
(3) shows changes in self-farming. Column (4) corresponds to casual agricultural work and column (5) corresponds to daily agricultural casual earnings. Casual wages are
deflated using the monthly, state-level price index for rural laborers from the Indian Labor Bureau. All district level time-invariant controls are interacted with a dummy
for the post-period. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Non Agricultural Employment 0.542* 0.268 0.549* 0.711*** 0.203 0.713**
(0.303) (0.338) (0.312) (0.271) (0.337) (0.316)
Non-Agricultural Earnings 0.485** 0.369* 0.214 0.574** 0.443* 0.471**
(0.220) (0.216) (0.145) (0.226) (0.260) (0.230)
Self-Farming -2.525 -3.284* -3.761** -3.070* -2.596* -3.091*
(1.617) (1.767) (1.576) (1.638) (1.542) (1.568)
Casual Agricultural Labor 1.757*** 1.903*** 2.069*** 1.735** 1.257** 1.596**
(0.636) (0.677) (0.650) (0.665) (0.620) (0.623)
Agricultural Earnings 0.128 0.275 0.205 0.176 0.0618 0.150
(0.207) (0.221) (0.181) (0.212) (0.220) (0.205)
District FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
District Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note: This table reports the results for differences-in-difference specification by excluding each state at a time. Each row corresponds to a different labor market outcome
mentioned in column (1). All district level time-invariant controls are interacted with a dummy for the post period. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
district level. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 2
B.1 Robustness Checks
The primary concern for any causal inference is that changes that are observed post
the intervention are not caused by the program but instead are due to other changes
happening in the economy over time. In the context of this study, changes in labor
market that we observe in landlord and non-landlord districts may not be because of
NREGA but due to other unobservable factors. This section addresses these concerns
by conducting two robustness checks to assess the validity of the results shown in
section 2.6. First, we re-estimate equation 2.2 using data from the pre-program period
1999-2005 for a falsification test and second, we use propensity scores to match the
treatment and control districts and re-run the estimates on the restricted sample of
matched-districts. The results are described below.
B.1.1 Placebo Treatment
Table B.1 shows the results of re-estimating equation 2.2 using data from two thick
rounds of NSSO data from the period before NREGA was implemented. We use the
55th and the 61th rounds of NSSO which correspond to the period of 1999-2000 and
2004-2005 respectively. Since the first phase of NREGA was implemented in 2006,
this data reports labor market dynamics prior to treatment. We assign a program
dummy for early districts and use data from 2004-2005 as the ‘post’ period for this
placebo test. In these estimations all district and individual level controls are included
along-with district and year quarter fixed effects. The results for the natural log of
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real casual wage, public and private employment are reported in columns (1), (2) and
(3) respectively. As expected, there is no effect of the placebo treatment for any of
the specifications. The increasing trend in ln real wages that was shown in Figure 2.3
does not hold when district and individual level controls are included. These results
show that even though district level factors like poverty head-count ratios may have
affected the selection of districts in the program, we can control for these factors using
district level time-invariant controls.
B.1.2 Propensity Score Matching
Next, we employ propensity score matching to test the main results presented in this
chapter. This method is used when selecting a subset of comparison units similar
to the treatment units is difficult because units must be compared across several
pre-treatment characteristics. Matching is based on the concept of contrasting the
outcomes of program participants with the outcomes of ‘comparable’ non-participants
(Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). To estimate a treatment effect for each treated person,
the outcome (like wage or private employment) is compared to an average of the
outcomes for matched persons in the untreated sample. Matching on the propen-
sity score is essentially a weighting scheme, which assigns a higher weight to similar
comparison units when computing the estimated treatment effect to ensure unbiased
estimates of the treatment (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002).
This method is particularly attractive in cases like NREGA as it allows us to match
observations across multiple dimensions. We know that the program was implemented
in the early districts based on the poverty criteria. Zimmermann (2012) notes that the
criteria for selecting the first 200 poorest districts and the subsequent 130 districts was
based on a backwardness index created by the Planning Commission of India in 2003.
This included agricultural wage, fraction of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
in the population of a district, the fraction of agricultural workers, the poverty head-
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count ratio and agricultural productivity per worker. I use these district level criteria
to match treatment districts with control districts using non-replacement matching
with the nearest neighbor and keep only matched districts.
Correspondingly, the number of districts with a common support reduces from 289 in
the original estimation to 267 in the matched estimation. Further, the median bias
reduces from 32 percent (in the unmatched sample) to 6 percent (in the matched
sample).
Figure B.1 shows the histogram for the estimated propensity score for the treatment
and control districts. I find that the first bin of treated districts has no comparison
units and there are fewer controls that are matched to treatment districts in bins
0.7 to 1. The matching estimation will therefore, drop the treatment districts that
do not have comparable control districts. Table B.2 provides the summary statistics
for the controls after matching and Table B.3 provides the changes in the number of
individual observations before and after matching.
Table B.4 presents the regression results for equation 2.1 and equation 2.2 for real
wages, public and private employment. All regressions include district and individual
controls. In addition, district and year-quarter fixed effects have been applied to
all specifications. The triple difference coefficient for real wages continues to remain
positive and significant at the 5 percent level. This is similar to results in table 2.5.
Further, on comparing the double difference coefficients, we find that wages increased
by around 5 percent in non-landlord districts and fell by around 3 percent in landlord
districts. However, these results are not statistically significant. This shows that
wages in non-landlord districts rose differentially in comparison to landlord districts.
However, contrary to earlier results, there is an increase in public employment in land-
lord districts which is significant at the 5 percent level. The corresponding increase for
non-landlord districts is also statistically significant but the magnitude of increase is
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(0.8 percentage points) is less than that in landlord districts (1.2 percentage points).
This shows that if we restrict the study to 267 districts which are matched on poverty
indicators, we find that there is an increase in time spent in public employment in
landlord districts. However, this increase in public employment is not sufficient to
increase the bargaining position of workers as we do not see any wage increase in
landlord districts. Therefore, our central conclusion that landlords can keep wages
depressed using their market power as the provision of NREGA may not be sufficient
to provide workers with a credible alternative, continues to hold.
Finally, private employment has fallen by around 2.5 percentage points in non-
landlord districts (significant at the 1 percent level) while it has increased by around
one percentage point in landlord districts which is not statistically significant. This
is similar to results in table 2.7. These results show that even when we control for all
baseline factors that may have contributed to a district’s inclusion in the treatment
group, the differences between the impact of NREGA in landlord and non- landlord
districts remains significant. The institution of zamindari continues to play a major
role in determining the success of NREGA. Districts that did not have this exploita-
tive system continued to show greater improvement in rural wages under NREGA in
comparison to landlord districts.
B.1.3 Excluding states based on Land Revenue System and Land Re-
forms
In this section we re-estimate equation 2.1 and equation 2.2 for rural wages, public
and private employment by excluding states which had exclusively landlord-based
system and those that had some successful land reform attempts.
States in north and eastern India like Bihar, Jharkhand and West Bengal were charac-
terized exclusively by landlord-based revenue system. Excluding these states should
not alter the results for non-landlord districts in the difference-in-differences estima-
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tion. Further, removing these states would also check whether our triple difference
estimators are driven by few northern states without any non-landlord districts. This
would ensure that state-level factors like differences in the administrative capacity
and political commitment of states to NREGA are not responsible for the differen-
tial impact of NREGA in non-landlord districts. We will first re-estimate our main
regressions with the exclusion of Bihar and Rajasthan from the sample.
Our original regressions included 45 districts from Bihar and Jharkhand which con-
tributed to over 30 percent of our sample for landlord districts. Table B.5 reports
the results for the full specifications (all controls and fixed effects) for our regres-
sions for rural wages, public and private employment. As expected, the results for
the impact of NREGA on non-landlord districts remains unchanged. Further, the
results for landlord districts also show the same pattern as before. The provision of
NREGA continues to be weak in landlord districts which attenuates its wage and pri-
vate employment impact. Finally, the differential impact of NREGA on the wages of
non-landlord districts also show an increase of 6 percent. Since Bihar and Jharkhand
created the least NREGA employment, this reduction in our regression coefficient by
2 percentage points (in comparison to the complete sample in Table 2.5) shows that
the provision of public employment under NREGA drives its labor market impact
in rural wages and private employment. Therefore, our mechanism for the impact
of NREGA being attenuated in landlord districts due to lower provision of NREGA
employment is further validated by these results.
Next, we turn to the eastern state of West Bengal which was also placed under the
landlord-based revenue system. However, post-independence this state together with
the southern state of Kerala witnessed some land reform attempts by the state gov-
ernments. As a consequence of these land reform attempts, land ceiling was enacted,
and land was distributed to landless workers. This could potentially reduce the effect
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of historical inequalities on the functioning of NREGA. In this section, we exclude
these states from our sample and re-estimate the model in Section 2.5.
As can be seen from table B.6, the exclusion of states like West Bengal and Kerala
which witnessed partial land reforms after independence also does not alter the main
results of this chapter. We report the results for the difference-in-differences and triple
difference estimators using the complete specifications including district and individ-
ual controls and fixed effects. As can be seen from Panel A of the table, NREGA has
a positive and statistically significant impact on rural wages in non-landlord districts.
Since there is no impact of NREGA in landlord districts, the differential impact of
NREGA in non-landlord districts measured by the triple difference estimator is round
8 percent which is similar to the results in section 2.5.
Panel B of Table B.6 discusses changes in public employment in this sample. We see
that both landlord and non-landlord districts witness an increase in time spent in
NREGA employment. However, this increase is landlord districts is not enough to
cause an increase in rural wages and crowding-out of private employment which is
seen in non-landlord districts (Panel C).
Therefore, our results are robust to different specifications and continue to hold even
when states which were exclusively landlord based and those which witnessed some
land reform post-independence are excluded from the sample.
B.2 Creation of Variables
B.2.1 District Boundaries and Date of Conquest
In their data appendix, Banerjee and Iyer (2005) provide detailed information on the
date of conquest by the British and historical land revenue system instituted in these
districts. However, over time these district boundaries were changed significantly. The
geographical boundaries of districts under colonial rule are significantly different from
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those today as districts have been divided, renamed, or merged with other districts.
Kumar and Somanathan (2009) document the changes in district boundaries from
1961 to 2001. Using these changes in district boundaries over time, we create a panel
of 289 rural districts with data on land revenue system. Districts for which data
was ambiguous or unclear were verified using sources like government websites and
if the ambiguity could not be resolved, then those districts were dropped from the
sample. Further, data on the date of conquest by the British is an important control
as Banerjee and Iyer (2005) show that regions that fell under British rule before 1820
were highly fertile and witnessed greater exploitation and plunder. We also include
the date of British colonial conquest as a control in our estimations.
B.2.2 Productivity of workers and rainfall
Data on productivity per worker is constructed using data on output for nine major
crops and their prices published by the Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India.
These crops include bajra, gram, jowar, maize, ragi, rice, wheat, arhar and barley for
2004-2005. In addition, the prices are taken from the website of the annual tables
on district-level prices compiled by the Ministry of Agriculture. If data on price
for any crop is missing for any particular district, we use the state level average as
the price for crops in that district. Data on annual rainfall comes from the rainfall
data set, Terrestrial Air Temperature and Precipitation: Monthly and Annual Time
Series (1970-2010) prepared by the Center for Climatic Research at the University
of Delaware. We create long term means using quarterly data from 1970 - 2010 and
calculate the normalized quarterly deviation from this long term mean.
B.2.3 Poverty Headcount Ratio
Data on poverty headcount-ratio comes from the Consumption Expenditure Survey
of the 61st Round of NSSO data (2004 - 2005). We use state level poverty lines using
the monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) reported in the data. We construct
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estimates of the proportion of people living below the state level poverty line for
every district using the Uniform Recall Period (URP).
B.3 Dropping of Central Province as Non-landlord Districts
In this section we test whether the results would hold after dropping the districts as
suggested by Iversen et al. (2013). The 18 districts of the Central Provinces today
account for around 31 districts according to the 2001 Census which accounts for
over 10 percent of the sample. Since there are conceptual reasons why the Iversen
et al. (2013) objection may not hold, we do not re-classify the districts. However,
our results should not be driven by observations from these districts, therefore we
drop them from our sample in the estimation below. The results below show that
the primary result of this chapter that the wage effect of NREGA is attenuated in
landlord districts holds. However, dropping the districts does change the coefficient
for time spent in public employment in landlord districts. The results for rural wages,
public and private employment are shown below.
From table B.7 we can see that even after dropping districts in Central Provinces
(CP), wages in landlord districts remain depressed and in non-landlord districts they
increase. This is similar to the main results of the chapter in table 2.5 Turning
next to public employment in table B.8, we see that our results for landlord districts
change in comparison to the results of table 2.6. After we drop the 31 districts in
Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, we find that public employment
in landlord districts increases significantly by around 1.2 percentage points which is
statistically significant. While the increase in public employment in landlord districts
is not sufficient to increase wages, which is the major argument of this chapter,
the changes in public employment shown in table B.8 suggest the need for future
investigation on the subject.
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Finally, we discuss private employment in table B.9. We find that on comparison
with the results of table 2.7, private employment does not change after incorporating
the changes suggested by Iversen et al. (2013). Therefore, there is no crowding-out of
private employment in landlord districts which is consistent with results in table B.8
which show that wages in landlord districts do not rise post-NREGA. Therefore,
large landlords do not reduce their labor demand as they can keep wages depressed.
Alternatively, in non-landlord districts we see that there is crowding-out of private
employment as wages rise. These results show that the main argument of this chapter,
that the labor market impact of NREGA is attenuated in landlord districts, continues
to hold.
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Figure B.1: Distribution of Propensity Scores across NREGA Districts
Table B.1: Placebo Treatment Between Landlord and Non Landlord Districts in the
Dry Season
VARIABLES Ln Deflated Wage Public Employment Private Employment
(1) (2) (3)
NREGxNLxpost -0.0122 -0.374 -0.849
(0.0690) (0.287) (2.071)
NREGxpost 0.0346 0.229 -2.415
(0.0531) (0.275) (1.587)
NLxpost -0.0570 0.188 2.836*
(0.0539) (0.192) (1.645)
Observations 16,030 116,521 116,521
R-squared 0.522 0.031 0.185
District FE YES YES YES
Year-Quarter FE YES YES YES
District Controls x post YES YES YES
Individual Controls YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Each column reports the results for a separate triple difference regression. Column (1) reports the re-
sults for log of deflated casual wages when the dummy for post equals 1 for 2004-2005 and similarly, col-
umn (2) and column (3) report the results for public employment and private employment respectively. The
natural log of daily wages are deflated using the monthly, state-level price index for rural laborers from the
Indian Labor Bureau. Data on employment is calculated using the 55th Round (pre-period) and the 61th
Round (post-period) of NSSO data. The NSSO collects data over four sub-rounds in a year and the last two
sub-rounds (January to June) comprises of the dry season and the other two quarters are the rainy season.
We use weights proportional to the district population and all district level time-invariant controls are inter-
acted with a dummy for the post period. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.
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Table B.2: Matched District Level Controls
Variable Treatment Control p-value
(1) (2) (3)
Ln Agricultural Wage 3.41 3.39 0.92
Fraction SC 0.17 0.18 0.61
Fraction ST 0.15 0.14 0.92
Fraction Agricultural Labor 0.52 0.54 0.15
Fraction Below Poverty 0.32 0.30 0.45
District Observations 95 174
Individual Observations 55672 27916
Note: This Table shows the mean values of matched district level controls used in all estimations. Col-
umn 1 and 2 present the mean values of controls for non-landlord and landlord districts respectively. Col-
umn (3) presents the p-values of the student’s t-test of equality of means in columns 1 and 2. The Em-
ployment and Unemployment Survey is used for calculating labor force participation variables and the Con-
sumption Expenditure Survey is used for calculating the proportion of population below poverty line. Pro-
portion of population comes from Census 2001 and productivity per worker (normalized) is calculated using
data on output and prices from the Ministry of Agriculture and number of agricultural workers from NSSO.
Table B.3: Individual Observations before and after Matching
Panel A. Before Matching
Land Revenue System Control Treatment
Landlord 16,983 1,04,478
Non landlord 65,008 61,680
Total 81,991 1,66,158
Panel B. After Matching





Table B.4: Propensity Score Matching: Effect of NREGA on Rural Labor Markets
in the dry season
Landlord DD Non Landlord DD Triple Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Ln Casual Wage
NREGxNLxpost 0.148**
(0.0614)




Observations 10,015 10,939 20,954
R-squared 0.402 0.597 0.509
Panel B. Public Employment
NREGxNLxpost -0.308
(0.649)




Observations 57,276 55,286 112,344
R-squared 0.057 0.078 0.062
Panel C. Private Employment
NREGxNLxpost -2.264
(1.903)




Observations 57,276 55,068 112,344
R-squared 0.292 0.292 0.291
Year-Quarter FE YES YES YES
District Controls x post YES YES YES
Individual Controls YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This table shows the impact of NREGA on rural labor markets using propensity score matching.
Panel A, Panel B and Panel C report the regression results for log of agricultural wage (deflated), public
employment and private employment respectively. Each column presents results from a separate specifica-
tion and includes only districts matched on five criteria of backwardness identified by the Planning Commis-
sion in 2003. All rates are calculated using the 61st and 64th Round of NSSO data which is spread over
four sub-rounds in a year. All regressions are estimated for the dry season. All regressions include dis-
trict controls mentioned in Table (1) and individual controls mentioned in Table (4). In addition, each spec-
ification includes year quarter and district fixed effects. Re-weighted sampling weights provided by NSS0
are used in these regressions and robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.
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Table B.5: Labor Market Effects of NREGA excluding Bihar and Jharkhand
Landlord DD Non Landlord DD Triple Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Ln Casual Wage
NREGxNLxpost 0.143**
(0.0634)




Observations 6,816 10,490 17,306
R-squared 0.417 0.592 0.528
Panel B. Public Employment
NREGxNLxpost 0.285
(0.790)




Observations 41,545 59,458 100,777
R-squared 0.073 0.107 0.083
Panel C. Private Employment
NREGxNLxpost -3.184
(2.311)




Observations 41,545 59,232 100,777
R-squared 0.256 0.281 0.269
Year-Quarter FE YES YES YES
District Controls x post YES YES YES
Individual Controls YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This table shows the impact of NREGA on rural labor markets excluding the states of Bihar and
Jharkhand. Panel A, Panel B and Panel C report the regression results for ln of rural casual wage (de-
flated), public employment and private employment respectively. Each column presents results from a sepa-
rate specification and includes only districts matched on five criteria of backwardness identified by the Plan-
ning Commission in 2003. All rates are calculated using the 61st and 64th Round of NSSO data which is
spread over four sub-rounds in a year. All regressions are estimated for the dry season. All regressions in-
clude district controls mentioned in Table (1) and individual controls mentioned in Table (4). In addition,
each specification includes year quarter and district fixed effects. Re-weighted sampling weights provided by
NSS0 are used in these regressions and robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.
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Table B.6: Labor Market Effects of NREGA excluding West Bengal and Kerala
Landlord DD Non Landlord DD Triple Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Ln Casual Wage
NREGxNLxpost 0.190***
(0.0700)




Observations 7,053 9,910 16,963
R-squared 0.426 0.552 0.499
Panel B. Public Employment
NREGxNLxpost 0.303
(1.002)




Observations 46,322 55,862 101,972
R-squared 0.074 0.110 0.083
Panel C. Private Employment
NREGxNLxpost -2.771
(2.557)




Observations 46,322 55,650 101,972
R-squared 0.277 0.274 0.274
Year-Quarter FE YES YES YES
District Controls x post YES YES YES
Individual Controls YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This table shows the impact of NREGA on rural labor markets excluding the states of West Bengal
and Kerala. Panel A, Panel B and Panel C report the regression results for ln of rural casual wage (de-
flated), public employment and private employment respectively. Each column presents results from a sepa-
rate specification and includes only districts matched on five criteria of backwardness identified by the Plan-
ning Commission in 2003. All rates are calculated using the 61st and 64th Round of NSSO data which is
spread over four sub-rounds in a year. All regressions are estimated for the dry season. All regressions in-
clude district controls mentioned in Table (9) and individual controls mentioned in Table (3). In addition,
each specification includes year quarter and district fixed effects. Re-weighted sampling weights provided by
NSS0 are used in these regressions and robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.
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Table B.7: Changes in Ln Deflated Wages Between Landlord and Non Landlord Districts using Iversen el al. (2013) classification
DD: NREGA by Landlord Districts DD: NREGA by Non Landlord Districts DDD: By NREGA and Non Landlord
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
NREGxNLxpost 0.179*** 0.152** 0.158**
(0.0618) (0.0633) (0.0685)
NREGxpost -0.0669 -0.0285 -0.0205 0.112*** 0.0629** 0.0636** -0.0671 -0.0515 -0.0515
(0.0499) (0.0611) (0.0683) (0.0368) (0.0306) (0.0293) (0.0496) (0.0555) (0.0626)
NLxpost -0.117** -0.0851 -0.113*
(0.0503) (0.0583) (0.0648)
Observations 7,679 7,679 7,675 10,940 10,492 10,490 18,619 18,171 18,165
R-squared 0.283 0.293 0.353 0.449 0.459 0.592 0.395 0.401 0.503
District FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year-Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District Controls NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES
Individual Controls NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This Table shows results for three panels. Columns (1) - (3) show results of a difference-in-differences for landlord districts, columns (4) - (6)
for non-landlord districts and columns (7) - (9) show results of a triple difference. Each column presents results from a separate specification. Ln Daily
wages are deflated using the monthly, state-level price index for rural laborers from the Indian Labor Bureau. Data on on employment is calculated us-
ing the 61st Round (pre-period) and the 64th Round (post-period) of NSSO data. I use weights proportional to the district population and all dis-
trict level time-invariant controls are interacted with a dummy for the post period. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.
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Table B.8: Changes in Public Employment Between Landlord and Non Landlord Districts using Iversen el al. (2013) classification
DD: NREGA by Landlord Districts DD: NREGA by Non Landlord Districts DDD: By NREGA and Non Landlord
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
NREGxNLxpost 1.033 0.884 0.900
(0.725) (0.764) (0.775)
NLxpost -0.168 -0.433 -0.415
(0.137) (0.271) (0.276)
NREGxpost 0.186 1.246*** 1.245*** 1.219* 0.936** 0.936** 0.186 0.372 0.372
(0.191) (0.453) (0.464) (0.700) (0.396) (0.396) (0.191) (0.414) (0.424)
Observations 52,134 52,134 52,002 63,067 59,458 59,458 115,201 111,592 111,234
R-squared 0.024 0.029 0.032 0.099 0.107 0.107 0.066 0.069 0.071
District FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year-Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District Conp NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES
Individual Controls NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This Table shows results for three panels. Columns (1) - (3) show results of a difference-in-differences for landlord districts, columns (4) - (6)
for non-landlord districts and columns (7) - (9) show results of a triple difference. Each column presents results from a separate specification. Log
Daily wages are deflated using the monthly, state-level price index for rural laborers from the Indian Labor Bureau. Data on on employment is calcu-
lated using the 61st Round (pre-period) and the 64th Round (post-period) of NSSO data. I use weights proportional to the district population and all
district level time-invariant controls are interacted with a dummy for the post period. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.
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Table B.9: Changes in Private Employment Between Landlord and Non Landlord Districts using Iversen el al. (2013) classifi-
cation
DD: NREGA by Landlord Districts DD: NREGA by Non Landlord Districts DDD: By NREGA and Non Landlord
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
NREGxNLxpost -2.774 -2.243 -2.198
(2.282) (2.575) (2.286)
NLxpost 0.980 1.180 1.637
(1.902) (2.092) (1.776)
NREGxpost -0.211 -0.898 -0.543 -2.984** -3.593*** -2.927** -0.211 -1.111 -0.574
(1.928) (2.843) (2.423) (1.230) (1.202) (1.146) (1.923) (2.392) (2.076)
Observations 52,134 52,134 52,002 63,067 59,458 59,232 115,201 111,592 111,234
R-squared 0.022 0.024 0.284 0.032 0.034 0.281 0.028 0.030 0.281
District FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year-Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District Controlsp NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES
Individual Controls NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This Table shows results for three panels. Columns (1) - (3) show results of a difference-in-differences for landlord districts, columns (4) - (6)
for non-landlord districts and columns (7) - (9) show results of a triple difference. Each column presents results from a separate specification. Log
Daily wages are deflated using the monthly, state-level price index for rural laborers from the Indian Labor Bureau. Data on on employment is calcu-
lated using the 61st Round (pre-period) and the 64th Round (post-period) of NSSO data. I use weights proportional to the district population and all
district level time-invariant controls are interacted with a dummy for the post period. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level.
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